Mitigation Research

Scaling Novel Carbon Dioxide Removal: Strategy Report

Summary

What is carbon dioxide removal, and why is it important?

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods remove CO₂from the atmosphere and durably store the carbon in other carbon pools, such as the ocean, soils, or underground reservoirs. Conventional methods, such as afforestation, are already deployed at scale. Novel methods, such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), and enhanced rock weathering (ERW), are largely undeployed.

CDR can reduce net emissions and, in the long term, undo lingering historical emissions (also known as “legacy emissions”). It can also hedge against three distinct risks:

It provides optionality if hard-to-abate sectors or countries fail to decarbonize.
It offers a way to respond to a stronger climate system reaction to emissions than typical forecasts suggest.
It might enable reversing global warming.

How much CDR is needed, and how far off track is deployment today?

Total CDR in 2025 was 2.2 billion metric tons of CO₂ (tCO₂), of which almost all (99.95%) came from re-/afforestation. A reanalysis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios suggests that 5.5-9.4 billion tons of CDR per year is required by 2050 to limit warming to 2°C (>67% probability) by 2100. Conventional methods cannot close this gap on their own because of land competition and reversal risks, so we think it is important to scale up novel CDR methods.
How could efforts to scale CDR reduce greenhouse gas concentrations?

Carbon removal is a public good, so demand for it has to be created rather than discovered. The voluntary carbon market has driven most novel CDR demand to date, but we expect it to remain fragile and limited in scale. Larger volumes are more likely to come from compliance mechanisms such as emissions trading systems and from integrating CDR into existing industrial policies in sectors such as agriculture, mining, and wastewater.

The incentive type best suited for a given CDR method depends on measurability. Credit-based systems rely on ton-for-ton claims and therefore require durable CDR methods with precise monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV). Sectoral integration and industrial policies often do not, which makes them promising sources of demand for CDR methods where MRV costs are high.

What do our findings suggest are the most promising philanthropic sub-strategies for scaling CDR?

Based on our evaluation of scale, feasibility, and funding need, we think the most promising philanthropic sub-strategies are creating demand for CDR through compliance mechanisms and/or alternative demand mechanisms, and improving MRV and setting standards for novel CDR, especially for open-system processes. We think that demand generation, MRV, and standards are important and solvable barriers to scaling CDR. We may also support efforts to advance research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of novel CDR, especially for methods with the potential to bring down the cost of CDR that are otherwise unlikely to receive funding.

Is there room for more funding?

We think there is substantial room for more funding to scale CDR. Our understanding from conversations with funders and experts is that funding is declining. Major donors have exited the space since 2024, and several smaller funders have retreated without a public announcement.

Most CDR funding has supported science and innovation rather than demand creation, MRV, or standards. Conventional climate funders often do not support novel CDR at all, which we attribute to risk aversion, concerns that this work could reduce or delay mitigation, and the absence of an institutional home for CDR within their portfolios.

Are there major co-benefits or potential risks?

Depending on the method and demand pathway used, CDR has co-benefits for biodiversity, economic development, and agricultural yields. At the same time, CDR can create a mitigation deterrence risk, especially if policies and sectors rely on CDR to decarbonize but removals underperform. CDR-dependent mitigation pathways are also at risk of policy reversal, unlike abatement strategies that can create technological lock-in. Large-scale deployment could also compete for land and energy, which requires strong governance.

What are the key uncertainties and open questions?

While we think CDR is an important component of climate change mitigation, we are uncertain about the feasibility of growing CDR deployment, partially due to the unknown price floor of CDR. We are also uncertain how much demand sectoral integration can generate. Untapped demand opportunities likely exist within existing industries, though their aggregate scale is uncertain. We think this uncertainty can be resolved through philanthropic support for feasibility research.

Our most fundamental uncertainty is that CDR may be least available in a future where it matters most. Since CDR is largely a public good, scaling it depends on sustained climate ambition. As a result, CDR is most feasible in a future which has only few remaining emissions. In futures with high warming, additional mitigation is more important but CDR is less likely to get political support. We are uncertain how much this tension weakens the case for CDR as a risk management strategy.

What is the bottom line, and what are the next steps?

Given the gap between required and projected CDR, the declining level of philanthropic funding, and the role CDR plays in managing climate risk, we think it is important to direct more philanthropic funding toward scaling CDR.

We recommend that philanthropists consider funding organizations that are working to address the challenges outlined in this report and consider grants aligned with the strategies we have laid out.

The findings in this report will inform the grantmaking strategy for the Giving Green Fund. Therefore, donors interested in progressing this work can choose to donate directly to the Giving Green Fund.

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This report was last updated in October 2026.

This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

Questions and comments are welcome at hello@givinggreen.earth.

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What Is Carbon Dioxide Removal?

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) refers to strategies that remove carbon dioxide (CO₂) from the atmosphere and durably store the carbon in other carbon pools, such as the ocean, soils, buildings, or underground reservoirs. To classify as CDR, the captured CO₂must come from the atmosphere (not from point sources), the subsequent storage must be durable, and the removal must result from human interventions that are additional to Earth’s natural processes.¹

There are multiple CDR methods, each with different advantages, disadvantages, and technology readiness levels (TRLs). Conventional CDR methods, such as afforestation, improved forest management, and wetland restoration, are already well-established and regularly implemented at scale. Novel methods such as direct air capture and storage (DACCS), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), and enhanced weathering are relatively new and limited in deployment.²

This report discusses the potential of scaling CDR as a climate change mitigation strategy and informs climate philanthropists on how to enable CDR to scale up, with a focus on novel methods. It will evaluate technical and policy pathways for CDR to scale, discuss current barriers to scaling, and assess philanthropic strategies to best address them.

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Difference between CDR and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS)

This report is about CDR, not carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS). These two terms are frequently conflated, but are distinct climate solutions. CDR draws CO₂ from the air and stores it durably, while CCUS refers to capturing CO₂ at a concentrated point source (such as a smokestack) before it is emitted, and then using or storing it. CCUS reduces the flow of new emissions but does not reduce the existing atmospheric CO₂ stock.

CCUS can be a component of CDR. For example, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is a CDR method in which plants absorb CO₂ from the atmosphere, and the CO₂ is then captured at thermal power stations equipped with CCUS when the biomass is combusted.

We discuss CCUS as an emissions-reduction technology in our sector report on industry decarbonization.

Role of CDR in Climate Change Mitigation

Unlike other climate change mitigation strategies, CDR does not address the sources of greenhouse gas emissions. While reducing emissions is paramount to meeting climate targets, global warming scenarios often rely in part on CDR to achieve them. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) includes CDR as a “key element” in scenarios that limit global warming to 2°C with at least a 67% likelihood, even if global emissions decline toward zero.³

Reducing Net Emissions and Achieving Negative Emissions

Because CDR can reduce atmospheric CO₂ without reducing emissions, it can play three roles in climate change mitigation.

In the near term, CDR can help reduce net greenhouse gas emissions.
In the medium term, CDR can counterbalance residual emissions (especially from hard-to-abate sectors like aviation) to achieve net-zero emissions before some sectors have fully decarbonized.⁴
In the long term, CDR can help achieve net-negative emissions, thereby removing legacy CO₂ from the atmosphere.⁵

These three roles are visualized in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Stylized role of CDR in mitigation strategies. CDR first reduces net emissions (1), then counterbalances residual emissions (2), followed by negative emissions (3). IPCC, 2022. [6]

CDR as a Risk Management Strategy

We think that scaling CDR holds three advantages as a philanthropic strategy, each of which hedges against a different risk in climate change mitigation.⁷ The first concerns whether comprehensive greenhouse gas emissions abatement across all sectors is likely to occur or even feasible (optionality), the second concerns how strongly the Earth system responds to existing carbon stocks in the atmosphere (climate sensitivity), and the third concerns whether temperature reversal is possible after a temperature threshold considered ‘dangerous’ has been breached (overshoot reversal).

