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We chose Original Power as one of the most effective climate organisations. Read more about our decision. Original Power: Recommendation // BACK This report was last updated in December 2021. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. Giving Green believes that donating to our top recommendations is likely to be the most impactful giving strategy for supporting climate action. However, we recognize that donors have different preferences regarding where they give - for instance, due to tax deductibility in their home country. Taking this into consideration, we recommend Original Power specifically for audiences with specific giving criteria that direct them to Australian nonprofits. We believe Original Power to be a high-impact option, but we are unsure of the extent to which its cost-effectiveness approaches that of our top recommendations. Summary Original Power (OP) is working to ensure Australia’s First Nations communities benefit from the renewables boom. It uses a collective-action model to resource and support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities to self-determine what happens on their country. This work is critical because, as Australia’s traditional owners, First Nations people have unique rights over 50 per cent of Australia’s land, making them critical stakeholders in the transition from a fossil fuel-based economy to one powered by clean, renewable energy. OP supports communities in their efforts to protect cultural heritage, challenge fossil fuel developments (if this is what communities decide), and create a just transition to renewables. OP’s work can support the rapid roll out of large-scale renewables as an alternative to fossil fuel projects, in turn reducing Australia’s emissions. This diagram illustrates OP’s theory of change: Based on OP’s achievements, strategic approach, and the impact that additional funding would have, we recommend it as one of our top organisations for accelerating climate policy and reducing Australia’s emissions. For more information on OP, please review our Deep Dive of the organisation. Donate to Original Power . Kalkarindji march in 2016 marking 50 years anniversary of Wave Hill walk-off. Credit: Jeff Tan Photography. Why we recommend Original Power The Giving Green Australia: 2021 Research Process details how we identified the highest impact organisations working to improve climate policy in Australia. The process involved expert interviews, an expert survey, focus groups, and desk research. We focused on organisations that are using the three key approaches our research determined are the highest priority for delivering policy change: ‘insider advocacy’, ‘outsider advocacy’ and ‘changing the story’. OP seeks policy change through ‘outsider advocacy’ and ‘changing the story’. Furthermore, OP was nominated 9 times by the 52 experts surveyed, which was the fourth highest number of votes any organisation received. OP would also likely deliver substantial returns from additional marginal investment. In our assessment of OP’s impact, we spoke with representatives from OP and interviewed a number of climate policy and advocacy experts and practitioners. We also reviewed publicly available information on OP, including its website and reports, as well as media coverage of the organisation. Here, we present our reasons for recommending OP. We also recommend that those interested read our Deep Dive report . 1. Original Power is helping to reduce Australia’s emissions by paving the way for renewables as a superior alternative to fossil fuels in providing jobs, economic opportunities and energy security for First Nations communities. The rapid deployment of renewable energy is critical to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and limit global warming to 1.5 degrees. While Australia is currently the world’s third largest exporter of fossil fuels (and number one for coal and gas), the nation could become a major global exporter of renewable energy. Australia has some of the best renewable resources in the world, many of which are on First Nations’ lands and waters. Already, the Sun Cable project is seeking to export Australian solar power to Singapore via a deep sea cable, and the development of hydrogen technologies would enable large amounts of renewable energy to be exported. However, regulation surrounding the development of Australia’s clean energy industry has inadequacies. There is little to no formal guidance on agreement-making with Australia’s First Nations people and significant barriers to ensuring equitable access to the benefits of clean energy. In the absence of government policy, OP is taking the lead. OP is a founding partner of the recently launched First Nations Clean Energy Network . The Network promotes best-practice standards in the renewable energy industry, to ensure that the transition occurs in partnership with First Nations communities, sharing its jobs and economic benefits, protecting sacred sites and respecting native title. The Network has endorsement from First Nations people, community organisations and land councils, technical and legal advisers, impact investors, clean energy industry bodies, trade unions, academia, think tanks, and major climate advocacy organisations. This breadth of support reflects a recognition that First Nations people should and can benefit from the renewables boom. As the clean energy industry expands, the Network recognises that it is important that First Nations people are empowered to make decisions which determine their future and protect their country and culture. OP is working to bring the economic benefits of renewable energy to indigenous communities. Many First Nations communities in remote parts of Australia rely on diesel generation for their energy needs, and are suffering due to high diesel prices and frequent power disconnections. Supporting these communities to develop their own renewable energy projects not only addresses energy security, but also reduces greenhouse gas emissions, improves health outcomes and creates employment opportunities. Clean, reliable energy will help First Nations communities deal with more extreme temperatures brought by climate change. OP has supported communities to develop demonstration community solar projects in Marlinja and Borroloola in the Northern Territory. It has developed a Clean Energy Economic Recovery Plan for the Northern Territory , which promotes a clean energy ‘superhighway’ through the centre of Australia via a high-speed electricity transmission line. OP worked with the Australian National University to develop a guide on Clean Energy agreement making on First Nations Land . The First Nations Clean Energy Network will advise First Nations communities and business enterprises seeking to set up or play a part in the establishment of medium- to large-scale export-focussed clean energy projects. 2. Original Power is supporting First Nations communities to exercise their rights to self-determine what happens on their country. OP provides support for First Nations communities to self-determine their own futures in the economic transition from fossil fuels to renewable power. It builds the capacity of First Nations communities who wish to protect their cultural heritage, challenge destructive fossil fuel projects, and ensure that renewable projects are developed in a way that provides just economic co-benefits to the community. As Australia’s traditional custodians, First Nations people hold special rights known as ‘native title’ over more than half of the continent. However, due to complex social and economic pressures, these rights are difficult to exert. Native title does not extinguish other land rights, such as mining rights, and usually falls short of the power to veto developments. Indigenous communities need to be able to scrutinise and manage proposed projects to ensure no damage will be done to their country or culture. OP is developing resources such as the Building Power Guide to provide First Nations communities with the knowledge, support and networks they need to protect their communities, land, water, and climate. It has been a key driver of the Passing the Message Stick Project , a two-year research initiative to find messages that are effective in building public support for First Nations self-determination and justice. OP is also connecting communities with each other and supporting the exchange of lessons, challenges and successes. 3. Original Power has a strong team with connections to First Nations communities and clean energy industry leaders and policy makers. OP’s CEO, board and staff includes highly regarded professionals from First Nations communities. They have expertise in community-building, economic development, climate change, clean energy, management consulting, and native title. The team has strong engagement with First Nations leaders and communities. Through the First Nations Clean Energy Network, OP has built a coalition with the renewables industry, investors, technical experts, campaigners and policy makers. Original Power’s Clean Energy Economic Recovery Plan for the Northern Territory is a rapid response report prepared for the Northern Territory Government’s Economic Reconstruction Commission in 2020 that demonstrates the potential for First Nations community-owned clean energy to lead the regions out of the COVID-19 economic crisis through the creation of sustainable jobs on country. The proposed plan was adopted by the NT Government as a key recommendation of the Economic Reconstruction Commission. The model is also being considered by Indigenous communities developing solar grids in Central Australia, the Barkley and Gulf regions. OP has proven it can support First Nations communities to self-determine what projects proceed on their land, and to create new industry networks that put First Nations people at the table as the renewables boom gets underway. 4. Additional marginal investment could help Original Power ensure First Nations people benefit from the renewable energy revolution, drive community-owned clean energy projects and secure equitable arrangements for large-scale renewable projects on their lands. OP is a small First Nations organisation working effectively with limited resources. Their budget for 2020-2021 was $1.2 million, the majority of which was from individual donations, trusts and foundations. Additional funding could help OP expand its on-country community engagement program, evaluate the community and climate impacts of clean energy demonstration projects, and further scale the work of the First Nations Clean Energy Network (the Network will be auspiced by OP for the first 12 months). OP’s priorities for 2022 focus on community, industry partnerships and policy reform so the First Nations Clean Energy Network can: support community-owned renewable projects to deliver lower-cost, reliable energy; create job opportunities and strong economies so First Nations people can live and work on their country; and form strong industry partnerships to share the benefits of a renewable future and avoid the mistakes of extractive industries. Risks There are three key risks associated with OP achieving its aims. First, that federal and state governments remain intransigent and fail to reform laws and regulations which currently frustrate securing a just, equitable and rapid transition to renewables. Second, that the clean energy industry does not sufficiently engage with or prioritise the interests of First Nations people as the renewables boom gets underway. Third, that First Nations communities, because of the actions of the fossil fuel industry which works to maximise profits at the expense of First Nations people, and because of a lack of alternate economic and job opportunities, have no real choice but to allow coal and gas development, or risk losing country and culture without any compensation. However, much of OP’s program is about mitigating these risks. By pursuing just economic and employment benefits for First Nations people from renewables, OP is building the social licence and political capital needed for a rapid and just transition to renewable energy within First Nations communities, the clean energy industry and policy makers. As a small organisation, OP carries personnel risks. Its ongoing effectiveness relies on retaining and attracting talent at all levels of the organisation. There can be challenges from building and managing a team of very diverse people and skills, working in communities where there may be no computers and limited internet access. To mitigate these risks, OP has recently brought on more staff and is implementing a peer-to-peer mentoring program to up-skill and support its team. OP is also offering additional support for remote staff, including helping the whole team develop systems that better acknowledge the diversity of language and literacy skills. This will be important as the organisation grows and works to expand its efforts across the country. Conclusion We believe that OP is making a significant contribution to ensuring Australia’s First Nations communities benefit from the renewables boom. Increasing First Nations communities’ access to clean, reliable energy will help them deal with more extreme temperatures brought by climate change. Securing equitable arrangements for medium- to large-scale renewable projects on First Nations land will provide an alternative to new, polluting coal and gas projects. Additional donations would enable OP to align the interests of First Nations people and the clean energy industry, making possible the mass deployment of renewables in a way that benefits First Nations communities. Based on OP’s achievements, strategic approach, and the impact that additional funding would have, we recommend it as one of our top organisations for improving climate policy in Australia. Donate to Original Power . // BACK

Project InnerSpace is one of our top climate charities in 2024. Read about its work advancing geothermal energy. Project Innerspace: Recommendation // BACK Project InnerSpace: Recommendation Last updated in October 2024. Giving Green classifies Project Innerspace as one of our top recommendations to address climate change. Conventional geothermal projects are highly limited by location, but Project Innerspace can help fast-track next-generation geothermal technologies capable of unlocking geothermal energy from more places. We think Project Innerspace’s resource mapping and funding efforts can help reduce project risks and attract more traditional investors, fostering innovation and decreasing costs. Project Innerspace has an ambitious plan for expanding access to geothermal energy, especially in the world’s top population centers in the Global South. We think its theory of change is backed by strong evidence, and we have been impressed by the thought leadership it has built. Project Innerspace reported a funding gap of $18 million for its global geothermal resource and prospecting map and would use additional funds to build this product. For more information, see our deep dive research report , a summary below, and our broader geothermal deep dive report . What is Project InnerSpace? Launched in 2022, Project InnerSpace is a US-based 501(c)(3) nonprofit focused on expanding geothermal energy globally. How could Project InnerSpace help address climate change? Project InnerSpace aims to combat climate change by expanding access to geothermal energy, which can supply carbon-free heat and electricity. We believe geothermal energy is crucial due to its ability to offer reliable, on-demand electricity while addressing the intermittent nature of wind and solar power. What does Project InnerSpace do? Project InnerSpace is developing a global geothermal resource and prospecting map, supporting geothermal projects facing funding hurdles, and building momentum for geothermal energy in both the public and private sectors. What are some of Project InnerSpace's historical accomplishments? Project Innerspace debuted its African GeoMap module in 2023 and its North America module in 2024. The latter lets users explore and rank geothermal development opportunities based on factors like transmission lines, energy demand, and cost-effectiveness, which we think could be a useful policy and advocacy tool. Members of Project InnerSpace were also lead authors on The Future of Geothermal in Texas , a technical and policy roadmap for building out next-generation geothermal technologies in Texas. What's new in 2024? As electricity demand from data centers grows in the US, Project InnerSpace is promoting geothermal energy as a clean, reliable option and accelerating partnerships to help meet this demand. It is also working with other stakeholders to build demand for geothermal heat in the US, and develop policy options that could catalyze funding for next-generation geothermal projects. It also plans to launch GeoMap modules in India and Indonesia in 2024, followed by Brazil in early 2025. Project InnerSpace, alongside its partners, also launched the Geothermal Energy from Oil and Gas Demonstrated Engineering initiative, which will adopt best practices from the oil and gas industry to address barriers to scaling next-generation geothermal technologies. What would Project InnerSpace do with your donation? Project InnerSpace reported that it would need between $3 to $5 million to manage and launch GeoMap in India and Southeast Asia, and that its progress on this project will match how quickly it fundraises. Project InnerSpace would also use additional funds to support its US policy work, such as examining incentives that could expand geothermal energy use in agriculture and data centers. Additionally, Project Innerspace anticipates a funding gap for its GeoFund, a venture whose nonprofit activities include funding catalytic projects in low- and middle-income countries. Why is Giving Green excited about Project InnerSpace? Project InnerSpace supports geothermal energy in a way that emphasizes fast iteration and quickly getting next-generation technologies on a learning curve to drive costs down. We think there is strong evidence to support its theory of change, that Project InnerSpace has positioned itself as a leader in the geothermal sector, and that it has capacity for more funding. Explore ways to give to Project InnerSpace and more. As Giving Green is part of IDInsight Inc., which is itself a charitable, tax-exempt organization, we are only offering an opinion on the charitable activities of Project InnerSpace and not on the for-profit side of its GeoFund, which includes both for-profit and nonprofit arms. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