Optionality: Compensating for hard-to-abate sectors and countries

CDR provides optionality when other strategies to address emissions fail.⁸ If some sectors or countries do not decarbonize, deployment of CDR provides an option to achieve global net-zero or net-negative emissions regardless. From a risk management perspective, the breadth of CDR options offers a hedge against decarbonization derailment risks, where decarbonization stalls because of reduced political ambition or technical infeasibility.⁹ We think the optionality argument is particularly salient for aviation, where available mitigation options can be more expensive than CDR.¹⁰

We extend this reasoning to non-abatement by states rather than sectors. For example, fossil-fuel-rich economies with cheap and stable oil supplies have a reduced incentive to decarbonize.

Climate sensitivity: Hedging against a stronger-than-median Earth-system response

CDR provides a way to address unacceptable climate change risks that persist even if decarbonization progresses. Climate science and policy are often aimed at stabilizing the concentration of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHGs), but this goal assumes that (a) a safe level of elevated GHG concentrations exists and can be sustained, and (b) that it is possible to predict this level despite uncertainty in the climate system.¹¹ “Preventive” CDR capacity can be used to hedge against the risks associated with a stronger-than-median Earth system response to cumulative emissions.¹²

We should note a few nuances around the use of preventive CDR:

Building preventive CDR for risk mitigation leaves less room to counterbalance hard-to-abate emissions. Since there can be sustainability limits to CDR, using preventive CDR underscores the importance of near-term emissions reductions even in hard-to-abate sectors.¹³
Avoiding CDR dependence is itself prudent risk management. Planning around optimistic CDR assumptions may delay abatement and produce worse outcomes if climate sensitivity turns out to be high and CDR feasibility turns out to be low.¹⁴ Climate policy should not deprioritize abatement by assuming that large-scale CDR will become feasible, but instead invest in preventive CDR for scenarios with high climate sensitivity or for its option value.

Overshoot reversal: Reducing long-term atmospheric CO₂ levels

CDR could allow for warming to be reversed rather than merely halted, which matters especially for outcomes beyond this century. The IPCC's third role for CDR is achieving and sustaining net-negative emissions in the long term by deploying removals above the level of residual emissions.¹⁵ Long-term temperature reversal has several benefits over mere stabilization, such as for sea level rise and feedback loops from soil carbon decomposition.¹⁶ From the lens of socioeconomic impacts and adaptation, reversing global temperatures becomes more important the higher the value one places on the well-being of future generations.¹⁷ We think choosing a low discount rate is morally defensible because of the principle of impartiality: the time at which people are alive should not affect the value of their happiness.¹⁸

We should note that reducing temperatures may not undo all previous damage. A world that reverses overshoot is expected to differ from one that avoids it in several ways. Some damages, such as sea-level rise and biodiversity loss, are effectively irreversible on human timescales. Moreover, regional climates do not necessarily return to their original equilibrium if global temperature does, and adaptation options foregone at higher warming levels may not be recoverable. Temperature reversal may itself fail to materialize due to climate response uncertainty, such as feedback mechanisms that could accelerate warming.¹⁹

Levels of CDR Required in Mitigation Pathways

Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C rely substantially on CDR. A secondary analysis of IPCC scenarios finds that pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C rely on 9.3 billion tons of CDR (interquartile range: 11.5-7.6) per year by 2050 (Table 1). For comparison, total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 were about 61 billion metric tons of CO₂-equivalent emissions (tCO₂e), and total CDR in 2025 was roughly 2.2 billion tons of CO₂ (tCO₂), which came almost entirely (99.95%) from reforestation and afforestation.²⁰ This mismatch implies that CDR needs to grow approximately fivefold to reach the 2050 target, despite scalability limits of conventional methods due to land availability and reversibility.²¹ As a consequence, novel CDR methods—which are now in their infancy—will need to grow to a scale of billions of tons at an ambitious rate (Table 2).²²

Table 1: Total CDR deployment in IPCC-assessed mitigation pathways (billion tCO2 per year, median [interquartile range]).

Source: Ganti et al. (2024), Table 1, “CDR (direct)” row.

Table 2: Novel CDR deployment in IPCC-assessed mitigation pathways (billion tCO₂ per year, median [interquartile range])

Source: Ganti et al. (2024), Table 1, “Novel CDR” row.

Scenarios by other research groups find similar orders of magnitude for CDR. ClimateWorks’ 2023 scenario to limit warming to 1.5°C with limited temperature overshoot scales CDR to 10.2 billion tons per year by 2050, of which 71% comes from novel methods.²⁵ Its 2026 least-cost mitigation pathway lands at 6.0 billion tons of CDR per year by 2050.²⁶ The Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) relies on roughly 12 billion tons per year in 2050 to limit warming to 1.5°C, or 3.5 billion tons to limit warming to 2°C.²⁷

Limiting warming to 1.5°C may be an unrealistic goal given current warming and emissions levels. Hence, our best guess based on the estimates above is that at least 5.5-9.4 billion tons of CDR are required by 2050 annually to limit global warming to 2°C (>67% probability) by 2100.²⁸ Compared to today’s CDR levels, this leaves a gap of roughly 3.3-7.2 billion tons per year.²⁹

We think it is very unlikely that this CDR scenario or more ambitious ones will materialize without additional support by governments, research organizations, and the private sector to set more ambitious targets, drive demand, and advance research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) projects, especially for novel CDR. We therefore think there is an important role for philanthropy to accelerate development and deployment of novel CDR by advocating for more ambitious policies and supporting initiatives that close knowledge gaps.

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¹ As explained in section 1.2 (p. 20) of the State of CDR, 2026.

² IPCC (2022), AR6, Working Group III, Chapter 12, Cross-Chapter Box 8.

³ “Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is a necessary element of mitigation portfolios to achieve net zero CO2 and GHG emissions both globally and nationally, counterbalancing residual emissions from hard-to-transition sectors such as industry, transport and agriculture. CDR is a key element in scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower, regardless of whether global emissions reach near-zero, net zero or net-negative levels.” IPCC (2022), AR6, Working Group III, Chapter 12, Cross-Chapter Box 8.

⁴ We use the term ‘counterbalance’ rather than ‘offset’ throughout this report, because removal offsets typically refer to actions outside an organizational boundaries represented by a credit, as defined by the ISO IWA 42:2022 Net zero guidelines. Counterbalancing is a broader term that can also include CDR within an organization’s boundary without the use of ton-for-ton credit logic.

⁵ The frame of removing legacy emissions is useful from an equity perspective, as it determines which countries or sectors are responsible for undoing the damage of historical emissions.

⁶ IPCC, 2022, AR6, Working Group III, Chapter 12, Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2. The timescales we use in the text (near, medium, long term) are not precise because they depend on emissions reductions, CDR ambitions, and feasibility constraints.

⁷ In our research, we treat scaling (novel) CDR as a sector of climate action comparable to addressing sector-specific emissions. For a broader discussion on climate risk management, see our sector report on climate risk management.

⁸ “In practical terms, optionality means keeping multiple pathways to decarbonisation open rather than relying on a single solution. Because the future of technologies, costs, and political conditions is uncertain, an optionality approach supports a range of promising solutions and creates the flexibility to scale those that prove most effective.” CATF, 2026

⁹ “There is also a more fundamental argument: carbon risk management. Policymakers already know that delivery of emissions targets can slip, technologies can underperform and politics can cause commitment to waver. While ensuring that removal options don’t provide a rationale to slow down gross emissions reductions, developing a portfolio of removal options offers insurance against contingencies, providing a buffer if real emissions cuts falter.” TBI, 2025, p. 9.