Read Giving Green's research on activism's role in addressing climate change. Activism: Overview // BACK This report was last updated in December 2021. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. What are the key techniques used by activists? When is activism effective in influencing policy? What does the academic literature on activism suggest is important to effective work? In this document, we address these questions and present our overall evaluation of the use of activism to influence US national climate policy. This review of the literature forms the basis of our work reviewing and recommending activist organizations. Read the full report below, or download here: 2021-12 Activism Overview .pdf Download PDF Activism: Giving Green's approach What is activism? Activism seeks to influence political outcomes by mobilizing citizens who are not political insiders to take actions that generate widespread or well-targeted public attention around specific issues or demands, usually through generating media coverage of events like protests, confrontations, or strikes. [1] Activism often seeks to generate a feedback loop where initial actions and attention draw greater participation, which leads to further activity and attention. Some activism is led by organized groups with complex strategies, while other activism emerges when ordinary people collectively protest a grievance and spark waves of action. Activism can play an important role in accomplishing the following objectives: Shifting public attention towards specific issues and disseminating a specific strategic framing to shape how the public understands and makes sense of an issue, leading to public opinion shifts that may change individual behavior. Targeting politicians, judges, or bureaucrats currently in power to change their opinion or behavior. As some of these individuals are accountable to public opinion to some degree, this is often strongly related to point (1) above. Changing the political fortunes of those in power, to generate support for alternative candidates or fend off challengers during the electoral process. These three aims are distinct but share a common goal, which is to change political outcomes (often legislation passed). This is usually achieved by shifting public opinion such that politicians responsive to public opinion must act differently in order to maintain electoral support. In addition, public opinion shifts can have broader impacts on society by changing how individuals and organizations behave, though our focus in this document is on activism for policy change. In addition, activism can shift the way companies and other organizations behave. While this is an important outcome of activism, we focus in this document on the outcomes of activism on US policy change. Giving Green's approach to activism To better understand how activism works, we analyzed the activity of activist organizations working on climate policy through a series of shallow dive reports. This allowed us to begin to inductively build a theory of change that describes how activism works (in theory and in practice) to affect policy outcomes in the climate space. Then, we completed a systematic literature review analyzing climate activism and the evidence on the effectiveness of the specific activities we catalogued in the first stage of our research. This allowed us to further refine our general theory of change for activism and to critically examine key assumptions linking each part of the theory together. While any one activism organization has a unique theory of change resulting in a unique approach to work, the theory of change in Figure 1 captures a broad overview of common threads running through most activist work, which we identified through reviewing both academic literature and the behavior of actual activist organizations. Note that we focus on research dealing with activist organizations in the United States, though we draw on some related work in other countries. Activism's theory of change The theory of change we developed is organized into 5 distinct stages, each of which corresponds either to inputs, outputs, or outcomes. We follow the broad formula of inputs + outputs = actions, which expresses the overall structure of the theory of change. The three final stages of the five are all outcomes, which occur one after another according to the arrows depicted in Figure 1 . The first stage of the theory of change is campaign building . This stage includes the starting points for all of the movement’s activities, including the creation of an organizational structure that allows room for the movement to grow while remaining coordinated, its strategic framing (and related content and branding) to shape public understanding of an issue, its internal policy consensus, and its alliance with powerful champions across the climate advocacy, political, and activist communities through coalition building. The second stage of the theory of change is directed action . This stage includes each of the key tactics employed on the ground like protests, participation in climate strikes, endorsement of political candidates, and participation in endorsed candidates’ campaigns. Many of these activities provide an opportunity for media content creation, by external media sources or, especially in recent times, media-savvy members of activist groups who record, package, and frame key events organized by the movement for social media dissemination. Each of these activities lays the groundwork for preliminary outcomes that eventually lead to policy change. The third stage of the theory of change is initial changes . Each of these changes in public opinion, the electoral prospects of politicians, and issue prioritization are preconditions for further policy change. In order to generate commitment by candidates and issue prioritization by politicians generally, media coverage of activist’s activities must draw public attention to candidates and activists’ stance on climate issues, mobilize larger numbers of the public to join the organization or otherwise pressure politicians to take action on climate change, and shift public opinion such that politicians perceive that their continued electoral success (including in primaries) is in part dependent upon their stances and actions around climate change legislation. The fourth stage of the theory of change is legislative change , the enactment of legislation to take action on climate change and reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Due to increasing pressure and the presence of politicians sympathetic to the activists’ aims of more aggressive and concerted legislative action around climate change, climate change has become a policy priority for the government. As a result, climate change legislation is enacted that would not have been enacted otherwise. The fifth and final stage of the theory of change is reduced greenhouse gases in the atmosphere . This is the final and most important outcome which an activist movement must cause in order for it to make a difference to the trajectory of climate change. Figure 1: Climate Activism – Theory of Change Below, we detail the assumptions and evidence available for each of the elements of the theory of change above. Assessing the Activism Theory of Change 1. Organization Building The social movement literature is composed of differing schools of thought on best practices for aspiring social movements and activist organizations. Roughly, we found that modern social movement theory can be divided into two camps: those that favor structure, and those that favor more informal organizations. We find it likely that both types of activist organizations have a role to play in the ecosystem of climate action, and we discuss both in this section. Importantly, their efficacy likely varies based on the political realities at any given time. A movement must not only organize itself well, but also take advantage of a favorable “political opportunity structure” that creates an opening for social change to occur, e.g. the fragmenting of elites or destabilization of the status quo (Piven and Cloward 1995; McAdam 2017; Caniglia et al 2015). Structured activist organizations Those that favor more structured organizations tend to fall into the camp of “resource mobilization theory,” which stipulates that an organization’s ability to create change is dependent on the resources it is able to access. Resources may be moral (legitimacy, solidarity); cultural (knowledge, know-how, magazines); human (labor, expertise, leadership); material (money, property, equipment); social-organizational (networks, organizations) (Edwards and Gillham, 2013). This creates several implications for effective social movements, e.g. that movements are more likely to develop and grow among existing socially integrated networks, and that hierarchically organized groups are more likely to succeed in challenging elite antagonists (Piven and Cloward, 1995). Resource-oriented organizations roughly correspond to the Alinskyite community organizing tradition, based on the work of Saul Alinsky; these tactics focus on building long-lasting structure through accumulating small yet radical wins. Notable Alinskyites include Cesar Chavez and Barack Obama (Engler and Engler, 2016). What makes such an organization successful? A common theme that emerges in the literature on policy-focused activism is a need to achieve internal policy consensus and have clear organizational and leadership structures. These signal to politicians the existence of a well-organized public interest group that they cannot easily counteract. Some recent literature on social movements and protest movements in the age of social media critiques an overall low level of organizational structure and coherence in such movements (Tufekci, 2017). This literature identifies the signaling importance of social and protest movements: in the past, organizing a large-scale protest or other collective action event required a significant amount of organizational centralization and commitment. Because of this, collective action may have derived much of its power through signaling effects: a protest served as a signal of a broader non-state organizational structure that could pose a meaningful electoral threat and not easily dissolve into disagreement and infighting. Because of the relative ease of organizing mass events today through social media mobilization, contemporary social movements have been hypothesized to lack effectiveness relative to historical movements due to their tendency to involve large numbers of people without a parallel organizational structure to ensure consensus and organized tactics (Tufekci, 2017). This suggests contemporary social movements that achieve success need to have a high degree of consensus and organization and clear leadership to achieve the same effect as historical movements. Informal mass movements Critics of resource mobilization theory argue that these highly structured and bureaucratic organizations with roots in longstanding social networks have their limits. At an individual level, people with many ties to the existing social order may be more constrained in their participation in movements, which may explain why students and young people are disproportionately represented in movements such as the 1960s civil rights movement (Piven and Cloward, 1995). At an organizational level, groups that depend on established social structures, e.g. for funding or legitimacy, are unlikely to meaningfully challenge those structures (McAdam, 2017). Indeed, some critics point to the failure of the institutionalized climate movement to enact meaningful federal policy despite an “impressive array of social movement organizations” (Caniglia et al, 2015), complex coalitions, and numerous Congressional testimonies (Brulle, 2014). This suggests that, while structured movements can be effective at winning short-term marginal victories, “informal” movements outside of dominant institutions may be more effective at creating larger shifts in political discourse and broader systemic changes. Such informal movements need “free spaces” to develop “truly oppositional” campaigns against the status quo (McAdam, 2017). Piven and Cloward (1995) argue that “lower-stratum” protestors—people without traditional political influence or access to the resources that enable the formation of a structured movement—can exert influence and mobilize outside support by disrupting “the workings of an institution on which important groups depend”. Such disruptions often arise from moments of mass grievance that must be effectively harnessed by existing mobilizing infrastructures. Examples of movements seen as more closely aligned to this tradition include Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, and some flanks of the feminist and civil rights movements of the 1960s. 2: Framing Framing processes are the ways in which activists (and other organizations) create collective understanding of a given issue based on their messaging and activities (Wasow, 2020; Goffman, 1974; Gitlin, 1980; Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993). The links between social movements and climate change knowledge have not been closely examined, though Jamison (2010) contends that the main positions in public discourse around climate change and climate science are shaped by social movements. We have thus far not found specific literature on effective framing processes for climate change activists, so we turn here to more general research on public opinion and the factors that influence individuals’ climate beliefs. Public opinion on climate change Addressing climate and environmental issues consistently polls favorably among Americans. However, as discussed in the previous section, several authors contended as recently as 2017 that an effective climate movement did not exist in the US. As recently as 2012, survey data in Western countries including the US indicated that the long-term increase in scientific confidence in climate change was not linked to any long-term increase in public concern (Ratter et al, 2012). Because of the scientific nature of climate phenomena, a lack of easy attribution of events in lived experience to climate change, a perception that climate change effects other countries more than the United States, and a concerted effort by fossil-fuel interests to tie climate change opinion to polarized American politico-cultural identities, climate change is an issue area that commands relatively little public attention and is also subject to high degrees of motivated and self-confirmatory reasoning (Egan & Mullin, 2017; Weber & Stern, 2011). This may be exacerbated by incentive structures in politics and the media that reward overemphasis on “extreme” scientific results from either end of the political spectrum (Schenuit et al, 2019). Further, climate change public opinion in the United States is typically believed to be elite-directed and determined by the dynamics of institutional polarization, rather than influenced by mass movements (Brulle et al. 2012; Stokes & Warshaw, 2017). Indeed, climate change has been found to be salient to extreme conservatives, who oppose governmental climate action as part of their core belief system, but not any other segment of the American public (McCright & Dunlap 2011 and Kahan 2015, in McAdam 2017). Thus, while many support climate action, few will take to the streets in favor of it. Factors that influence public opinion and individual beliefs We found that the literature on effectively framing climate change was inconclusive, with many studies of individual messages but few overarching patterns. Further, studies that examine specific messages on specific audiences in controlled settings may not generalize to real-world activism. Studies have found positive effects of framings that: Emphasize the potential for climate change to impact one’s own community and home (Spence et al., 2012), which is especially effective for independents and Republicans (Wiest et al., 2015); Emphasize gains from climate change action and de-emphasize climate change losses (Spence & Pidgeon, 2010); Emphasize air pollution and energy independence implications of climate policy, particularly towards Republicans (Feldman & Sol Hart, 2018); Emphasize job creation (Stokes & Warshaw, 2017); Focus on the negatives to be addressed (e.g. stop dirty energy) rather than the positives (e.g. promote clean energy) (Michelson and DeMora, 2021). Conversely, An emphasis on increased energy cost has negative effects on framing (Stokes & Warshaw, 2017); Multiple studies find “a strong relationship between economic fluctuation and concern for climate change,” with e.g. the Great Recession causing decreases in support for climate action (McAdam, 2017). Research has suggested that linking extreme weather events to climate change may be an effective framing (Egan & Mullin, 2017). Empirical evidence of the effects of extreme weather on climate beliefs is mixed (Demski et al, 2017). The effects of extreme weather on climate beliefs may depend on a variety of factors. For instance, different studies have found that long-term temperature changes affect climate beliefs, but recent temperature extremes do not (Hughes et al, 2020); and that cold temperatures and snowfall can decrease belief in climate change, whereas high temperatures and drought increase it (Borick and Rabe, 2017). Notably, motivated reasoning may result in people interpreting the weather in a way that confirms preexisting views. A person’s perception of the extreme weather event may influence or be correlated with climate beliefs (Howe, 2021; Dai et al, 2015), but it is unclear whether preexisting beliefs are merely causing them to perceive weather events in a way that confirms those beliefs (Borick and Rabe, 2017). How should climate-focused activist organizations frame climate issues? Overall, the evidence discussed above suggests emphasizing gains from climate action and links to one’s immediate experience. For instance, McAdam (2017) suggests mobilizing an identity-based group (e.g. young people, or coastal dwellers); organizing directly in communities affected by extreme weather in order to promote knowledge of its links to climate change; utilizing anger and hope against a common enemy; and choosing a campaign that allows for small victories. However, the literature is inconclusive on this front, and effective messaging is likely to depend on the target audience and broader political climate. 