Derailment risk is “the risk that the journey to bring the world back into a safe operating space is derailed by interacting biophysical and socio-economic factors” Laybourn et al., 2023

¹⁰ “In the short term, the easiest non-biomass alternative we study is continued use of fossil kerosene with direct air capture and remote sequestration of CO₂. [...] In the medium term, our opinion is that renewable kerosene is likely the best alternative [...] In the long term, we believe that hydrogen produced from renewable electricity will likely provide the most sustainable and least expensive solution.” Timmons & Terwel, 2022

“Accounting for the non-CO2 impacts from aviation means the sector will not be zero emissions unless carbon dioxide removals (CDR) are included.” Bergero et al., 2023

¹¹ This argument was first proposed by Obersteiner et al. (2001) in a letter to Science.

¹² “We suggest that there is a need to prepare for an environmentally sustainable CDR capacity to hedge against long-term high-risk outcomes resulting from stronger-than-expected climate feedbacks.” Schleussner et al., 2024

¹³ “We find that this preventive CDR capacity might need to be of the order of several hundred gigatonnes of cumulative NNCE [net negative CO₂ emissions], a scale that might be just about possible within sustainable limits of CDR deployment leaving little room for CDR use for offsetting residual emissions beyond hard-to-abate sectors. This further underscores the importance of very stringent near-term emission reductions to limit long-term risks.” Schleussner et al., 2024

¹⁴ “Our scenarios indicate that [...] reliance on too optimistic future CDR feasibility creates mitigation deterrence. Early emission reductions are needed to hedge against both the risk of high CS [climate sensitivity] and the possibility of CDR deployment failure.” Schaber et al., 2024

¹⁵ IPCC, 2022, AR6, Working Group III, Chapter 12, Cross-Chapter Box 8.

¹⁶ “For global sea-level rise, we find that every 100 years of overshoot above 1.5 °C leads to an additional sea-level rise commitment of around 40 cm by 2300 (central estimate) apart from a baseline of about 80 cm without overshoot. [...] A similar pattern emerges for 2300 permafrost thaw and northern peatland warming leading to increased soil carbon decomposition and CO2 and CH4 release.” Schleussner et al., 2024

¹⁷ “Higher discount rates limit the time horizon relevant for economic adaptation decision-making to a few decades (Fig. 5b), in which case adapting to peak warming might always be preferable to adapting to a lower long-term outcome.” Schleussner et al., 2024

¹⁸ “The line of argument used by Stern to justify his low value of the utility discount rate is based on the principle of impartiality. [...] In the end, Stern does not use a zero-utility discount rate but does use a very low rate to account for a small probability that future generations may not exist.” Fleurbaey & Zuber, 2022. We think a higher-than-zero discount rate is defensible if future generations are more well-off than current generations, as the value of additional consumption will be worth less to them.

¹⁹ “Here we show that [...] risks after an overshoot are different from a world that avoids it. [...] Temperature reversal could be undercut by strong Earth-system feedbacks resulting in high near-term and continuous long-term warming. [p. 366] [...] Even if global temperatures are reversed, this is not a given for regional climatic changes. [pp. 368-369] [...] For a range of climate impacts, there is no expectation of immediate reversibility after an overshoot. This includes changes in the deep ocean, marine biogeochemistry and species abundance, land-based biomes [...] Sea levels will continue to rise for centuries to millennia even if long-term temperatures decline. [p. 369] [...] Transgressing hard adaptation limits, for example, by destroying sensitive ecosystems as a result of unbridled climate change, and high peak warming levels may render these measures unavailable under future warming reversal, reducing the available pool of adaptation measures compared with a no-overshoot case. [p. 371]” Schleussner et al., 2024

²⁰ Emissions: Climate TRACE, 2026; CDR: State of CDR, 2026, p. 11. There are large uncertainties in measuring the total flux of conventional CDR, so these numbers are not perfectly comparable.

²¹ “Conventional CDR faces different scale-up challenges including competition for land, reversibility, and weakening of the CO₂ fertilization effect as emissions fall.” State of CDR, 2026

With ‘reversibility’, we mean the risk that carbon sequestered in a biological reservoir (e.g., trees or soils) is re-released to the atmosphere through fire, drought, harvesting, land use change or other causes, undoing the removal.

²² Novel CDR, such as biochar, BECCS, and DACCS, amounted to 1.07 million tCO₂ in 2025. A gigaton is a billion tons.

²³ Figures are cost-optimizing model outputs rather than removal targets, and derive from a reanalysis of the AR6 scenarios. The three rows refer to the C1, C2, and C3 pathways used by the IPCC. Note that C2 pathways require less CDR by 2050 but more CDR by 2100 than C1 pathways because CDR is used to reverse global emissions to return to 1.5°C. Totals and components are each reported as the median across scenarios. Because the median of a sum is not the sum of medians, "CDR (direct)" does not exactly equal the sum of the novel and conventional rows.

²⁴ See footnote above.

²⁵ ClimateWorks, 2023, p. 39

²⁶ See our explainer on how we estimate mitigation potential. We derive these figures from scenario data shared by the Advisory and Insights team at ClimateWorks.

²⁷ ClimateWorks, 2023, p. 70

²⁸ Feasibility of 1.5°C target: “without very stringent climate mitigation, the first year above 1.5 °C occurs within the first 20-year period with an average warming of 1.5 °C.” Bevacqua et al., 2025
CDR needs: Based on Ganti et al. (2024), Table 1, “CDR (direct)” row, scenario C3, interquartile range.

²⁹ We calculated this gap based on CDR requirements by 2050 (Ganti et al., 2024, see previous footnote) and subtracting 2025 CDR levels (State of CDR, 2026, p. 11).

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Summary of key pathways to scale CDR

Methods: Conventional methods, such as afforestation, are already deployed at scale but face scalability limits from land competition and reversibility. Novel methods, such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and enhanced rock weathering (ERW), typically have a higher durability, fewer land constraints, but a lower technology readiness level. CDR methods with closed system boundaries allow precise and inexpensive measurement, while open-system removals must be inferred with models.
Incentives: Because CDR is a public good, demand has to be created rather than discovered. The voluntary carbon market (VCM) has driven most novel CDR demand so far, but we expect it to remain fragile and small. We think that compliance mechanisms, integration within existing industries, and government procurement are more promising routes to larger volumes.
Matching incentives to CDR methods: Credit-based systems such as compliance markets rely on ton-for-ton claims and therefore require durable methods with precise measurement. Sectoral integration and government procurement do not necessarily require ton-for-ton claims, and are therefore promising systems to scale demand for open-systems methods.

We think funders should (a) prioritize advancing novel methods over conventional methods because of lower scaling constraints and a higher funding need, and (b) enable a stronger and more reliable demand signal outside the VCM.

CDR Methods

There are multiple established conventions for categorizing CDR methods, including the perceived level of human intervention (engineered vs. natural), the durability of carbon storage (on a spectrum), the maturity of the technology (conventional vs. novel), and the system boundaries (open vs. closed systems). We think that technology maturity and system boundaries are most relevant to our strategy, so we explain these in more detail below.