3: Coalition-building Coalition-building is a feature of most activist organizations, who frequently partner and collaborate with other peer organizations as well as insider policy advocates and value-aligned politicians themselves. We found little evidence to suggest specifically how a climate organization should go about building a coalition, which is likely highly context-dependent. Importantly, public opinion and attention to climate change is highly responsive to elite partisan cues (Brulle et al., 2012; Stokes & Warshaw, 2017). For this reason, coalitions with sympathetic politicians may play an important role in amplifying and framing an issue. Politicians are highly accessible to the media and receive large amounts of coverage and attention, which filters to the public and plays a role in determining public opinion and discourse on the topic. On the other hand, of course, allying with a politician from one side of the political spectrum risks alienating members of the public on the other side. 4: Political endorsement and campaign involvement Climate activist organizations often become involved in the political process through issuing endorsements, supporting campaigns through direct voter contact campaigns to persuade and mobilize supporters, and pressuring candidates on climate issues. Political endorsements Overall, political endorsements are likely effective, particularly in settings such as primary races where voters and politicians share similar ideologies. A 2014 poll found that 60 percent of Democratic Party voters reported attaching importance to endorsements in determining which candidates to support. Voter contact The evidence of campaigns’ efforts on candidate choices is mixed, with one meta-analysis yielding an average effect of zero (Kalla & Broockman, 2018). However, efforts to mobilize existing supporters, rather than persuade undecided ones, may be more effective; recent studies suggest a positive effect on voter turnout of non-partisan get-out-the-vote efforts (Ohme et al, 2020; Peixoto et al, 2020; Green and Gerber, 2019), though this finding is by no means universal (Scott et al, 2021). We believe that such activities, when properly tailored to the race and political climate, may have a modest effect. Pressuring candidates on climate issues A number of activist organizations pressure candidates and politicians to refuse donations from fossil-fuel linked interests. The evidence on whether such donations influence political behavior is mixed. Until recently, much of the literature on campaign contributions and political donations found little evidence of systematic benefits accruing to corporations who make political donations when looking at roll call voting patterns, but more recent studies have called this into question (Powell, 2013). Kalla and Broockman (2016) find that politicians make themselves available for meetings with individuals said to be donors between 3-4 times more often than others. Overall, it is difficult to determine the effect of donations on political behavior, especially since many studies focus on single politicians and issue areas. Thus, we conclude there is modest evidence that pushing candidates to refuse campaign donations from fossil fuel interests could affect the candidate’s political behavior once in office. Refusing contributions is also unlikely to disadvantage the candidate in an election: corporate donors overwhelmingly donate to incumbents in non-competitive races (Bonica, 2016), and there is little evidence that campaign spending has electoral implications for incumbents (Gerber, 2004). Fundraising may be more impactful in competitive races and for challenger candidates (Gerber, 2004). 5, 6, 7, 8, 9: Protest action, targeted action, media content creation, attention, shifts in public opinion and candidate perception Overall, research demonstrates that activism has in the past played a key role in shifting public opinion around contentious social issues, with important implications for politics and policy. Broadly, some evidence suggests protest and movement activities generally tend to lead to greater political prospects for politicians aligned with protester demands (Gillion & Soule, 2018. Existing literature suggests that the success of mobilization is highly dependent on the number of individuals mobilized (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Importantly, negative media coverage has been shown to have had a negative effect on popular support for social movement aims (Gillon & Soule, 2018); climate policy is often the target of such coverage. Case studies in the US The civil rights protests of the 1960s were highly successful at gaining media and thus public attention, shifting public opinion, electoral support, and policy (Mazumder, 2018; Wasow, 2020). Social movements played an important role in shifting discourse and awareness around marriage equality issues in the United States (Woodly, 2015). Even movements initially seen as a failure, such as Occupy Wall Street, may turn out to bear fruit by shifting discourse five or ten years later (Engler, 2016). On the other hand, protest movements have certainly been evaluated as failing in achieving their mission, such as the anti-Vietnam war movement (McAdam & Su, 2002). Overall, these prominent case studies and others demonstrate that large-scale policy shifts driven by social movement activities are possible, but highly context-dependent, making it difficult to predict whether a particular protest act or social movement will achieve success with any reasonable certainty. The chain from base-building to action to shifting public opinion is long. Implications for climate activism Turning to climate change specifically, some evidence suggests that large-scale protests like marches may change public intentions to participate in climate social movement activities further (Swim et al. 2019). Continued participation is key to reaching the critical mass of active protestors observed by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). Overall, such evidence is not conclusive. In summary, we find ample evidence that activist mobilization can succeed in generating media attention and shifting public opinion, but little evidence that there is one “best-practice” approach to achieving public opinion and policy shifts. This suggests that a key criterion for evaluating the likely effectiveness of a climate activist organization must be the organization's ability to adapt its tactics to shifting political conditions and public opinion. 10, 11, 12: Commitments by candidates and politicians, election of political allies, climate change becomes a policy priority We observe that many climate activist organizations seek to gain commitments by elected politicians or candidates to act in a particular way. This serves partially as a way to attract media attention, but it may also be useful in changing politicians’ policy priorities. Overall, we find evidence that politicians most often do follow through on promises and commitments made during campaigns. The academic literature on the subject suggests that most politicians keep promises and follow through on their campaign commitments most of the time. A review of the literature on the subject by Pétry & Collette (2009) finds that on average across studies in North America and Europe, politicians keep their promises about 67 percent of the time. However, the variance of the studies is significant (around 10 percent) and the overall quality of research reviewed is deemed fairly low. In an analysis of follow-through on environmental campaign promises in the 105th US Congress (1997-99), Ringquist & Dasse (2004) found a rate of 73 percent agreement between campaign promises and votes on legislative proposals. Sulkin (2009) finds additional evidence of this, particularly in the context of campaign promises in the US and political activity in the 106th to 108th US congress (1999-2005). Thompson et al. (2017) provide a further up-to-date verification of these overall findings. Ultimately, we conclude that politicians are more likely to follow through on their promises than not. 13, 14: Enactment of legislative commitments, reduced atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration Activists often advocate for politicians to adopt commitments, such as commitments to decarbonize the American economy by a particular date (most often 2030 or 2050). Overall, we find little evidence that such commitments, in the context of climate policy, represent likely follow-through. Some intermediate evidence suggests that climate commitments across countries have tended to lead to expected intermediate changes (Tolliver et al., 2020). Conclusion Our analysis of available research demonstrates that activism has in the past played a key causal role in shifting public opinion around contentious social issues, with implications for politics and policy, but that such shifts are far from assured. For every instance of successful activism, instances of unsuccessful activism abound. The success of activism is highly context-dependent, relying on the ability of activists to formulate winning strategies in the face of existing and constantly shifting political, media, and public opinion conditions. Because of the demonstrated successes of activism in causing massive political and policy change around contentious social issues in the past, we believe that activism is a highly promising activity for influencing policy, but that activist organizations must be assessed for quality and the coherence of their theory of change within the political context in which they work . In our shallow-dive and deep-dive documents, we apply the lessons gained from our theory of change exercise and literature review presented here to identify high-potential opportunities for funding climate activism efforts. Note: This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes. Works Cited Bergquist, P., Mildenberger, M., & Stokes, L. (2019). 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Our research on Evergreen Collaborative's work to advance climate policy and implementation. Evergreen Collaborative: Deep Dive // BACK This deep dive was last updated in November 2022, in advance of releasing the list of Giving Green’s 2022 top climate nonprofit recommendations, which included Evergreen Collaborative. Evergreen Collaborative was not included in Giving Green’s 2023 list of top climate nonprofit recommendations. That being said, it is our impression that Evergreen Collaborative continues to do strong work and has continued to produce impressive achievements. For donors interested in supporting US policy work, we still believe that Evergreen Collaborative would be an excellent choice. The reason for removing Evergreen Collaborative from our 2023 list derives from a changing political landscape in the US and a shift in research priorities at Giving Green. We first recommended Evergreen Collaborative in 2021, primarily based on the strength of its contributions to federal legislation, during a time when Giving Green felt that there was a unique opportunity to pass federal climate legislation in the US. After the passage of major climate bills in 2021-2022 (IIJA and IRA), the legislative window for climate policy in the US seems to have mostly closed. Therefore, many advocacy groups in the US (including Evergreen Collaborative) have shifted their strategies to center implementation, regulation, and state-level policy. While these are important activities, the landscape is different enough from federal legislation that evaluating effective nonprofits in this context would first require us to conduct new research to assess the general impact strategy. Although we considered conducting this research, our 2023 research prioritization moved us in a different direction, toward advocacy targeting specific sectors and technologies. Given that Evergreen Collaborative’s work does not fall into the impact strategies we prioritized in our 2023 research, we did not fully reassess it. Therefore, it was not included in our list of 2023 top climate nonprofits. Table of Contents Executive Summary Overview Giving Green’s Research History of Evergreen Collaborative Historical Perspective Evergreen Collaborative’s Organization Budget and room for more funding Evergreen Collaborative’s Tactics Timing policies to the political climate Coordinating efforts with other climate organizations Evergreen Collaborative’s Activities and Outcomes Evergreen Collaborative’s Theory of Change – In Depth Inputs Groups Outputs Examining the Assumptions behind Evergreen Collaborative’s Theory of Change Evergreen Collaborative’s cost-effectiveness Key open questions and uncertainties Conclusion Appendix: 2021 Cost Effectiveness Analysis Overview Methods Executive Summary In this document, we provide a descriptive overview of Evergreen Collaborative’s activities and assess the organization’s marginal impact. Based on our assessment, we believe that Evergreen Collaborative is cost-effective and will likely reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2021 we focused our initial analysis on Evergreen Collaborative’s work on federal legislative advocacy given that the organization centered its 2021 and 2022 efforts on US federal climate legislation. Evergreen successfully advocated for many initiatives that were included in the IRA such as clean energy tax credits, the green bank, and environmental justice block grants. Following the 2022 passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) , Evergreen Collaborative is now planning to work on implementing bills and state-level policy, and influencing the Biden Administration and federal agencies to take further action on climate. We are cautiously optimistic that Evergreen Collaborative will be impactful in these areas as well given the organization’s track record of success and emphasis on timing its work to what is most politically tractable. Based on Evergreen Collaborative’s accomplishments, organizational strengths, strategic approach, and cost-effectiveness, we classify Evergreen Collaborative as one of our top recommendations Overview Evergreen Collaborative is a left-of-center insider policy advocacy group that was founded by former staffers of Washington State Governor Jay Inslee’s 2020 presidential campaign. It designs and advocates for policy proposals while working alongside like-minded environmental organizations such as the Sunrise Movement and the Big Greens (e.g., large and well-funded environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund). By working on policy advocacy and pooling resources with other organizations, Evergreen Collaborative seeks to influence Congress, the Executive Branch, and the states. Evergreen Collaborative has developed blueprints and fact sheets for policy proposals such as the vehicle electrification , housing retrofits , clean energy tax credits , A National Roadmap for Clean Buildings , 6 Ways President Biden Can Use Executive Action to Take on the Climate Crisis, and Meeting the Moment: How President Biden Can Align the Federal Fossil Fuel Program to Deliver on Climate and Put People Over Profits . Giving Green's Research We researched Evergreen Collaborative by reviewing publicly available information on Evergreen Collaborative, speaking with representatives from the organization and multiple experts on decarbonization and US policy, and conducting cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). Publicly available information on Evergreen Collaborative includes its website and various policy reports as well as media coverage of the organization. History of Evergreen Collaborative In early 2019, Washington state governor Jay Inslee ran for US President under a platform that centered on climate action. After he left the presidential race in August 2019, he turned his climate policy plan into an open-source document. This policy plan became a springboard for Evergreen Collaborative and Evergreen Action , which are sister organizations founded in early 2020 by former Inslee campaign staffers. Evergreen Collaborative is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization in the United States. primarily conducts policy development. As a 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization, Evergreen Action lobbies for Evergreen Collaborative’s policies. As Giving Green is part of IDinsight Inc., which is itself a charitable, tax-exempt organization, we are only offering an opinion on the charitable activities of Evergreen Collaborative, and not on Evergreen Action In this report, we occasionally refer to Evergreen Collaborative and Evergreen Action collectively as Evergreen. Since its founding, Evergreen has focused its efforts on supporting policies that aim to power the economy with 100% clean energy, invest in jobs, support environmental justice, transition the US from fossil fuels, and influence US leadership to confront climate change. Historical Perspective At the time that Evergreen was founded, Republicans controlled the White House and the Senate. This majority control made it challenging for Democrats to pass climate-related legislation at the federal level; according to numerous experts, many environmental organizations shifted their focus from federal legislation to state legislation during this time. After the 2020 election, several months after Evergreen was founded, Democrats gained a government trifecta – albeit with only very narrow control in the Senate. This opened up an opportunity for Democrats to take climate action through legislation and executive orders. Evergreen was able to capitalize on the political moment by substantially influencing both proposed and enacted legislation. After the passage of the IRA and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) , Evergreen plans to pivot away from legislative advocacy and devote more resources toward implementation, executive actions, and state-level work. Evergreen Collaborative’s Organization Evergreen’s staff and advisory board includes about 40 people, many of whom have prior experience in federal and state policy. Its advisory board includes members of well-known environmental organizations such as the BlueGreen Alliance, the US Climate Action Network, and Earth Uprising. Its board also includes several people highly involved in environmental justice groups such as the Hip Hop Caucus, the Sunrise Movement, and the ReGenesis Project. Budget and room for more funding When Evergreen was only a team of three people, its initial budget was about $1 million. Last year, it grew its budget to $3 million. About three-quarters of this funding is for Evergreen Collaborative’s 501(c)(3) fund, while the remaining quarter is for Evergreen Action’s 501(c)(4) fund. Evergreen uses its 501(c)(3) funding predominately for policy development (e.g., drafting memos for executive action and designing legislation) and state-level work. It uses its 501(c)(4) funding for lobbying, advocacy for specific bills, and communication such as its email program and social media channels. For example, in 2021, Evergreen used about half a million dollars from its 501(c)(4) funds to advocate for the Clean Energy Performance Program (CEPP) to a broad audience via television commercials. Evergreen’s 2022 budget is $5 million, but it would like it to grow to $7.5 million to increase capacity for its priority projects. In particular, it would like to expand its capacity to ensure that it can work closely with the Treasury on rulemaking. In addition, Evergreen outlined 6 ways that the Biden Administration could use executive actions , but it only has dedicated staff working on one of these pathways – the power sector. It would like to expand capacity to include more dedicated staff working on the other areas. Evergreen Collaborative’s Tactics Timing policies to the political climate Evergreen Collaborative’s strategy is to carefully time its policy communication to the political climate. For example, when President Joseph Biden won the White House and it seemed likely that Democrats would lose the Senate, Evergreen Collaborative released a list of President Biden’s proposed executive orders for combating climate change within days of the final election results. Evergreen Collaborative compiled these executive orders as a means to advocate for climate action outside of legislation; its work on calling attention to this path received media coverage through NPR’s Morning Edition . Additionally, Evergreen Collaborative developed lists of five key action items 21 different government agencies should each take on climate as the names of each agency’s potential appointees were released to the public. This was a gap in climate advocacy that other environmental groups had not filled. Evergreen Collaborative converted its original plan for a “100% Clean Energy by 2035” Clean Energy Standard (CES) into the CEPP when it became clear that given the Democrat’s very narrow control of the Senate would necessitate a structure that could pass through reconciliation. Although this particular piece of legislation was not included in the IRA, it helped set a benchmark for ambition and the level of spending in the electricity sector. Evergreen also advocated for initiatives that were included in the final bill such as EJ block grants, the green bank, and clean energy tax credits. Finally, Evergreen consistently helped shape the narrative in the media during the recent development of climate legislation as well as in response to other climate policy news. [1] According to Evergreen, the organization will still be effective if Democrats lose the government trifecta after the 2022 midterm elections. This is marked by a change in strategy as Evergreen shifts its focus away from passing federal legislation and instead works on (i) IIJA and IRA implementation, (ii) executive actions, (iii) state-level policy and implementation, and (iv) opportunities for federal legislation like the 2023 Farm Bill. Coordinating efforts with other climate organizations Evergreen Collaborative coordinates multiple actors by acting as connective tissue between diverse environmental organizations. For example, it has worked on the big picture of climate policy with the Big Greens and has also collaborated with the Sunrise Movement on developing a Civilian Climate Corps. It is also involved in an electrification coalition alongside other groups such as RMI, Rewiring America, and various environmental justice groups. Importantly, Evergreen led weekly calls on the CEPP with approximately 50 attendees from various groups, including large national organizations such as the League of Conservation Voters, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Environmental Defense Fund in addition to regional groups such as the Chesapeake Climate Action Network. Although the CEPP did not pass, the coalition that Evergreen built evolved into an ongoing 100% clean energy network that continues to push for shared power sector goals. Evergreen Collaborative’s Activities and Outcomes Evergreen Collaborative developed the original idea for the CEPP; it was initially in Governor Inslee’s climate action plan as the “2035 Clean Energy Standard” (CES) and its goal of 80% clean energy by 2030 was later adopted by President Biden. [2] Next, Evergreen Collaborative converted the CES into the CEPP, which could be passed through reconciliation. Additionally, Evergreen built an ecosystem of support around the CEPP that made it easier for other organizations to plug into efforts that would help develop and advocate for the CEPP. Finally, Evergreen Action directly lobbied committee staff about the CEPP and also worked on an almost daily basis with legislators throughout 2021 to help them design the CEPP. Several experts we spoke to agreed that without Evergreen, the CEPP is unlikely to have been developed and that if it had been, it would not have received nearly as much attention. Although the CEPP was not ultimately included in the IRA, it built momentum for power sector policy. Evergreen has also strongly advocated for clean energy tax credits , initially through the Clean Energy for America Act (CEAA). While this did not pass as stand-alone legislation, Evergreen continued its advocacy for the inclusion of similar tax credits and structures into the IRA. In its final form, the IRA includes about $30 billion in clean energy tax credits. [3] Evergreen Collaborative has also contributed to blueprints, fact sheets, and media coverage on policy proposals regarding issues such as vehicle electrification , housing retrofits , and the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (green bank). [4] Provisions related to all of these initiatives were included in the IRA. Although unable to secure the inclusion of the Civilian Climate Corps in the IRA, Evergreen successfully advocated for environmental justice initiatives that were included in the legislation such as the Climate and Environmental Justice Block Grants. [5] Moving forward, Evergreen has transitioned its strategy to reflect the climate policy landscape after the passage of the IRA. It has identified four major initiatives: implementing the IIJA and IRA, pushing the administration to take further climate action, working on state policy and implementation, and remaining active in contributing to further federal legislative climate opportunities such as the forthcoming Farm Bill. Our Take on Evergreen Collaborative’s Theory of Change – In Depth Evergreen Collaborative reduces GHGs from the atmosphere by influencing policymakers and regulators via its policy workstream and coalition building. We illustrate a simple theory of change in Figure 1. Figure 1: Our take on Evergreen Collaborative’s theory of change Inputs Evergreen Collaborative pushes climate policies forward by designing policies, strategically communicating its work, and coordinating advocacy efforts. Evergreen Collaborative’s policy work includes writing policy proposals and model bills and also strategizing ways to advance its proposals. In terms of coordination, Evergreen Collaborative works with organizations across the climate movement, including Big Greens. By working in consortium with like-minded organizations, Evergreen Collaborative helps the organizations share their expertise with one another and coordinate their efforts around policy development and advocacy. This in turn helps inform parts of Evergreen Collaborative’s own policy workstream. Ultimately, Evergreen Collaborative uses its advocacy and the advocacy of its partner organizations to apply pressure on Congress, the Executive Branch, and states to take climate action. Additionally, Evergreen’s 501(c)(4) arm directly lobbies members of Congress, the Biden Administration, and states to advocate for policies that would combat the climate crisis. It is also responsible for Evergreen’s email program and social media. Groups Evergreen Collaborative advocates for certain policies based on the political climate. It therefore focuses on influencing different branches and levels of government (e.g. federal versus state) depending on what is most tractable at the time. Before the passage of the IRA, Evergreen Collaborative mostly focused on federal legislative outcomes. With the passage of the IRA, Evergreen now plans to focus less on legislative policy and more on bill implementation, executive actions, and state-level work. Outputs While we recognize Evergreen’s contributions to the IRA, we think it is highly unlikely to expect another broad, climate-focused package in the coming cycle. By continuing to apply pressure to federal legislators, Evergreen Collaborative can improve the likelihood of Congress passing further climate legislation, even if that comes in the form of smaller climate provisions in larger bills. Upcoming opportunities include potential climate provisions in the 2023 Farm Bill. Evergreen also applies pressure to the Biden Administration and federal agencies; these efforts are among Evergreen’s priorities moving forward. In this way Evergreen can ensure that bills are implemented effectively and also encourage agencies to commit to climate action steps . Evergreen can also encourage the President to take climate action through executive orders. Evergreen has done some of this work already through its “46 for 46” report as well as its paper 6 Ways President Biden Can Use Executive Action to Take on the Climate Crisis , which detail various executive actions President Biden can take to fight against climate change. In addition, Evergreen plans to expand its work to the state and regional levels. [6] It plans to support state and localities in navigating climate funding opportunities within the IIJA and IRA including the Climate Pollution Reduction Grants and the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. We believe that its direct connections to governors’ offices in several states will increase the likelihood that Evergreen can substantially influence state-level policy and implementation. Examining the Assumptions behind Evergreen Collaborative’s Theory of Change Below, we discuss and evaluate the main assumptions related to Evergreen’s theory of change. For each of the assumptions, we rank whether we have low , medium , or high certainty about the assumption. Our assessment is based on both primary and secondary evidence, as well as our general impression of the plausibility of the assumption. [7] Importantly, a number of the stages of Evergreen’s theory of change may not be amenable to easy measurement or quantification, are not supported by a robust evidence base, or are expected to occur in the future but have not occurred as of yet. Policies that Evergreen Collaborative introduces enters the public discourse and are debated as parts of potential bills, regulations, and executive and state-level actions ( high certainty ). Evergreen Collaborative has a track record of developing policy proposals that gain traction. For example, both the CEPP and Civilian Climate Corps were co-developed by Evergreen Collaborative and have been widely covered in the media. 2. The policies that Evergreen Collaborative develops and advocates for will pass in the House and Senate ( medium certainty ). Evergreen has had mixed results. One of its main policy initiatives, the CEPP, was not included in the IRA as it was not palatable to more moderate members of the Democratic party. Evergreen successfully advocated for many initiatives that were included in the IRA such as clean energy tax credits, the green bank, and environmental justice block grants. In response to the passage of the IRA and the expectation that the political environment will be less amenable to further climate-focused legislation, Evergreen will no longer focus on federal legislation in the coming cycle. However, we do think it is possible that Evergreen may successfully influence the inclusion of climate provisions into broader pieces of legislation such as the upcoming Farm Bill. 3. Evergreen Collaborative can successfully influence the Biden Administration and federal agencies ( medium certainty ). Evergreen Collaborative wrote a plan for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to take action steps such as standardizing definitions of Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) . Since then, the SEC has developed a task force that will identify ESG-related misconduct; however, the role that Evergreen Collaborative had in this task force’s development is unclear. Evergreen also released a report card for the EPA identifying where the agency is falling behind on climate and air quality regulations as well as 6 Ways President Biden Can Use Executive and Legislative Action to Take on the Climate Crisis . 4. Evergreen Collaborative can successfully influence states ( medium certainty ). We are less familiar with Evergreen Collaborative’s work with states. Evergreen has committed much of its focus in the coming cycle to state-level initiatives. While Evergreen in its present form does not yet have as robust a track record on the state level, members of the team have worked on state-level policy and have maintained connections especially through governors’ offices. 