By Maturity: Conventional vs. Novel CDR

Conventional CDR encompasses well-established CDR methods that are already deployed at scale and are typically reported by countries as part of their Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) activities. This category includes afforestation, reforestation, forest management, agroforestry, soil carbon sequestration in croplands and peatlands, wetland restoration, and using durable wood products.³⁰ Conventional CDR accounted for nearly all (99.95%) of CDR activity in 2025.³¹

Novel CDR is a catch-all term for all CDR methods that are not conventional, such as BECCS, DACCS, biochar, enhanced rock weathering (ERW), and all ocean-based CDR methods. Typically, novel CDR methods have a higher durability, but a lower technology readiness level (TRL).³² As a consequence, novel CDR is currently a negligible part of overall CDR (0.05%).³³

As a rough heuristic, we think philanthropists should prioritize novel CDR over conventional CDR. We think the value of marginal donations is higher in novel CDR because:

Conventional CDR—while important overall—cannot scale much further to reach global climate targets. Conventional methods face scale-up challenges that do not affect most novel methods, such as competition for limited land, reversibility (e.g., due to forest fires), and the weakening of the CO₂ fertilization effect if emissions fall in the future.³⁴ We cannot count on conventional CDR alone to reach climate targets.
Novel CDR has a higher funding need than conventional methods. In 2025, novel CDR deployment (as measured in tCO₂ sequestered) was more than 1,000 times lower than conventional CDR, and conventional methods also received more attention in CDR policies.³⁵

By Boundaries: Open Systems vs. Closed Systems

The system boundaries of CDR methods are relevant for cost and durability. In “closed system” methods, every step in the CDR process sits in an engineered boundary where the flow and storage of carbon can be measured, and reversal only occurs if there is a clear engineering failure. In “open system” methods, CDR takes place in the environment with no engineered boundary, such as soils, biomass, or the ocean. The amount of CDR cannot be precisely measured using open-system methods but must be inferred with models, and the reversal risk depends on environmental factors. Some CDR methods are hybrids between open and closed systems, with an open stage preceding a permanent boundary (e.g., BECCS). See Table 3 for a comparison between open, closed, and hybrid methods.

Table 3: Classification of CDR methods by system boundaries

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Pathways to Incentivize CDR

Scaling CDR requires that actors are willing to pay for it. We see carbon removal as a public good, which means demand has to be created rather than discovered. This section covers three main ways that CDR can be incentivized: through the voluntary carbon market, through climate policies, and by integrating CDR into existing industries.

Voluntary Carbon Market

So far, the main driver of novel CDR demand has been the voluntary carbon market (VCM), a voluntary marketplace where actors can buy and sell carbon credits to offset their greenhouse gas emissions. On the VCM, Microsoft was responsible for 82% of novel CDR credit purchases in 2025, but the company announced that it is pausing its CDR credit purchases in 2026.³⁶ In 2025, the VCM retired 8 million metric tons of CDR credits, 5% of which were from high-durability methods. However, there was considerably more demand for CDR through offtakes and commitments, which exceeded 70 million metric tons, 43% of which were high-durability.³⁷

Based on conversations we had with experts, we see the VCM as a vital precursor to grow CDR, but think that demand on the VCM itself will remain fragile and limited in scale.

Demand from Climate Policies

Climate policies can incentivize CDR by allowing it to be used to counterbalance hard-to-abate emissions. CDR can ‘piggyback’ on existing climate policies to drive demand.

We distinguish between two main policy mechanisms that drive CDR demand: carbon pricing mechanisms and standards or regulatory requirements. For example, emissions trading systems can allow CDR as a way to generate allowances (or reduce the need to purchase those), and aviation fuel mandates can allow CDR as a way to reduce the carbon intensity of fuels.³⁸

A report by BCG estimated the scale of demand that could be generated from integration in several climate policies. We show these results in Table 4.

Table 4: Potential durable CDR demand by 2050 from various climate policies (BCG, 2024)

We note that these demand estimates are uncertain, as they depend heavily on how CDR is integrated into these different policies. We also note that CDR demand from these mechanisms is not entirely counterfactual, as CDR could cannibalize abatement.

Integrating CDR Within Existing Industries and Policies

Rather than relying on climate policies, governments can incentivize CDR within existing policy frameworks. The benefit of this approach is that it provides a way to incentivize CDR even if climate ambition stalls. Additionally, it allows CDR to scale beyond compliance demand, since the demand potential from compliance markets (Table 4) is lower than the CDR requirements in CDR-reliant mitigation pathways.

Key sectors for sectoral integration are agriculture, mining, and wastewater. These industries already have experience moving large amounts of mass between carbon reservoirs. For example, agricultural policies could incentivize enhanced rock weathering on farmed lands, mining policies can incentivize capturing CO₂ during critical minerals recovery, and wastewater policies can incentivize carbon-reducing pH management practices.⁴³ While there is substantial uncertainty about the potential scale of demand generation through sectoral integrations, one analysis by BCG found that using 2% of global conservation and fertilizer subsidies can generate up to 1 billion tons per year in CDR demand through practices like biochar application and enhanced rock weathering.⁴⁴ We cover the potential scale of industrial integration in more depth in our section on evaluation key assumptions.

Government Procurement or Execution of CDR

Besides incentivizing other actors to engage in CDR through policies, governments can directly procure CDR or set up state-run CDR initiatives to meet their climate targets. Some governments, notably Sweden, Denmark, the U.S., Canada, and Switzerland, have set up CDR procurement strategies or provide operational subsidies.⁴⁵ These government programs include reverse auctions and tenders to procure a fixed volume, prize-style purchases, and operational subsidies or contracts-for-difference.

Matching Incentives to CDR Methods

The potential CDR incentives discussed above are not equally applicable to all CDR methods, as different policies will require varying durability and MRV properties. The “like-for-like” concept holds that the CDR method used to counterbalance some emissions should match the properties of these emissions. Since CO₂ has an atmospheric lifetime of thousands of years, sectors like aviation or industry should be counterbalanced with high-durability CDR methods like DACCS. Methane emissions can be counterbalanced with lower-durability CDR methods.⁴⁶

We think that credit-based systems, like compliance markets, require more durable and precise measurements, because these systems rely on ton-for-ton-based claims. Sectoral integration approaches and government procurement, however, do not have a credit-based logic and can therefore work with a wider range of methods, including open-system approaches where measurement carries more inherent uncertainty. One approach to financing CDR within these demand mechanisms is the “pay-for-practice” scheme, in which payments are linked to CDR practices rather than outcomes.

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³⁰ State of CDR, 2026, p. 30

³¹ State of CDR, 2026, p. 11

³² “These [novel] methods generally have a longer characteristic storage timescale and lower level of readiness for deployment” State of CDR, 2026, p. 30

³³ State of CDR, 2026, p. 11

³⁴ “Conventional CDR faces different scale-up challenges including competition for land, reversibility, and weakening of the CO₂ fertilization effect as emissions fall.” State of CDR, 2026, p. 13

³⁵ Deployment: Total conventional CDR, including transfers between carbon stores: 2530 million tCO₂ per year. Novel CDR: 2.04 million tCO₂ per year. 2530/2.04≈1240.
Policy attention: “Conventional CDR policy is both more prevalent and more developed across countries [than novel CDR], focusing on afforestation and reforestation.” State of CDR, 2026, p. 108

³⁶ Microsoft dominance: State of CDR, 2026, p. 108; pausing purchases: CarbonCredits.com, 2026

³⁷ State of the Voluntary Carbon Market, 2026, p. 6

³⁸ We base this distinction on BCG, 2024.

³⁹ A megaton (Mt) is equal to a million tons.

⁴⁰ A border carbon adjustment or a carbon tariff is an import tax levied based on the emissions associated with an imported good.

⁴¹ Note that using DAC to produce eSAFs does not technically count as CDR because there is no durable storage element. See the definition in the introduction.

⁴² The estimate provided by BCG only concerns CDR as a feedstock for e-SAF.

⁴³ CRSI, 2026

⁴⁴ BCG, 2024, p. 25

⁴⁵ Sweden: State of CDR, 2026, p. 62; Denmark: Carbon Herald, 2024; U.S: Carbon Gap, 2025; Canada: Carbon Herald, 2026; Switzerland: Carbon Direct, 2025.

⁴⁶ WRI, 2026

We identified five promising philanthropic sub-strategies and evaluated each sub-strategy's scale, feasibility, and funding need (see Table 5). For more information on these metrics and our research process, see Giving Green's Research Overview.

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Table 5: Scale, feasibility, and funding need of approaches nonprofits use to scale CDR

We chose to center sub-strategies with two ‘highs’ in our strategy report, while also including sub-strategies with one ‘high’ and two ‘mediums’ as supplementary sub-strategies. Based on the above evaluations, we think the most promising philanthropic sub-strategies are increasing demand for CDR through policy advocacy and market engagement, and improving MRV methods for novel CDR, especially for open-systems processes.

While we have scored other sub-strategies lower on scale, feasibility, and funding overall, we keep the door open to support sub-strategies that scored one ‘high’ and two ‘mediums’. We think there may be promising opportunities to support within these strategies that rank higher in feasibility or funding need than other opportunities in the sub-strategy.⁴⁸

Creating demand for CDR through compliance mechanisms and/or alternative demand mechanisms

Scale 🟢🟢🟢 High

Feasibility 🟡🟡⚪ Medium

Funding need 🟢🟢🟢 High

We think philanthropists should fund initiatives that can generate demand for CDR through environmental compliance mechanisms or alternative demand mechanisms via sectoral integration.

Scale: High. Our understanding is that unlocking demand for CDR is a crucial step to scale CDR. An analysis of CDR policies in G20 countries in The State of CDR found that novel CDR policies focus on building capacity by supporting supply, but pay less attention to demand and governance.⁴⁹ The lack of demand is also highlighted in countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), in which CDR targets are far below Paris-compatible scenarios and completely absent for most countries.⁵⁰ We think the importance of creating demand is even more important now that Microsoft has paused its novel CDR purchases, as it was the largest purchaser. The importance of demand was consistently raised in our expert interviews.

Feasibility: Medium. We expect a wide range in the feasibility of opportunities to support demand creation through policy. While generating demand for a public good like CDR can be challenging due to the absence of private benefits, we see promising opportunities for CDR to ‘piggyback’ on existing climate policies (especially in the European Union), or to incentivize CDR within existing industrial policies. As of 2026, the European Union is revising its emissions trading system (EU ETS), which presents an opportunity to generate CDR demand through compliance markets.⁵¹ We are also interested in sectoral integration opportunities that can be feasible in jurisdictions with lower climate ambitions.

Funding need: High. While we do not have a comprehensive overview of CDR grants, our understanding based on expert conversations is that CDR philanthropy has so far primarily supported innovation rather than demand. A funding heatmap by ClimateWorks also confirms that CDR grants by institutional funders have primarily supported “Innovation, Data & Tech.”⁵² We find that the European Union might have a particularly high funding need, since a major funder that previously focused on CDR in Europe has pivoted to a different strategy.

Our approach to creating demand has changed slightly since Giving Green’s previous CDR strategy. While our 2024 strategy already strongly supported demand creation through sectoral integration, we are now more supportive of demand from compliance mechanisms due to a window of opportunity in the European Union and reduced levels of overall funding in the CDR space.

Improving MRV and/or setting standards for novel CDR, especially for open-systems processes

Scale 🟡🟡⚪ Medium

Feasibility 🟢🟢🟢 High

Funding need 🟢🟢🟢 High

We think that philanthropists should support improving MRV methods and creating standards for CDR accounting to enable integration within demand mechanisms. This sub-strategy is especially important for open-systems methods, where MRV and accounting pose bigger challenges to scaling.

Scale: Medium. Improving MRV and standards can allow for more different CDR methods to be incentivized through demand mechanisms and allow for CDR to count toward national and international climate targets. For many novel methods, evidence of real-world performance remains nascent, and there are considerable MRV challenges.⁵³ MRV protocols are early-stage across methods, and their costs are poorly characterized.⁵⁴ Fragmented accounting methods raise costs and make results incomparable. CDR experts have called for common standards, warning that inconsistent credit quality risks a “race to the bottom.”⁵⁵ We rated this sub-strategy as ‘medium’ because we think that measurability and standards is not currently the largest barrier for scaling CDR, but we expect that better standards and MRV will enable a diversified set of CDR methods to scale once demand mechanisms exist.

Feasibility: High. We expect that developing standards and methodologies often does not require substantial capital investments or run into political opposition from incumbent industries. We think there is an important role for civil society in setting high-credibility standards that would be less ambitious if set by CDR companies or credit issuers. Civil society players are well-equipped to do so given their existing relationships with the academic community and their ability to convene suppliers, buyers, and verifiers around a shared technical question without being suspected of steering the result. We think the role of civil society is especially important for standards and policies for the industrial integration of CDR, where credit-based actors (issuers, verifiers, and marketplaces) do not have a stake in the creation of standards.

Funding need: High. Our understanding, based on conversations with several funders and CDR experts, is that climate and CDR funders do not tend to focus on MRV and standard-setting.

Funding, or advocating for governments to fund, RD&D of novel CDR approaches

Scale 🟢🟢🟢 High

Feasibility 🟡🟡⚪ Medium

Funding need 🟡🟡⚪ Medium

While we think that the funding need of RD&D (advocacy) is lower than advocating for demand and setting standards, we think that there might still be promising opportunities to support this sub-strategy.

Scale: High. We think that government or philanthropic RD&D support for CDR is important for improving our understanding of the efficacy and side effects of novel CDR methods, as well as their potential to lower mitigation costs. Several CDR methods, such as ocean fertilization, have the potential to be relatively low-cost but might not be supported by demand mechanisms due to their low TRL.⁵⁶ Supporting RD&D can help build evidence to enable later demand support from the private sector (through policy) or from governments.

Feasibility: Medium. Directly financing RD&D projects is expensive, and government funding requires building long-term political support for CDR. We see some positive indications of feasibility, however: for instance, governments in Europe and North America have provided CDR-focused research grants, and the U.S. government supports DACCS demonstration.⁵⁷

Funding need: Medium. We think that, on average, the funding need for RD&D support is lower than the sub-strategies focused on demand creation and standards. According to ClimateWorks data, institutional CDR funders have largely supported “Innovation, Data & Tech” over other enabling strategies.⁵⁸ Additionally, RD&D support has come from Frontier, which funds CDR RD&D through offtake agreements and pre-purchases and recently added a large new member to its buyers group.⁵⁹ We think that there are still promising innovation (advocacy) gaps to support in CDR, so we remain open to supporting this strategy.

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⁴⁷ RD&D = Research, Development, and Demonstration

⁴⁸ While we think public familiarity, acceptance, and support is important to give CDR the social license to scale up, we do not support this sub-strategy for the following reasons. First, we think public familiarity, acceptance, and support is currently not the primary barrier to scale-up. Second, we think that public engagement is primarily a task for governments and companies (not philanthropists) as part of their CDR strategies, as we expect that public engagement strategies are dependent on specific policies, projects, and methods.

⁴⁹ State of CDR, 2026, p. 108

⁵⁰ The 2030, 2035, and 2050 gap is 0.3, 1.2, and 5.2 billion tCO₂, respectively. “Only about one-third of countries mention novel CDR in their mid-century strategies.” State of CDR, 2026, p. 12

⁵¹ “The Commission’s intention is to purchase 250 Mt of CDR over 2031-40, hitting 48 Mt per year by 2040. [...] this will involve spending around €50 billion over the period.” Isometric, 2026

⁵² ClimateWorks, 2026, Figure 6. Note that the data year is 2024, which was a peak year for philanthropic CDR funding. Since 2024, overall CDR funding has declined substantially. See our section on room for more funding for more information.

⁵³ State of CDR, 2026, Chapter 4.

⁵⁴ “Across methods, MRV protocols are at early stages, and costs remain unclear. Comparable data on MRV costs are lacking, with only one reference, mainly based on developer estimates. While the importance of this (often overlooked) cost component is recognized, there is a pressing need for more rigorous quantitative comparisons.” State of CDR, 2026, p. 259

⁵⁵ State of CDR, 2026, Chapter 4.4.

⁵⁶ State of CDR, 2026, p. 236. We should note that ocean iron fertilization is not uncontroversial. In 2008, 191 countries signed a moratorium on major ocean fertilization projects until the risks and benefits are more clearly understood.

⁵⁷ Research grants: State of CDR, 2026, p. 38; DACCS demonstration: Carbon Gap, 2025

⁵⁸ ClimateWorks, 2026, Figure 6. Note that the data year is 2024, which was a peak year for philanthropic CDR funding. Since 2024, overall CDR funding has declined substantially. See our section on room for more funding for more information.