5. After legislation is enacted, Evergreen Collaborative is an effective force for ensuring that it’s implemented in a meaningful way ( medium certainty ). As far as we know, Evergreen Collaborative has not yet conducted a significant amount of work on implementation of enacted legislation. However, this will become one of its main priorities over the coming cycle. We believe that Evergreen Collaborative will be successful given its depth of policy knowledge and experience, connections to federal and state-level policymakers, and strong media and social media presence. Evergreen Collaborative’s cost-effectiveness The cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) from 2021 (included in the Appendix) was based on the CEPP and CEAA. While many provisions from the CEAA were included in the IRA, the CEPP was not included. In addition, moving forward we project Evergreen’s main contributions to come from the implementation of the IRA. Given this, we do not find the 2021 CEA to remain relevant. Instead of entirely updating this analysis, we have made a back of the envelope calculation to estimate Evergreen’s cost-effectiveness in the context of IRA implementation. We have low confidence in the ability of this model to estimate Evergreen’s general cost-effectiveness due to uncertainty regarding the scope and efficacy of Evergreen’s influence on IRA implementation; as a result we had to use many highly subjective guess parameters. [8] Overall, we think Evergreen Collaborative could plausibly be within the range of cost-effectiveness we would consider for a top recommendation. [9] Cost-effectiveness of the IRA (estimate). We estimate the cost-effectiveness of the IRA to be about $60/tCO 2 e given that the climate provisions within the IRA constitute about $369 billion of investment and are projected to influence a cumulative ~6.3 billion tons of emissions reductions over the next decade. Evergreen’s influence on IRA implementation (guess). We then aggregate the provisions in the IRA that we believe Evergreen will attempt to impact (around $180 billion) and guess Evergreen’s level of influence on this amount. Cost-effectiveness of Evergreen. By projecting an annual budget of $7.5 million dollars, we estimate that $3.75 million dollars will go toward IRA implementation (since 2 out of 4 of Evergreen’s priorities are related to bill implementation) each year over the next decade. Choosing a conservative parameter for Evergreen’s probability of influence, we conclude that Evergreen’s cost-effectiveness, $4.88/tCO 2 , is within the range of our most cost-effective options. Key open questions and uncertainties Given that Evergreen has mostly focused on federal legislative policy development and advocacy, we are uncertain about its efficacy regarding bill implementation especially on the state level. Through conversations with Evergreen and other policy experts, we have understood small size and relative agility to be important traits behind Evergreen’s efficacy. We are uncertain if, or how much, growth of the organization will affect its nimbleness. Permitting reform has emerged as a contentious issue among climate advocates, and we are uncertain as to where Evergreen stands on the issue generally. While Evergreen came out strongly against Manchin’s permitting reform proposal, it is unclear whether Evergreen opposes that specific proposal or permitting reform more generally. [10] Conclusion Based on Evergreen Collaborative’s accomplishments, organizational strengths, strategic approach, and cost-effectiveness, we classify Evergreen Collaborative as one of our top recommendations. Regarding Evergreen’s cost-effectiveness, we acknowledge that this is neither guaranteed over time nor over its portfolio of work. Namely, it is unclear to us how Evergreen’s work moving forward (e.g., bill implementation, regulation, state policy) will compare to its legislative work in terms of impact and cost. These are aspects that we would like to explore further in the future. Nonetheless, we believe that Evergreen is a promising organization given its track record, agility, policy knowledge, sphere of influence, and emphasis on calibrating its work to the political climate. Appendix: 2021 Cost Effectiveness Analysis Overview We developed a simple CEA model that estimated Evergreen’s cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions . Our model centered on the CEPP and CEAA tax credit extensions because of (1) Evergreen’s advocacy for both the CEPP and clean energy tax credits and (2) the combined proposals would help the US power sector reach close to Evergreen’s goal of 80% clean energy by 2030. Although Giving Green is only considering the 501(c)(3) Evergreen Collective for a recommendation, our CEA model is based on the combined activities of Evergreen Collective and the 501(c)(4) Evergreen Action. This is because the activities were interlinked, and both contribute to the impacts on climate, so it would be hard to model them separately. We modeled three scenarios (i.e. Pessimistic, Realistic, and Optimistic) that varied in terms of how much influence Evergreen has in getting a bill passed with either the CEPP or the CEAA tax credit extensions included. Based on how much CO2e it would reduce between 2022 and 2030, Evergreen is predicted (in expectation) to reduce emissions at a cost of about $0.54 per metric ton of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) under our Realistic scenario. In other words, our Realistic scenario predicts that Evergreen will reduce GHGs at a cost of about 1.9 metric tons of CO2e per dollar. These results should be viewed as rough, indicative estimates given the uncertainty in our different model inputs. Overall, our results suggest that Evergreen could be highly cost-effective in reducing GHG emissions. However, we do not believe that its cost-effectiveness is guaranteed. First, there are major points of uncertainty in our model, such as estimating Evergreen Collective’s influence on getting the CEPP and CEAA tax credit extensions passed, as well as the provisions’ ultimate impact on emissions. Also, our model only considers the current moment and Evergreen’s influence on Congress will likely be significantly reduced in years where Congress is not under Democratic control; this would in turn reduce Evergreen’s expected value. Finally, our model is not all-inclusive. Namely, we do not have cost-effectiveness estimates for Evergreen’s work on influencing the Executive Branch and regulators. We would like to investigate this further in the future. Regardless, we are cautiously optimistic that Evergreen will remain cost-effective in the future given its track record of success and its emphasis on timing its work to the political climate. Methods Background Both the CEAA and CEPP are policies that are intended to make the power sector cleaner. The CEAA is expected to bring the power sector to 69% clean energy by 2030. Combining the CEAA and the CEPP is expected to lead to 78% clean energy by 2030. Evergreen Action has played a pivotal role in developing the CEPP. It has played a much smaller role in advocating for the CEAA and tax credits in general. We use Resources for the Future ’s (RFF) projected emissions for our CEA model. Overview We illustrate our CEA’s steps in the flowchart below (Figure 3). Figure 3: Flow chart of Evergreen’s cost-effectiveness analysis model. Yellow, blue, and green rectangles represent inputs, outputs, and outcomes, respectively. Our model inputs included Evergreen’s spending on the CEPP and CEAA; reductions in power sector emissions because of the CEAA and CEPP; and the change in probability of a bill passing with either CEAA or CEPP due to Evergreen. We computed Evergreen’s expected value by multiplying either provision’s CO2e reduction relative to BAU by the change in probability of a bill passing with the provision due to Evergreen. We then used Evergreen’s expected value and its spending on the CEPP and CEAA to determine the cost per change in metric ton of CO2e. We used the reciprocal of this value to estimate the change in CO2e per dollar. We also input our CEA into a Guesstimate model , which allows us to set ranges for each input and uses a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate cost-effectiveness. Each metric included 5,000 samples. This simulation enabled us to account for uncertainty in each parameter by predicting many thousands of potential futures. Detailed overview Evergreen’s spending on the CEPP Evergreen estimates that it spent around $2 million to develop and advocate for the CEPP. We understand that around $500,000 of the spending was used on TV advertising from its 501(c)(4), and the remaining amount was from its 501(c)(3) fund and was used to model the CEPP, pay staff and consultants, and support digital advertising. We are unsure how much Evergreen spent on lobbying, which would come from its 501(c)(4) fund. Evergreen also spent $500,000 on advocating for clean energy tax credits and used both its 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) accounts for this. Power sector emissions We used a CEPP and CEAA model developed by Resources for the Future (RFF). The model’s 78% clean energy by 2030 plan was closely aligned with Evergreen’s plan for 80% clean energy by 2030 and 100% clean energy by 2035 . Estimates for CO2e emissions from the RFF model were similar to other CES/CEPP models analyzed by NRDC/EDF and other researchers . We focused on emissions from between 2022 and 2030 because (1) we believe that a bold climate provision such as the CEPP can only be passed while Democrats hold a government trifecta and (2) Democrats have held a government trifecta about once every ten years over the past four decades. Based on this pattern, we assumed that a proposal similar to the CEPP would not be proposed again until 2030 at the earliest. We used a range of eight years to be conservative in our estimates. Although RFF’s projected data extends to 2040, we do not consider emissions data past 2030 because we are unsure what BAU would look like so far out in the future; it seems plausible that the rising impacts of climate change would alter the US’ BAU strategy. Change in probability of a bill passing due to Evergreen The change in probability of a bill passing with the CEPP due to Evergreen was one of the most difficult values to estimate and is highly subjective. Because we were unsure how much Evergreen changed the likelihood of a bill passing with the CEPP, we examined three different scenarios that varied in probability (i.e., Pessimistic, Optimistic, and Realistic). To estimate our cases’ probabilities, we first assumed that Evergreen would have a positive impact on getting the bill passed and that its impact would be relatively small given the number of organizations that have been involved in developing and advocating for the CEPP. We therefore assumed that the Realistic case had a probability of 1% and used that value to anchor our estimates for the Pessimistic and Optimistic cases, which we set as 0.5% and 3%, respectively. We assumed that the probability of a bill passing with the CEAA due to Evergreen would be less than the probabilities we selected for the CEPP. This is because Evergreen put less emphasis on the CEAA relative to the CEPP. Ultimately, we selected probabilities that are a tenth of what we used for Evergreen’s influence on the CEPP; we used 0.05%, 0.1%, and 0.3% for the Pessimistic, Optimistic, and Realistic cases, respectively. Results The cost per change in CO2e is predicted to be $1.08, $0.54, and $0.18 for the Pessimistic, Realistic, and Optimistic scenarios, respectively. In terms of change in CO2e per dollar, this is about 0.93, 1.9, and 5.6 metric tons of CO2e per dollar. Per our example run of our Guesstimate model, the distribution of cost per change in metric ton of CO2e is right-skewed across the thousands of simulated futures (Figure 4). The mean and median cost per change in CO2e are $0.46 and $0.42 per metric ton of CO2e, respectively. In terms of change in CO2e per dollar, the mean and median are about 2.6 and 2.4 metric tons of CO2e, respectively. The 5th and 95th percentiles are about 1.2 and 4.6 metric tons of CO2e per dollar, respectively (Table 1). Figure 4: Histogram of cost per change in metric ton of CO2e. Values along the horizontal axis indicate the cost to remove one metric ton of CO2e from the atmosphere. The horizontal axis is truncated to the 1st and 99th percentiles. Table 1: Percentiles for change in CO2e per dollar Endnotes Evergreen Collaborative is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization in the United States. As Giving Green is part of IDinsight Inc., which is itself a charitable, tax-exempt organization, we are only offering an opinion on the charitable activities of Clean Air Task Force, and not on CATF Action. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes. [1] “ The analysis, which was conducted by the climate advocacy group Evergreen Action, examined whether the EPA is on track to finalize 10 power-sector regulations before the end of President Biden's first term.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/10/05/epa-is-falling-behind-power-plant-rules-report-says/ [2] According to an outside expert we spoke to, Evergreen played a role in getting the CES on President Biden’s campaign agenda. Namely, Governor Inslee’s staffers (now Evergreen) influenced Governor Inslee’s climate platform, which influenced Senator Bernie Sanders’ platform, which later influenced President Joe Biden after he spoke with Senator Sanders’ team about developing consensus positions on climate change during the 2020 presidential race. [3] “Among the many funding measures included in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) ( P.L. 117-169 ) that are geared toward combating climate change is the inclusion of $30 billion in clean energy tax credits for resources such as solar and wind energy and battery storage.” https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/clean-energy-tax-credits-get-a-boost-in-new-climate-law [4] “This is, I think, one of the most exciting and transformational investments and programs in this new law,” said Sam Ricketts, co-founder of the climate group Evergreen Action. “The importance of a national clean energy accelerator is that it’s a national entity, with a national mandate to finance these projects in every state.” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/11/green-bank-clean-energy-climate-change [5] “The Inflation Reduction Act includes historic investments in environmental justice, including establishing several new environmental justice grant programs.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/17/fact-sheet-inflation-reduction-act-advances-environmental-justice/ [6] The pivotal role for states in implementing the IRA. https://www.evergreenaction.com/blog/pivotal-role-for-states-in-implementing-the-ira [7] We describe our certainty as low/medium/high to increase readability and avoid false precision. Since these terms can be interpreted differently, we use rough heuristics to define them as percentage likelihoods the assumption is, on average, correct. Low = 0-70%, medium = 70-90%, high = 90-100%. [8] We describe our confidence as low/medium/high to increase readability and avoid false precision. Since these terms can be interpreted differently, we use rough heuristics to define them as percentage likelihoods our takeaway (i.e., [not] plausibly within the range of cost-effectiveness we would consider recommending) is correct. Low = 0-70%, medium = 70-90%, high = 90-100%. [9] As a heuristic to guide our research prioritization, we consider something to plausibly be within the range of cost-effectiveness we would consider for a top recommendation if its estimated cost-effectiveness is within an order of magnitude of $1/tCO2e (i.e., less than $10/tCO2e). [10] https://www.evergreenaction.com/press/evergreen-statement-on-permitting-reform-proposal

Renewable energy projects can sell carbon offsets, but the offsets may not always make an impact on emissions. Grid Renewable Energy // BACK This report was last updated in November 2020. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. Summary Adding renewable energy capacity to the electricity grid is a critical part of the energy transition and almost certainly contributes to reduced greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is very difficult to prove the additionality of renewable energy offsets, since many projects would be built regardless of their ability to sell carbon credits. Since renewable energy projects are frequently large and complex, project developers can’t rely on the uncertain voluntary offset market to justify new projects. Projects likely to be additional are ones in locations where renewable energy is unprofitable and not mandatory, where offsets provide a large proportion of the funding, and where the developer is continuing to develop new projects. Giving Green has done an initial assessment of many renewable energy offsets sold directly to consumers, and we have not found any that meet our criteria. Therefore, we do not recommend any renewable energy offsets at this time. However, we are continuing to assess the market for renewable energy offsets that we can recommend, as we believe that some grid renewable energy offsets are likely additional. Grid renewable energy as a carbon offset Decarbonizing the power grid is a key part of the energy transition, so electricity production is a natural place donors look to support. Investing directly into building new plants is unattainable for most climate-conscious consumers, but instead, they can support these projects through purchasing offsets. Offsets for the renewable energy field are a bit more complex than other types of offsets, as there are many different types of credit available. There are at least 5 major players in the field and each NGO has its own name/acronym to refer to offset credit [1]. To make matters even more confusing, some credits do not actually claim to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs). In this report, we try our best to demystify this complex field. We will focus on the terminology used by Gold Standard for this review since they are one of the more respected certifiers in the field. There are two types of offset instruments for renewable energy: Renewable Energy Credits (REC) and Verified Emission Reductions (VER). “[RECs] are tradable, non-tangible energy commodities that represent proof that 1 megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity was generated from an eligible renewable energy resource ( renewable electricity ) and was fed into the shared system of power lines which transport energy” [2]. By purchasing RECs, consumers can claim to contribute a “direct and quantifiable impact on increasing the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix” [3]. They are sold on renewable energy markets. RECs do not require demonstration of additionality, and therefore are not