⁵⁹ “Frontier Climate adds Anthropic to buyers group, makes new financing pledge.” ESGDive, 2026

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Based on our prioritized sub-strategies, we developed a high-level theory of change (Figure 2) for how philanthropic actors can scale CDR. Theories of change enable us to better understand the pathways of influence, the likelihood of each pathway, and the avenues of greatest impact for philanthropic and civil society efforts.

We evaluate the main assumptions underlying the theory of change and rate our certainty in each as low, medium, or high.⁶⁰ Our assessment is based on both primary and secondary evidence, as well as our general impression of the assumption’s plausibility.

Figure 2: Theory of change diagram for scaling novel carbon dioxide removal

Evaluating Key Assumptions

Nonprofit advocacy can increase novel CDR ambitions within existing climate and industrial policies (medium certainty)

For nonprofit advocacy to meaningfully increase novel CDR ambitions within existing climate and industrial policies, policymakers must be open to integrating CDR within existing policies, and advocacy efforts must counterfactually increase ambitions.

Even though current country pledges on CDR are insufficient to reach Paris-compatible scenarios, we see promising signs of policymaker interest in CDR.⁶¹ For example, the European Commission announced plans to auction 250 million metric tons of ETS allowances to purchase an equivalent amount of CDR credits.⁶² In the U.S., a $1.2 billion USD DACCS program continues to be partially supported by the Department of Energy despite drastic cuts in support for climate programs.⁶³

We think that nonprofits can increase government CDR ambitions, but doing so will require either building long-term policy support or exploiting windows of opportunity. We consider global government support for CDR to be low, though we think there is considerable room for nonprofits to either capitalize on emerging policy windows that could enable additional CDR support or build support for CDR in the long term across the political spectrum.⁶⁴

We have high certainty that efforts to include CDR within the EU ETS remain counterfactually valuable. While it is very likely that the 2026-2027 EU ETS revision will include some provisions for CDR, we think there is an important role for nonprofits to ensure that ambitions are protected or raised, that political actors support proposed reforms, and that the procured CDR is durable.

Integration of CDR within existing industries can physically supply more than 1 billion tons of novel CDR per year (low certainty)

We have low certainty that physical opportunities exist to integrate CDR within existing industrial processes exceeding 1 billion tCO₂ per year.⁶⁵ A short review of the literature provides a wide range of estimates of CDR potential:

A report by Carbon Gap (2026) identified a global sequestration potential of 25.5, 2.3, and 51 million tCO₂ per year for wastewater, concrete waste recycling, and nickel and platinum mining waste management, respectively.⁶⁶
Beerling et al. (2020) found that deploying ERW on 10-11% of croplands in 12 major economies can sequester 0.5 billion tCO₂ per year, with slight diminishing returns to scale beyond 10% of cropland.⁶⁷
Bullock et al. (2021) found that mined metal and diamond commodity tailings from silicate-hosted deposits have the potential to capture 1.1-4.5 billion tCO₂ per year, albeit with a dissolution rate over many decades.⁶⁸
A report by BCG (2024) mentioned that using 2% of global conservation and fertilizer subsidies to incentivize CDR practices in agriculture, such as enhanced rock weathering and biochar application, could remove 70-1,000 million tCO₂ per year, depending on the size of the subsidy and the costs of the materials, but did not explain its methodology for this number.⁶⁹

We acknowledge that embedding CDR within industries is a relatively underexplored concept and think that this uncertainty will be resolved with more feasibility studies and demonstration projects. An earlier Giving Green Fund grantee, the Carbon Removal Standards Initiative (CRSI), is undertaking a feasibility study to identify and prioritize CDR potential within existing industries.⁷⁰ Climate funders can reduce this uncertainty by funding further feasibility studies.

Nonprofits can create tractable CDR standards that secure agreement from a wide range of actors (medium certainty)

For this assumption to hold, nonprofits must be able to produce quantification guidance that reflects the best available science; the bodies that write binding rules (standard-setting programs, regulators, and registries) must adopt that guidance; and the resulting requirements must be precise and affordable enough to implement at scale. We have high certainty about the first condition, medium certainty about the second, and lower certainty about the third for open-system methods.

We have high certainty that nonprofits can convene the relevant actors and produce credible technical guidance. Our assessment rests on historical examples. Cascade Climate's community process for enhanced rock weathering drew public sign-on to a set of core quantification principles from 93 leaders spanning scientists, suppliers, buyers, credit issuers, and civil society. Its subsequent guidance emerged from a multi-stakeholder process involving roughly 50 academics and 20 project developers.⁷¹ Industry has also asked for such guidance: in 2023, 35 organizations representing carbon removal buyers, suppliers, verifiers, nonprofits, and academics called for an independent standards initiative whose funding does not depend on issuing or selling carbon credits.⁷² We think this demand reflects a structural problem that nonprofits are unusually well-placed to address, since other actors have a commercial interest in the leniency of methodologies.⁷³ We also think that this benefit extends from the voluntary carbon market to compliance markets and pay-for-practice schemes, since governments may lack the required expertise to write such standards without technical assistance.⁷⁴

We think nonprofit guidance influences binding rules, but generally as an input rather than as a standard in its own right. The European Union developed the Carbon Removal and Carbon Farming (CRCF) certification methodologies through its Expert Group on Carbon Removals and public consultation, in which civil society organizations participated.⁷⁵ We note that the leading organizations have also chosen this model for themselves: Cascade states that it will never become a credit issuer or a standards body, and CRSI describes its role as providing technical assistance to policymakers and regulators who set rules rather than building a standard of its own.⁷⁶ We therefore think the case rests on nonprofits shaping standards rather than owning them.

Our main reservation is that securing agreement from a wide range of actors and maintaining rigor can be conflicting goals, as illustrated by efforts to set standards for forest credits on the VCM. After the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) successfully convinced carbon-crediting programs to adopt its “Core Carbon Principles,” its 2024 approval of three forest credit methodologies faced public dissent from the Öko-Institut for failing its own Assessment Framework.⁷⁷ We read this outcome as evidence it is possible to achieve broad support for standards, but potentially at the expense of integrity. We think a standard that secures wide agreement by lowering its bar would not advance the responsible scaling of CDR.

We have medium certainty that high-integrity and tractable standards are achievable in the near term (~10 years) for open-system methods, which is where we think the funding need is greatest. So far, major rule-setting exercises have primarily focused on closed and hybrid methods. For example, the CRCF regulation covers DACCS, BECCS, and biochar, while still considering ERW.⁷⁸ Similarly, the six CDR methodologies approved by the ICVCM in October 2025 are exclusively closed or hybrid.⁷⁹ Scientific consensus on quantifying open-system methods, such as ERW, is still lacking, with fundamental disagreements on quantification approaches.⁸⁰ Consequently, Cascade found that establishing generalizable rules was premature, opting instead to publish foundational guidance rather than a formal standard.⁸¹

We think the tractability of standard-setting is higher for alternative demand mechanisms that do not rely on ton-for-ton claims than market-based approaches. As discussed in our section on CDR pathways, sectoral integration and government procurement do not necessarily rely on ton-for-ton claims and can therefore accommodate pay-for-practice set-ups, which require conservative and consistent quantification rather than precise per-ton and per-project measurement. We think that dropping ton-for-ton logic improves the likelihood that workable standards can be agreed upon, especially for open-systems methods.

Even without philanthropic support, we think standards would still be written, but by more conflicted parties and with less consistency. Registries and regulators are actively producing methodologies regardless. The contribution of nonprofits is therefore about improving the rigor, comparability, and pace of these standards.