meant to equate to a reduction in emissions. Verified Emission Reductions (VER), in contrast, go through a more robust verification process that seeks to verify additionality, and therefore guarantee reduction in GHG emissions. Since the focus of our review is to find instruments that cause reduction in emissions, we will be focusing on VERs. Theoretically, this market is a win-win-win situation: creators of renewable energy projects can fundraise money for their investments, consumers of VERs get to claim reduction in emissions, and active steps are taken towards reduction in GHG emissions. But do investments into VERs actually cause reduction of GHGs? Let’s take a closer look at the certification process and how complex it can become. Causality Adding renewable energy to the grid will reduce GHGs if it is replacing generation (either current or planned) that would have taken place using fossil fuels. This is likely true in most circumstances, since fossil energy is the most common source of grid generation. However, this might vary based on the circumstance. For instance, if renewable energy is used to replace nuclear energy (which may happen in countries that are phasing out nuclear power), then the renewable energy may not actually have an effect on GHGs. Overall, it is important to know the dynamics of the specific electricity market to understand causality of renewable grid energy projects. Project-level additionality A grid electricity project satisfies project-level additionality if it only would have been developed due to the ability to sell VERs. Depending on the specifics of the local power market, this assumption may or may not hold for a number of reasons. First, renewable energy technologies such as wind and solar are becoming comparable in cost to fossil fuel generation of power without the sales of VERs [4], making investments into renewable energy a potentially attractive option in the absence of carbon offset markets. In places where they are not profitable on their own, they are frequently supported by government subsidies that attract project developers. So VERs may not be a strong factor in a project developer’s decision to invest or not invest into renewable energy (Broekhoff et al. 2019). This may not hold in all places: region-specific assessments for energy generation profitability may improve one’s ability to determine additionality more accurately. For example, Cames et al. 2016 highlight that additionality is unlikely to hold in India due to high profitability of on-shore wind generation. Second, the problem lies in the market itself. Once projects receive certified VERs, they need to sell them in order to realize any value. Project developers who sell their VERs on voluntary markets cannot be sure that anyone will buy them. Also, prices are driven by market forces, so project developers will be unsure about future revenues from offsets even if they are purchased. This creates uncertainty in the revenue stream for investors. Anticipating high unpredictability of fundraising on the voluntary market makes potential project developers heavily discount the outcomes from the market, and hedge against the volatility by relying on different sources of funding. One potential solution to this is to secure the purchase of the VER prior to implementation through emission reduction purchase agreements, or ERPAs (Broekhoff et al. 2019). Offsets purchased as part of ERPAs, therefore, have a higher chance of being additional, but these are generally not purchasable in small quantities by individuals. Timing is a critical issue. VERs are only issued by certifying agencies after a plant is up and running. Therefore, in a very literal sense buying VERs that are not part of an ERPA cannot possibly cause a project to be executed. It arguably makes sense to take a wider view of causality: by creating demand for VERs through the purchase of an offset, you can spur future projects that rely on offset sales to be profitable. If projects are being developed due to the belief that the project developers will be able to sell VERs in the future, they need to see active demand in the VER market. Therefore, by buying VERs for a past project, you may cause future projects to be developed. There is a much more direct link if the organization selling the VERs is continuing to develop more renewable energy projects, and can use the income from offsets to fuel these new investments. Another problem is that the voluntary markets cover only a small fraction of total costs, which further demonstrates that VERs may not alter the decisions of investors (Gillenwater 2008). In the case of the Belen plant, generated VER revenue per year is projected to be 584,010 euros per year, or about 10% of yearly revenue from electricity sales. While this is not a trivial amount, it is unclear if this was really enough to swing the initial investment decision. Marginal additionality Marginal additionality is achieved if each offset/VER sale can lead to additional GHG removal. Renewable energy generation projects are large, capital-intensive projects. They tend to have high up-front costs, and then relatively low operational costs that should be easily covered by electricity sales. Therefore, VER income is generally not necessary to keep projects running once they are already built. Also, in most cases, a developer is managing just one project. This means that if they receive VER income above their capital and operations cost for the project, it will likely go towards profits as opposed to developing additional renewable energy projects. This means that at some point, VERs will not have any effect on emissions. Overall, we believe the marginal additionality for renewable electricity plants is likely to be low, even if project-level is satisfied. Permanence When polluting electricity is replaced by clean energy, this permanently avoids emissions. Therefore, there is no concern about permanence in renewable energy projects. Co-benefits Fossil energy plants can cause air and water pollution, which has detrimental effects on human health and natural ecosystems. If renewable energy plants cause fossil fuel plants to go offline (or not be built), then it can achieve these co-benefits. However, these can be difficult to measure because it’s difficult to know the exact health and environmental counterfactual. Overall, we believe that renewable energy plants likely do have some co-benefits, though they are difficult to quantify. Assessment of grid renewable energy projects In summary, while we acknowledge that adding renewable energy to the grid is a key part of the energy transition, we believe that it is very difficult to verify the additionality of renewable energy offsets. Therefore, it is difficult to find reliable offsets. Offsets are more likely to be additional for projects with the following characteristics: They are in a context wherein increase in renewable energy is not required by mandates. They are in a context where renewable energy projects are unlikely to be profitable, even after taking into account government subsidies Offset revenue makes up a large proportion of a project’s revenue. The project developer is continuing to develop more renewable energy projects. Giving Green has done an initial assessment of many renewable energy offsets sold directly to consumers, and have not found any projects in which we are confident that they meet the above criteria. Therefore, we do not recommend any renewable energy offsets at this time. However, we are continuing to assess the market for renewable energy offsets that we can recommend, as we believe that some offsets are likely additional. [1] Table 1 in http://www.offsetguide.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/11.15.19.pdf [2] https://www.goldstandard.org/articles/gold-standard-renewable-energy-labels [3] https://www.goldstandard.org/impact-quantification/renewable-energy-markets [4] US energy information administration compares costs electricity generation, concluding that, on average pre-tax costs of operating/building a wind plant are comparable with non-green technologies ( link ). References Gillenwater, Michael. "Redefining RECs—part 1: untangling attributes and offsets." Energy Policy 36, no. 6 (2008): 2109-2119. Gillenwater, Michael. "Redefining RECs—Part 2: Untangling certificates and emission markets." Energy Policy 36, no. 6 (2008): 2120-2129. Gillenwater, Michael. "Probabilistic decision model of wind power investment and influence of green power market." Energy Policy 63 (2013): 1111-1125. Broekhoff, Derik Gillenwater, Michael Colbert-Sangree, Tani Cage, Patrick “Securing Climate Benefit: A Guide to Using Carbon Offsets”, November 2019, http://www.offsetguide.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/11.15.19.pdf Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2018 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo18/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf Cames, Martin, Ralph O. Harthan, Jürg Füssler, Michael Lazarus, Carrie M. Lee, Peter Erickson, and Randall Spalding-Fecher. "How additional is the clean development mechanism." Analysis of the application of current tools and proposed alternatives (2016). https://ec.europa.eu/clima/system/files/2017-04/clean_dev_mechanism_en.pdf

This grant to Solutions for Our Climate will fund its work across Asia to decarbonize steel and petrochemicals production. Solutions For Our Climate // BACK Overview The Giving Green Fund plans to award a restricted grant to Solutions for Our Climate (SFOC) for its work to decarbonize heavy industry. SFOC is a research and advocacy organization based in South Korea that works to align policy, business, and finance activities with international climate targets. Our grant to SFOC falls into our philanthropic strategy for decarbonizing heavy industry. Please see Giving Green’s deep dive report on decarbonizing heavy industry for more information, including risks and potential co-benefits, recommended sub-strategies, theory of change, funding need, and key uncertainties. Last updated: October 2024 What is Solutions for Our Climate? SFOC was established in 2016 in South Korea to advocate for governments and corporations to take evidence-based climate action with an initial focus on decarbonizing the power sector. It has grown exponentially and now drives reductions across South Korea’s largest sources of emissions, including industry, transport, and land use change. SFOC’s core activities include technical research, litigation, community organizing, and policy advocacy. SFOC also fulfills an important role as a thought leader for climate action in South Korea, with frequent broadcast and print media collaborations. It is expanding its international presence through multilateral convenings and its on-the-ground team members in Japan, and Thailand. What are we funding at SFOC, and how could it help reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Heavy industry accounts for around one-third of global greenhouse gas emissions, and Asia is the largest manufacturing region in the world. We think both technological progress and an enabling policy environment are needed to incentivize manufacturers to shift to low-carbon production methods. We are giving a restricted grant that can be used flexibly across SFOC’s industry programs: Steel : SFOC’s steel program advocates for the government, producers, and consumers to work towards steel carbon neutrality by 2040. Its policy work blends government advocacy and education; its target policies include an updated low-carbon steel strategy, financing for green hydrogen RD&D, and more ambitious industry-specific Nationally Determined Contributions working towards the Paris Agreement. Its producer advocacy work campaigns against the repair and upgrade of coal-based blast furnaces and challenges greenwashing claims. Its consumer work advocates for steel-consuming industries, like auto manufacturers, to set green procurement commitments. Petrochemicals: SFOC’s petrochemicals program started in 2024. Its initial strategy is to advocate for the government to increase the stringency of petrochemical regulations, and for corporations to set Scope 3 emissions reduction targets and publish decarbonization roadmaps. Why do we think SFOC will use this funding well? We have been impressed by SFOC’s climate advocacy leadership and its strong track record. In the power sector, SFOC started a coalition of organizations that campaigned for South Korea’s commitment to end overseas coal finance, with subsequent commitments following this in Japan and China. SFOC also participated in campaigns to prevent the building of 3,700 MW of new coal power plants and expedite the retirement of 8,000 MW of coal power plants. We think philanthropic funding for industrial decarbonization is especially neglected in Asia, and therefore, we are excited to support SFOC’s efforts in the field. SFOC’s steel program successes included government advocacy leading up to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy’s request for KRW 880 billion ($638 million) to commercialize green steel technology and successful litigation against the greenwashing claims of South Korea’s largest steel company. We believe SFOC will be able to replicate previous levels of success in its nascent petrochemicals program. For more on the difference between the grantees of the Giving Green Fund and our Top Nonprofits, please see this blog post on the Giving Green Fund. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

GFI is one of our top climate charity picks in 2024. Read our research into their work advancing alternative proteins. Good Food Institute: Recommendation // BACK Good Food Institute: Recommendation Last updated in November 2024. The Good Food Institute (GFI) promotes alternatives to conventional livestock products through science, policy, and corporate engagement workstreams. GFI is one of the top climate nonprofits selected by Giving Green in 2024. Livestock emissions are the largest source of food system emissions and are only expected to grow in the coming decades. We think shifting demand from emissions-intensive conventional livestock products to alternative proteins, such as plant-based and cultivated meat, is one of the most promising pathways to decrease emissions from agriculture and land use. According to our theory of change, GFI's work to make alternative proteins as delicious and affordable as meat could reduce meat consumption and help people follow a more climate-friendly diet. We recommend GFI because of its successful track record, breadth of expertise, and strategic approach. We think GFI plays a unique and important role in promoting alternative proteins and that its work could reduce demand for conventional meat. We also believe GFI has substantial room to grow in its three programmatic areas and across its regional offices. Since alternative protein production is still in its early stages, we plan to continue to monitor alternative protein development and look forward to following GFI’s efforts in this space. We previously recommended GFI in 2022 and 2023. For more information, see our deep dive research report , a summary below, and our more comprehensive food sector report . What is the Good Food Institute? GFI is a nonprofit that seeks to make alternative proteins competitive with conventional proteins in terms of taste and price. Launched in 2016, GFI is headquartered in the US and has independent affiliate offices in the Asia Pacific region (based in Singapore), Brazil, Europe, India, Japan, and Israel. How could GFI help address climate change? Livestock emissions include direct emissions from livestock, such as methane release from cows, and indirect emissions, such as those caused by deforestation. Reducing livestock production is an important lever for driving down emissions and freeing up land that could be used for carbon sequestration activities. We think that making alternative proteins equal to or better than conventional meat could make them the default choice for more consumers, resulting in fewer food system emissions. What does GFI do? GFI has three focus areas: science, policy, and industry. Its science-focused activities include identifying research gaps, regranting to and advocating for open-access research, and convening scientists. Its policy workstream includes advocating for increased government funding for alternative protein research and development, campaigning for fair-label laws, challenging cultivated meat bans, and establishing a clear path to market for cultivated meat. Its industry work includes supporting smaller alternative protein startups and building relationships with large agri-food companies to encourage them to invest in alternative protein products. What’s new at GFI in 2024? GFI added significant wins to its track record in 2024. Highlights include its partnership with the Bezos Earth Fund to unlock $100 million of funding for three global alternative protein research centers, engagement with Singapore’s Islamic council on the first-ever authoritative ruling that cultivated meat can be halal, and opening GFI’s newest office in Japan. Its ongoing work includes continued wins unlocking millions of dollars of public funding for alternative protein innovation, securing support for alternative proteins as national priorities, and challenging several cultivated meat bans in Europe and the US. What would GFI do with your donation? GFI is currently fundraising for its three-year goal of $125 million. GFI would use this funding to maintain core operations across its seven global organizations and expand internationally, including its recent launch of GFI Japan and plans for building GFI Korea. Why is Giving Green excited about GFI? We think GFI continues to be a powerhouse in alternative protein thought leadership and action. It has strong ties to government, industry, and research organizations and continues to achieve impressive wins. We believe donations to GFI can help stimulate systemic change that reduces food system emissions on a global scale. Explore ways to give to Good Food Institute and more. GFI has 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) entities. As Giving Green is part of IDinsight, which is itself a charitable, tax-exempt organization, we are only offering an opinion on the charitable activities of GFI’s 501(c)(3) arm, and not on GFI’s 501(c)(4) entity. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

We chose The Superpower Institute as one of the most effective climate organisations. Read more about our decision. The Superpower Institute: Recommendation // BACK Last updated in 2024. Giving Green recommends The Superpower Institute as one of Australia's most effective organisations combating climate change. Their theory of change is compelling, and their staff holds uniquely strong expertise. We are further excited by the thought leadership it has built popularising Australia as a renewable energy superpower. The Superpower Institute aims to help Australia seize the extraordinary economic opportunities of the post-carbon world while allowing Australia to become a major player in climate globally. The Superpower Institute has an ambitious plan for accelerating Australia’s development into a major exporter of renewable energy and green industrial products. In addition to mitigating domestic emissions, which make up approximately 1% of global emissions, The Superpower Institute’s approach may also provide Australia with an opportunity to decarbonise up to 7% of global carbon emissions. If successful, this approach would deliver significant economic benefits coupled with significantly higher levels of impact on climate change than could be achieved under any domestic strategy. The Superpower Institute reports a funding gap of $1.5 million AUD and would invest additional funds in expanding its research and policy work. For more information, see our deep dive research report and a summary below. What is The Superpower Institute? The Superpower Institute is an Australia-based nonprofit focused on accelerating Australia’s transition to a renewable energy "Superpower" – a major green energy and green industrial exporter. Through this approach, Australia could do more than just reduce its own domestic emissions; it could play a globally important role in addressing climate change. The Superpower Institute was launched in 2022 by two of Australia’s most respected economists, Ross Garnaut AC and Rod Sims AO . Ross Garnaut was Senior Economic Adviser to Prime Minister Bob Hawke, Australia's ambassador to China, and led the Garnaut Climate Change Review in 2007 and 2010. This review was the most comprehensive economic modeling project on climate change ever undertaken in Australia at the time. Garnaut has also had significant influence shaping Australian climate dialogue through his research and his books, ‘ Superpower: Australia’s Low-Carbon Opportunity ’ and ‘ The Superpower Transformation: Building Australia's Zero-Carbon Future ’. Rod Sims is another of Australia’s premiere economists. Sims was the longest-serving chair of the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission in the agency's history. How could The Superpower Institute help address climate change? The Superpower Institute aims to combat climate change by producing policy research and by engaging in public policy and evidence-based communication. It focuses on approaches to decarbonising Australian heavy industry exports, which comprise a high portion of Australia’s emissions profile. We believe this approach is the most impactful area of work in the Australian climate space. The Superpower Institute’s research and policy work can also play an integral role in accelerating the development of green industry across Australia. What does The Superpower Institute do? The Superpower Institute engages in practical research and policy advising, with a specific focus on addressing climate changes in high-impact ways while unlocking significant opportunities across the Australian economy. The Superpower Institute researches and designs regulatory settings and market incentives needed to make Australia to become a leader in green energy and associated industries. The Superpower Institute provides in-depth economic analysis and policy insights to Federal Government through advisory work, policy proposals, and research reports. What evidence is there of The Superpower Institute’s effectiveness? While The Superpower Institute is a fairly new organisation, with only a short time to develop a track record, they are gaining steady traction. Already, The Superpower Institute has assisted the South Australian Government in developing a roadmap which can help the state play a major role in building the zero-carbon world economy. The South Australian Government is already taking action to implement plans in this direction. And while The Superpower Institute’s work on a National Emissions Monitoring Roadmap, which could be implemented by Federal Government, is still in its early stages, this work has already received significant praise from organizations such as the Climate Change Authority (a Federal Government agency) and the Sunrise Project. In addition, The Superpower Institute’s founders have had significant influence in the past on climate policy, climate projects, and climate dialogue in Australia. Garnaut played a critical role in the development of the Hornsdale Power Reserve , also known as the South Australian ‘Big Battery’. When it was built in 2017, this battery was the world's first large-scale lithium-ion battery storage system, and it was one of the largest climate projects to go ahead in Australia that decade. Garnaut also coined and popularized the concept of Australia as a ‘Renewable Energy Superpower’ through his books and reports. Experts we interviewed cited Garnaut as integral to the development and dissemination of this idea, and they cited the significant impact of these ideas on federal policy. The current Australian government has also incorporated the term "renewable energy superpower" in its 2023 Federal Budget, indicating its alignment with this vision and the growing influence of Garaut’s and the Superpower Institute’s proposals. What would The Superpower Institute do with your donation? Donating to The Superpower Institute will contribute to expanded research and policy impacts. Specifically, in the short term, they will likely focus on proposals such as the National Emissions Monitoring Network—a powerful enabling feature for developing green industry in Australia and for the successful operation of Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism. The Safeguard Mechanism is a major policy implemented by the Australian Government, similar to a carbon credit scheme, that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from major companies. Longer-term policy work will focus on the design and implementation of policy architecture that will support Australia’s rapid transition to green industry for export, including the correction of market failures; accounting for externalities; and encouraging innovation to develop export markets for zero-carbon commodities where Australia has a comparative advantage, such as green aviation fuel, green fertiliser, green iron, green aluminum, and green silicon. Why is Giving Green excited about The Superpower Institute? The Superpower Institute supports the development of Australia into a major exporter of renewable energy and green industrial products. It plans to significantly accelerate the development of green industry in Australia - an approach that is strategic, large-scale, economically beneficial, and informed by some of the nation’s most renowned economists. The Superpower Institute's team offers unique expertise in climate, economics, and other fields. We think The Superpower Institute’s theory of change is compelling and that the organization is earning its position as a future leader in the Australian climate space. Donate to The Superpower Institute to advance Australia’s climate superpower: using our domestic resources to decarbonise the globe. Giving Green is part of IDInsight Inc., a charitable, tax-exempt organization. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes. // BACK

We chose The Next Economy as one of the most effective climate organisations. Read more about our decision. The Next Economy: Recommendation // BACK Last updated in 2024. Giving Green recommends The Next Economy (TNE) as one of Australia's most effective organisations in combating climate change. Their evidence-based theory of change and history of success are complemented by expansive community engagement work. Their unique insights are rooted in on-the-ground consultations and provide policymakers with a meaningful lens through which to view climate change and then to act. The Next Economy works across all economic sectors to accelerate Australia’s transition to a climate-centered, economically sound future. The Next Economy works with all stakeholders to tackle some of the hardest issues facing the country as Australia moves towards net zero: for example, the decarbonisation of the land sector, and the sustainable and fair development of heavy industries key to Australia’s export future like green manufacturing and critical minerals development. The Next Economy’s ability to leverage what it is learning on the ground to influence new policies sets it apart from many other organisations. Because public support and action are integral to Australia’s transition to a zero-carbon future, TNE collaborates with communities, industries, and governments to identify climate opportunities that are pragmatic and meaningful to all stakeholders. TNE has also identified green heavy industry as a major area of focus, and it considers green industrial exports a core pillar of Australia’s future economy. The Next Economy’s approach and deep relationships with communities across the country increase the likelihood of accelerated action on climate change by ensuring that new developments deliver lasting and tangible benefits for the climate, communities, workers, and the environment. The Next Economy reports a funding gap of $400,000 AUD and would invest new funds in 2024 to further its research and policy advisory work at both state and federal levels. For more information, see our deep dive research report and a summary below. What is The Next Economy? Launched in 2018, The Next Economy is an Australia-based nonprofit and consultancy focused on supporting and accelerating Australia’s evolution to a zero-emissions economy while engaging and supporting regional communities involved in the transition. How could The Next Economy help address climate change? The Next Economy aims to combat climate change by tackling practical challenges and social attitudes towards decarbonisation to increase the likelihood that green projects and climate policies will advance. It ensures that local stakeholders are informed and consulted so that critical groups' concerns can contribute to policies and projects wherever possible. These efforts help to preempt pushback while garnering more public support. The Next Economy does considerable work supporting initiatives with significant potential to reduce emissions, such as major projects to decarbonise heavy industry or which lay the foundations for future green heavy industry. What does The Next Economy do? The Next Economy seeks to support groups across regional Australia to develop plans and strategies that reduce carbon emissions while simultaneously creating beneficial social, environmental and economic outcomes. Through consultancy projects, community engagement, and utilising on-the-ground insights, TNE advocate for climate policy developments at state and federal levels This advisory work could lead to significantly more tractable and publicly acceptable climate policies, accelerate the development of a zero-carbon Australia, and promote Australia’s green export industries. Overall, The Next Economy aims to do all of this while creating an economically prosperous future with thriving regional economies. What evidence is there of The Next Economy’s effectiveness? In recent years, TNE has made significant progress in accelerating critical green projects. One example is their work with the Gladstone Regional Council to develop the Gladstone 10-year Economic Transition Roadmap . Previously, Gladstone - a primary coal mining region - was considered one of the carbon capitals of Australia. Now, Gladstone identifies as one of Australia’s major green industrial hubs, home to multiple new industrial-scale green hydrogen and ammonia developments. Experts we interviewed cited TNE as being a key driver of this change. Similarly, experts cited TNE’s advisory work a shaving had influence on climate policy at both federal and state levels. As such, we consider The Next Economy to have a strong history of success. What would The Next Economy do with your donation? Donating to The Next Economy will further help it to enable vital research and policy advisory work. Funding would be used to support research and policy staff who can enhance The Next Economy’s policy advisory work with state and federal governments. Funding would also allow The Next Economy to be able to respond to new advocacy opportunities and assist with the growth of its communications work, such as the development of flagship reports and timely media engagement. Why is Giving Green excited about The Next Economy? The Next Economy supports the development of a zero-carbon Australia in an economically beneficial, politically feasible way while mitigating push-back on key green projects. Few groups are as well-placed as The Next Economy to smooth the way for new renewable projects and policies. The Next Economy has unique advantages in its strong working relationships with local communities, which make its policy advising activities especially salient. We think there is strong evidence to support its theory of change and have assessed that The Next Economy has room to deploy more funding impactfully. Donate to The Next Economy to advance a sustainable and fair green transition. Giving Green is part of IDInsight Inc., a charitable, tax-exempt organization. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes. // BACK

Do biochar and bio-oil carbon offsets sequester CO2 emissions? Our independent analysis finds the best offsets and carbon removals to reduce climate change. Biochar & Bio-oil // BACK This report was last updated in January 2023. The prior version of this report was published in November 2022 . Summary Biochar is a charcoal-like substance that is created by heating up biomass (typically agricultural residues) at very high temperatures in a low-oxygen environment – a process known as pyrolysis. Converting biomass into biochar effectively halts much of the decomposition of biomass that would have led to the release of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases. Biochar is typically applied to soils where it is claimed to enhance soil quality, though this is highly dependent on several conditions that still need to be fully understood through large scale field trials. Since biochar is often sold to farmers as soil amendments, it can be difficult to ascertain the additionality of buying biochar offsets. It is also difficult to quantify the permanence of biochar, as well as its soil benefits, as it can vary based on production and post-production conditions. We believe biochar has the potential to be a beneficial tool in addressing climate change, and have based our recommendations on the projects that we feel best address issues of additionality and permanence. We recommend one biochar project— Mash Makes —which can meet these criteria by giving away biochar we estimate as high-permanence for free. Bio-oil, a dense liquid that is also created through pyrolysis, can overcome biochar's additionality and permanence challenges if it is not sold for commercial purposes but is instead injected underground in geologic formations. We recomend one company— Charm Industrial —that produces bio-oil and injects it underground. What is biochar? Carbon removed from the atmosphere through the process of photosynthesis is released back into the atmosphere when biomass (organic material) biologically degrades. Biochar is a charcoal-like product that is created by heating biomass to very high temperatures in a low-oxygen environment—a process known as pyrolysis. Converting biomass to biochar slows the decaying process and locks stored carbon in place, in turn slowing down its release back into the atmosphere.[ 1 ] This charcoal-like substance can be added to soils, which prolongs carbon storage, enhances soil quality, and potentially increases crop yields in some conditions , enabling the soil to sequester more carbon overall.[ 2 ] A process known as “fast pyrolysis” can be used to convert biomass into bio-oil which can be used as an energy feedstock or pumped back underground for permanent storage. Biochar as a carbon removal While biochar is a relatively mature product, its use as a carbon removal is quite nascent. The IPCC revised its carbon removal guidelines to include biochar in 2019.