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⁶⁰ We describe our certainty as low/medium/high to increase readability and avoid false precision. Since these terms can be interpreted differently, we use rough heuristics to define them as percentage likelihoods the assumption is, on average, correct. Low = 0-60%, medium = 60-80%, high = 80-100%

⁶¹ “Country pledges, taking into account the latest [NDCs], reach 2.5 GtCO2 per year CDR in 2030 - but the median level in the highest-ambition Pariscompatible scenarios is 2.9 GtCO2 per year. This results in a gap of 0.3 GtCO2 per year. To close the 2030 gap, overall ambition needs to roughly double [...] through new and revised pledges.” State of CDR, 2026, p. 12

⁶² “Between 2031 and 2040, a centralised authority is proposed to auction 250 million additional allowances and use the proceeds to procure an equivalent volume of permanent domestic [CDR] credits.” Carbon Herald, 2026

⁶³ “The Department of Energy is allowing the Direct Air Capture hub program created by the Biden administration to move forward, according to a list the department submitted to Congress on Wednesday. The program awarded up to $1.2 billion to two projects.” Heatmap, 2026

⁶⁴ As a regrantor, we focus on organizations exploiting time-bound opportunities or work on bounded feasibility studies, rather than building long-term political support. We think that the latter might be more suitable for funders who can provide consistent, long-term funding.

⁶⁵ We chose the 1 billion tCO₂ per year threshold for this assumption arbitrarily to increase the specificity of the section.

⁶⁶ Table 1 in Carbon Gap, 2026

⁶⁷ See Table 1 in Beerling et al. (2020)

⁶⁸ “Our data indicate that all deposit types, notably mafic and ultramafic rock-hosted operations and high tonnage Cu-hosting deposits, have the potential to capture ~1.1-4.5 Gt CO2 annually, between 31 and 125% of the industry's primary emissions. However, current knowledge suggests that dissolution rates of many minerals are relatively slow, such that only a fraction (~3-21%) of this potential may be realised on timescales of <50 years.” Bullock et al., 2021

⁶⁹ “Using 2% of conservation and fertilizer subsidies to support CDR activities in agriculture could generate up to 1,000 Mtpa of CDR demand. Land used for growing crops can capture atmospheric carbon through practices like spreading biochar and enhanced rock weathering. [...] Depending on the portion of subsidy funds allocated and the cost of materials, CDR demand from agriculture subsidy could range from ~70 to 1,000 Mtpa.” BCG, 2024

⁷⁰ Giving Green supported CRSI’s general operating funds in 2024 and 2025, which were used to conduct this study.

⁷¹ Public sign-on: “As a foundational first step on the path toward a community quantification standard, 93 leaders in ERW—spanning scientists, suppliers, buyers, credit issuers, civil society and more—have publicly signed onto a set of Core Principles.” Cascade Climate, 2023

Results: “[The foundations are] the culmination of a multi-stakeholder process undertaken from October 2023 through August 2024, involving ~50 academic scientists, ~20 ERW project developers, and not-for-profit organizations.” Cascade Climate, 2024

⁷² “In an open letter [...], 35 organizations representing carbon removal buyers, suppliers, verifiers, non-profits, and academics call for the creation of an independent standards initiative that would provide a trusted, scientific stamp-of-approval for CDR protocols.” CarbonPlan, 2023

⁷³ An implication is that nonprofits, too, should have revenue decoupled from credit issuance. An investigation by The Guardian, Die Zeit, and Source Material found that 90% of Verra’s rainforest offset credits are “phantom credits”. Verra’s funding depends on credit issuance. We note that rainforest credits (which are usually not CDR) have challenges distinct from durable CDR.

⁷⁴ To illustrate this point, the European Union hosts an Expert Group on Carbon Removals to get technical assistance. See the paragraph below.

⁷⁵ See the Expert Group on Carbon Removals entry on the EU transparency register.

⁷⁶ Cascade Climate “In addition, it’s worth stressing again that there is no ‘Cascade Standard’. Cascade will never become a credit issuer nor a standards body. We want to partner with scientists, suppliers, buyers, credit issuers and governance bodies to build community alignment and bring the dream of a robust, rigorous, and consistent MRV system into reality. Cascade will help stand up the core building blocks of that system before handing those over to the right long-term stewards.” Cascade Climate, 2023. CRSI: “At CRSI we’re making it our job to provide that technical assistance, and that financially unconflicted voice to support standards, and support better, faster, more carbon removal policy.” Anu Khan in Latitude Media, 2024

⁷⁷ “The ICVCM approval of three REDD [Removing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation] methodologies presents risks to the integrity of the initiative” Öko-Institut, 2024

⁷⁸ “The Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/285 sets out CRCF certification methodologies for three types of permanent carbon removals activities: Direct air capture with carbon storage (‘DACCS’); Biogenic emissions capture with carbon storage (‘BioCCS’); Biochar carbon removal (‘BCR’)” European Commission, last updated 2026

⁷⁹ The methodologies are concrete recarbonation, biomass and bio-oil storage, BECCS, and DAC. ICVCM, 2025

⁸⁰ “For novel, open-system methods – including enhanced weathering, alkalinity enhancement of water bodies, DOCCS, ocean fertilization and biomass sinking – the quantity of CO2 durably removed per unit activity is poorly constrained, given ongoing scientific uncertainties related to Earth system processes.” State of CDR, 2026, p. 255

⁸¹ “Cascade has since changed course as regards the near-term development of an industry standard for quantifying carbon removal via enhanced rock weathering deployments. [...] We reached the conclusion that premature standardization—encoding generalizable rules that apply across all settings—posed risks at a moment when the ERW field is better served by a pre-standardization period and a measure of flexibility to adopt tailored quantification approaches in different settings. We are publishing foundational guidance on rigorous quantification to help ensure a common core of consistency in quantification as the community scales up deployment-driven learning.” Cascade Climate, 2024

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We think the choice of where to fund matters considerably for CDR. Countries differ in how supportive their policy environments are for CDR, their capacity to fund RD&D and innovation projects, the suitability of their geography for different removal methods, and the ability to generate demand for removals through policy mechanisms (Table 6). We think these differences are large enough to change the expected impact of an otherwise identical grant. This section sets out the considerations we weighed for each country and region we assessed, and then explains where we think funders should concentrate.

Table 6: Key considerations for geographical prioritization of CDR philanthropy⁸²

Since our strategy focuses on building demand for CDR, we recommend prioritizing philanthropic support for demand-focused nonprofits in jurisdictions with favorable climate policy environments, such as the European Union, Canada, and Japan. Notably, we are more cautious about funding CDR demand advocacy in the U.S. due to the current unpredictability of federal policy support, though we still see significant value in continued funding there, especially for nonprofits that can secure bipartisan support. Donors who prioritize supply-side constraints or anticipate a reversal in U.S. climate policy may choose to weigh these geographical priorities differently.

For demand advocacy, we think funders should support work in several countries rather than concentrating on one. Overdependence on a small number of actors is a weakness in the CDR sector that creates vulnerability to policy reversal.⁸³ Funding across several jurisdictions makes the strategy more robust to election results and shifts in political support in any one country or jurisdiction. Because we think that philanthropic funding for demand-focused policy engagement is not saturated in any one geography, we see an argument for increasing funding in multiple geographies simultaneously.

Some work aligned with our prioritized sub-strategies is not geographically specific. We think that conducting feasibility research on integrating CDR into industrial processes and improving MRV do not necessarily have a strong geographical component. The value of these sub-strategies comes from the method or the evidence they produce, which other countries can then take up, rather than from the jurisdiction in which the work was done.

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⁸² Sources: Carbon Gap (n.d.); Tony Blair Institute, 2025; Serin et al., 2025; expert interviews. In no particular order.

⁸³ “Important aspects of the CDR system are highly concentrated, create vulnerabilities, and would benefit from diversification across methods, actors and countries. [...] While first-movers play important roles, if their actions do not diffuse more widely, vulnerability emerges, as evidenced by the impact of US climate policy dismantling and Microsoft’s recent adjustments to the pace of its procurement.” State of CDR, 2026, p. 14

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We think there is substantial room for more funding to scale CDR. Despite progress on CDR policy goals, CDR philanthropy is declining. Our understanding is also that within CDR philanthropy, most funding supports science and innovation or conventional CDR, which indicates even greater room for funding for demand policy advocacy, MRV, and standards.⁸⁴

Since 2024, major donors have exited CDR philanthropy. While CDR philanthropy rose steadily until 2024, a reduction in overall climate philanthropy in 2025 has led to philanthropists prioritizing short-term priorities over longer-term priorities like CDR. In addition, funders focusing on frontier areas have largely pivoted to other emerging topics, such as solar radiation management and glacier stabilization.⁸⁵ Notable CDR funders that are exiting CDR include Breakthrough Energy’s advocacy arm (which dissolved altogether) and the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative (which moved away from climate policy).⁸⁶ The Quadrature Climate Foundation underwent a major strategic pivot to expand its core mandate to include inequality and humanitarian work, and is likely to reduce overall CDR funding, especially in the Global North.⁸⁷ We are also familiar with other major CDR funders retreating from the space who have not made a public announcement.

Conventional climate funders often do not support CDR activities. While motivations differ from foundation to foundation, our understanding is that conventional climate funders do not typically support CDR because of risk aversion, concerns over moral hazard, and the lack of an ‘institutional home’ for CDR. For many funders, CDR often fits within biomass strategies or industrial decarbonization workstreams, which means they do not have dedicated staff for CDR grantmaking.

Based on conversations we have had with CDR philanthropy experts, we think civil society capacity outside the U.S. is particularly neglected. Most CDR philanthropy by U.S.-based funders focuses on the U.S. itself, which makes it difficult to fundraise for CDR in other countries.

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⁸⁴ Science and innovation: The “Innovation, Data & Tech” X “Carbon Dioxide Removal” cell is the most dimly colored within its row. ClimateWorks, 2026, Figure 6. Our understanding, based on two conversations we have had with climate philanthropists, is that this cell includes investments made by two philanthropic funders into companies.
Conventional CDR: “More than 70% of such [CDR] support has gone to natural methods, such as planting trees or changing farming practices, according to ClimateWorks’ database. About 9% goes to ocean processes, which include growing seaweed and dissolving minerals to impact alkalinity. Less than 15% has gone to technological approaches, a field best known for machines that suck up carbon dioxide. The remainder (6%) goes to a variety of other strategies and innovations, such as glued or laminated wood used in construction in place of more carbon-intensive options.” Inside Philanthropy, 2021

⁸⁵ “Many large climate donors paused, shrank, or outright stopped their climate giving at just the same time that the US Federal Government threw sand in the gears of its large science and innovation funding apparatus, leaving NGOs working on novel removal as one of many types of organizations left scrambling for funding. This reduction in philanthropy and government funding cascaded into many of the remaining climate donors quickly shifting funding away from longer-term priorities like removals to save legacy efforts and defend recent climate policy wins from total annihilation. And on top of this crisis, donors that focus on supporting frontier areas in the climate conversation [...] had been in the process of moving from supporting removals to supporting even more nascent spaces (like solar radiation management, glacier stabilization, etc.), compounding the headwinds facing NGOs working on removals.” Deich, 2026
Multiple interviews we conducted with CDR experts confirmed this view.

⁸⁶ Breakthrough Energy: “Breakthrough Energy [...] is closing its policy and advocacy office.” Heatmap, 2025

CZI: “Chan Zuckerberg Initiative Shifts Focus to A.I. and Science” Observer, 2025

⁸⁷ Previous CDR focus: “As part of this strategy, QCF is advancing multiple initiatives to address these challenges, including: Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)” QCF, 2024
New focus: “We have decided to bring our founders’ different philanthropic funding streams together into one foundation strategy, spanning three interconnected challenges: Human security [...] Poverty and inequality [...] Climate risk.” QCF, 2026

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Co-Benefits

Environmental benefits: Potential environmental co-benefits from CDR depend on the CDR method. For example, ocean alkalinity enhancement reduces ocean acidification, which is a threat to marine biodiversity. Conventional CDR methods, such as re- and afforestation, can improve terrestrial biodiversity.
Economic benefits for low- and middle-income countries: If high-income countries finance CDR activities in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), it could create an economic opportunity for LMICs. For example, India has suitable soils and environmental conditions for enhanced rock weathering, and Kenya has abundant clean energy from geothermal.⁸⁸
Agricultural yields: Some CDR methods, such as enhanced rock weathering and biochar application, can contribute to increasing agricultural productivity.⁸⁹

Potential Risks

Moral hazard and mitigation deterrence: Moral hazard concerns the risk that promising or working on CDR reduces or delays mitigation efforts.⁹⁰ Mitigation deterrence can occur if (a) CDR is a politically attractive mitigation option that enables polluting industries to continue, even though there is no willingness to pay for removals, (b) promises of future removals are used to reduce current abatement, or (c) we run out of inexpensive CDR options while we let emissions increase.⁹¹ However, we think that the importance of scaling up CDR outweighs the risks since current deployment of novel CDR is very small.
Policy reversal risk: Conventional mitigation is largely self-sustaining once achieved: building out renewables or electrifying transport replaces fossil infrastructure with capital that keeps delivering low emissions regardless of whether the policy that prompted it survives. CDR has no such lock-in. Removals continue only as long as someone keeps paying for them, so a strategy leaning heavily on CDR is a bet on climate policy remaining in place. We think that this risk can best be addressed by having CDR targets that are separate from emissions reduction targets.
Environmental, energy, and land use impacts: Large-scale CDR deployment, depending on the methods used, can require substantial land and energy, which can compete with land needed for agriculture or energy for household or industrial use.⁹² Therefore, CDR deployment requires strong governance for biomass, land, and energy use.

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⁸⁸ India: “India is particularly well-positioned to leverage ERW due to its extensive agricultural base, favourable tropical and sub-tropical climatic conditions, and abundant availability of silicate rock resources, particularly basalt formations.” CRIA, 2026, Executive Summary

Kenya: “Kenya's growing renewable energy sector (geothermal, solar, wind) provides a solid foundation for durable CDR projects i.e., DAC requiring significant clean energy” Great Carbon Valley, 2024

⁸⁹ ERW: “Warm tropical climates and productive crops will substantially enhance weathering rates, with potential co-benefits including decreased soil acidification and increased phosphorus supply promoting higher crop yields sparing forest for conservation, and reduced cultural eutrophication.” Edwards et al., 2017

Biochar: “Around the world, biochar, a multipurpose carbonaceous material, is being used to concurrently solve issues with enhancing soil fertility, plant growth, and development under both normal and stressful circumstances.” Khan et al., 2024

⁹⁰ “the risk that promises of and/or efforts to pursue carbon removal end up reducing or delaying near-term mitigation efforts.” Carton et al., 2023

⁹¹ McLaren et al., 2021, p. 8-9

⁹² “This is because terrestrial carbon removal at the scales indicated in this Article would require vast amounts of land and entail severe risks for food production and/or biosphere functioning as well as the land rights and livelihoods of rural communities and Indigenous peoples. While some industrial carbon-removal techniques such as direct air carbon capture and storage have a much smaller direct land footprint, this approach comes with large energy requirements, which could divert energy, and critical minerals and the associated land for renewables, from other societal needs.” Buck et al., 2023

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Scaling Novel Carbon Dioxide Removal: Strategy Report

Summary

Introduction

Pathways to Scale CDR

Assessment of Philanthropic Sub-Strategies

Theory of Change for Philanthropic Engagement

Geographical Prioritization

Cost-Effectiveness of Scaling CDR

Is There Room for More Funding?

Are There Major Co-Benefits or Potential Risks?

Key Uncertainties and Open Questions

Bottom Line and Next Steps

Acknowledgments

Appendix: Glossary of Terms

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