[ 3 ] Shortly after, Puro.Earth released its biochar methodology for use in verifying biochar projects in the carbon removal market, followed by the release of the Verra biochar methodology in 2022. [ 4 ] Projects are primarily certified by either the European Biochar Certificate or the Puro Standard , with carbon credits available for purchase through traditional carbon registries, marketplaces such as Puro.Earth , and directly from projects themselves.[ 5 ] In fact, at time of writing this overview, major carbon offset registries had not yet begun listing biochar projects. The American Carbon Registry rejected an effort to approve a methodology for biochar projects after a peer review process found limited evidence of the stability of soil carbon sequestration in fields treated with biochar. Another registry, Verra, only recently proposed a methodology for establishing project baselines and project additionality for biochar projects with public review and final approval of this methodology expected by the end of 2021. Despite the lack of existing certification, marketplaces like Puro.Earth have made it possible to buy biochar carbon removal credits from providers outside of traditional carbon registries, and a few biochar and bio-oil producers make it possible to purchase carbon removal credits directly. Mechanism When biomass is converted to biochar, it dramatically slows the release of carbon into the atmosphere by preventing the biological decomposition of biomass - avoiding the release of greenhouse gases. For example, projects that collect biologically degrading agricultural wastes and convert them into biochar are generally seen as emissions avoidance projects. Some biochar advocates claim that removing crop waste from natural cycles of growth and decay (by converting it to biochar) is the equivalent of a carbon-negative technology. From our perspective, we admit that is somewhat of a grey area between avoided emissions and CO2 removal. As the production of biochar results in carbon being removed from the atmosphere overall, we lean towards considering biochar and bio-oil projects to be carbon removal, addressing ambiguity by labeling it a medium-permanence removal strategy. Projects that grow plants for the purposes of converting plant biomass to biochar have a more solid claim to be considered CO2 removal, as the project boundary includes the removal of carbon from the atmosphere through photosynthesis. Growing plants for this purpose, however, can have negative environmental and land use implications, and we therefore believe this approach should only be pursued if it does not harm food security, biodiversity, and rural livelihoods in the process. Proponents have also claimed that biochar applied to soils can increase crop yields, suggesting higher carbon dioxide uptake by plants through the process of photosynthesis, and therefore that biochar adds to carbon removal from the atmosphere. This effect has not been widely studied in field trials and varies significantly due to soil type, biochar composition, and other environmental conditions (see Causality section). We therefore ignore this in determining whether a biochar project is an avoidance or removal project unless strong evidence can be provided on the added soil carbon sequestration claims. Causality Produced from organic materials that have high carbon content, biochar is made up of anywhere between 35% to 95% carbon .[ 6 ] The product fixes carbon that would have otherwise been released into the atmosphere as carbon dioxide (every ton of carbon fixed in biochar results in 3.61 tons of avoided CO2 emissions as CO2 has a higher molecular weight than carbon).These organic materials, typically crop residues like wheat straw, corn stover, almond shells, rice husk, and others, would have been broken down by soil microorganisms, which release CO2 and other gases in the process and return nutrients from crop residues back into the soil .[ 7 ] A recent study found that leaving crop residues to decay on agriculture farms may actually store more carbon in the soils than would have been the case had the residues been cleared (though these benefits may be offset by increased emissions of nitrous oxide , a strong greenhouse gas).[ 8 ] Converting forestry and crop residues to biochar and applying them to soils leads to longer, more stable storage of carbon in soils than if residues were burned or simply applied to soils (approximately 50% of the original carbon is stored in biochar compared to 3% retained after burning and less than 20% after 5-10 years of biological decomposition).[ 9 ] The production of bio-oil through fast pyrolysis that is subsequently sequestered into injection wells also results in a more stable storage of carbon than would have otherwise decomposed. Biochar's and bio-oil's ability to fix carbon that would have otherwise more quickly decomposed is assessed as high, though the longevity of this benefit varies based on several factors, which are covered in the Permanence section. Project Additionality Biochar is a product that is commonly sold to farms where it is added to soils. Biochar projects that primarily depend on the sale of carbon credits, as opposed to the sale of physical biochar to farms, can make a reasonable claim to additionality. These projects tend to provide biochar to end users for free or at a substantial discount. Bio-oil that is sequestered underground and not sold to an end user would also satisfy additionality. Many of the projects we evaluated, however, depend primarily on the sale of biochar to farms as a soil amendment, making it hard to determine whether the biochar would have been produced without the sale of credits. For example, in 2012, it was found that an estimated 90% of biochar produced in Europe has been used as a feed additive in livestock farming for years, suggesting an already robust existing market for the product.[ 10 ] A 2018 producer survey estimated total biochar production at 36,700 to 76,600 tons per year in North America . A separate 2018 analysis estimated global biochar production at over 394 kilotons in 2021, which is expected to reach 781 kilotons by 2028 .[ 11 ] Determining the additionality of credits that support an already growing industry will require market analyses that can isolate growth in biochar production based on demand for credits. The ability to purchase biochar credits is relatively new, thereby limiting robust analysis of their additionality. A techno-economic analysis of biochar production cited wholesale biochar prices as being between $600/ton to $2,778/ton of biochar, with the most commonly cited sales price being $1,600/ton of biochar.[ 12 ] This would correspond to a carbon price of $237 to $1100/ton of CO 2 e, assuming a 70% carbon content. Biochar credits sold for substantially less than this carbon price are likely to be heavily dependent on end user sales, suggesting lower levels of project additionality. However, this is an admittedly crude approach to estimating additionality. With the exception of projects that do not generate profits from the sale of biochar or bio-oil project additionality for biochar is typically assessed as low. Marginal Additionality The production of biochar depends on a number of key inputs, including energy for the pyrolysis process, biomass feedstock, and pyrolysis units to conduct pyrolysis. The degree of marginal additionality depends on how constrained biomass producers are in obtaining these key inputs in response to revenue from credit sales. Biochar producers who are able to easily access new biomass feedstocks like agriculture waste residues, or are able to easily deploy new, modular pyrolysis units can make a strong case for marginal additionality. Alternatively, biochar producers that struggle to source new biomass feedstocks or depend on large, industrial scale pyrolysis units have a lower degree of marginal additionality. Overall, biochar projects tend to have high marginal additionality unless a project is unable to readily acquire new pyrolysis capacity or biomass feedstock because of credit sales. Permanence Converting biomass feedstock into biochar fixes carbon that would have otherwise been released into the atmosphere as the original biomass degrades. There are a number of factors that affect the stability, or durability, of the carbon in biochar: (i) biochar characteristics, (ii) production conditions, and (iii) post-production conditions. A combination of these factors determines the overall permanence of a biochar project; we expand upon each of these further in Appendix 1. (i) Biochar characteristics Molar ratios: the ratio of H:C( org) and O:C( org) in biochar determines its stability. For medium permanence biochar (with a half-life of 100-1000 years under laboratory conditions), the O:C( org) ratios should be between 0.2-0.6. For high permanence biochar (with a half-life greater than 1000 years under laboratory conditions), the ratio should be less than 0.2. Fixed carbon content: this is the proportion of stable carbon in biochar. The higher this number is, the more carbon can be stored per tonne of biochar.[ 13 ] (ii) Production conditions Pyrolysis temperature: Pyrolysis temperature is the temperature at which feedstock is converted to biochar. Pyrolysis temperatures of over 500°C to 600°C are most effective in producing stable biochar; however, this is also influenced by the type of feedstock.[ 14 ] Feedstock: Feedstock (the material being used to create biochar) also affects the permanence of biochar. Woody feedstocks tend to be the most stable, and grassy and manure feedstocks the least.[ 15 ] Crop waste and grassy feedstocks are intermediates between the two but can have wide variability in their stability depending on their ash content; low ash crop wastes such as sugar cane and nut shells are more suitable for carbon storage than rice husks and straws.[ 16 ] (iii) Post-production conditions The real-world applications of biochar can also strongly determine its stability in soils. The different geographic regions in which biochar is applied contain a diversity of soil types, moisture levels, mineral contents, and microorganism conditions, which can have varied impacts on biochar carbon decomposition.[ 17 ] More research and field trials are needed to achieve greater precision around biochar’s durability in soils. Carbon stored in bio-oil that is injected into injection wells is even less likely to decompose than biochar applied to soils. This is primarily because bio-oil sinks to the bottom of injection wells, whereas biochar is distributed near soil surface where it interacts with soil microbes and other elements. Injection wells are regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and are used to inject hazardous or non-hazardous wastes and fluids in deep geologic formations. While carbon stored in bio-oil that is injected this way is less reversible than biochar in soils, this storage method is not without its risks. Lax oversight into over 680,000 underground waste and injection wells in the United States could lead to leaks and structural failures , however the EPA has deemed the probability of well failures to be low . In addition, bio-oil is denser than other brines, oils, and gases typically stored in these formations, and has been shown to form a solid approximately 48 hours after injection.[ 18 ] Alongside EPA monitoring bolstered by recent airborne leakage sensor technology, this gives us higher confidence in the permanence of bio-oil.[ 19 ] While the permanence of bio-oil is generally assessed to be in the medium range (100+ years), the permanence of biochar should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Figure 1. Carbon storage methods by expected storage time, including biochar in soil in the 100-1000 yr range and bio-oil underground in the +100,000 yr range. Cost Puro Earth, a marketplace listing 23 biochar projects as of this writing, lists prices for biochar-based carbon removal credits ranging from $98 (100 EUR at the time of writing) to $524 (535 EUR) per ton of CO2. This is substantially more expensive than traditional avoidance-based carbon offset projects, but are cheaper than some of the technological carbon dioxide removal projects like direct air capture. One reason for the cost disparity between projects is that some biochar providers (like CarboCulture and HUSK Ventures ) make their biochar available to farmers at a significant discount and depend more heavily on the sale of credits, and are therefore pricing their credits higher. While we believe biochar projects that rely primarily on revenues from credit sales have a stronger case for additionality, they are often high cost. Projects that produce bio-oil from biomass that is sequestered underground (not sold) are priced even higher than biochar credits and are also considered high cost. For projects that sell to farmers and use carbon credits to lower the cost marginally, their “true” cost is difficult to ascertain, since one would need to understand the additional amount of biochar demanded due to the cost difference. We at Giving Green value when organizations are financially transparent so that additionality can be better assessed. Co-benefits When added to soil in some conditions, specific types of biochar can create long-term carbon pools in the soil, stimulate microbial benefits, increase soil’s water holding capacity, improve nutrient availability, decrease susceptibility to plant disease, and increase crop yields.[ 20 ] However, these benefits depend on a variety of environmental factors and biochar characteristics; we expand further upon these in Appendix II. Environmental factors The impact of applying biochar to soil on increasing crop yields depends on a number of environmental factors like soil type, soil pH, fertilizer inputs, and soil fertility.[ 21 ] Biochar could cause a positive increase in crop yields where it is able to improve the water holding capacity of the soil or add nutrients. Biochar characteristics Feedstocks that are less suited to carbon sequestration appear more beneficial for increasing agricultural outputs, due to their high mineral and unstable carbon content. Lower pyrolysis temperatures (between 401°C and 500°C) also had the greatest positive effects on crop yield.[ 22 ] While these are helpful guidelines, additional long-term field studies on the effects of biochar in soils under different contexts are needed to address our uncertainty regarding the co-benefits of biochar purposed for carbon sequestration. In the US, the recent Biochar Research Network Act of 2022 will establish a national biochar research network to quantify the characteristics that influence biochar co-benefits and carbon sequestration and understand the trade-offs between these uses. Conclusion We believe that biochar and bio-oil hold significant promise as valuable tools in addressing climate change, especially given their ability to store carbon for 100+ and 1000+ years, respectively. However, there can be a great deal of variance regarding the additionality, permanence, and co-benefits. In order to ensure that the climate potential of these pathways is maximized, we think a project-by-project assessment is necessary. At this time we recommend one biochar project, Mash Makes ; it is able to address uncertainty around additionality and permanence by providing its biochar—which we estimate as being high permanence—to farmers for free, and it is currently undertaking field trials to assess co-benefits. We also recommend one bio-oil provider, Charm Industrial ; it produces bio-oil and sequesters it underground, addressing some of the additionality and permanence issues with biochar providers. Glossary Aromatic compound : Flat, cyclical chemical compounds containing aromatic rings, which are a highly stable chemical structure. Inorganic carbon : Carbon-containing compounds that lack carbon-hydrogen bonds; these are more stable than organic carbon-containing compounds Feedstock : The biological material used to create biochar. Labile carbon : The residues of volatile or semi-volatile components of biochar:, the non-stable parts of organic carbon that can be easily degraded by microorganisms over weeks to months. This is not made up of aromatic compounds. Organic carbon : Carbon-containing compounds that have carbon-hydrogen bonds present; these are less stable than inorganic carbon-containing compounds. Pyrolysis : Thermal decomposition of materials at elevated temperatures. Appendix I - Biochar Characteristics (i) Biochar characteristics Molar ratios Hydrogen to organic carbon molar ratios (H:C( org) ) and oxygen to organic carbon molar ratios (O:C( org) ) are useful for identifying high-permanence biochars. The lower the ratio, the more stable the final product is and the longer it will take to degrade.[ 23 ] Where possible, search for H:C( org) ratios over O:C( org) ratios due to their greater accuracy.[ 24 ] Puro Earth ’s and the European Biochar Certificate (EBC)’s methodology requires H:C( org) ratios of less than 0.7 and O:C( org) molar ratios less than 0.4, which is the point at which the biochar is stable enough to use in carbon storage.[ 25 ] For medium permanence biochar (with a half-life of 100-1000 years under laboratory conditions), the O:C org ratios should be between 0.2-0.6. For high permanence biochar (with a half-life greater than 1000 years under laboratory conditions), the ratio should be less than 0.2.[ 26 ] Fixed carbon content Fixed carbon content is the proportion of stable carbon in biochar, which is also important to consider. This is a measure of how much carbon the biochar can store, showing the carbon sequestration potential per tonne of biochar.[ 27 ] Puro Earth requires a fixed carbon content of over 50%, but the higher this number is, the more carbon can be stored per tonne of biochar.[ 28 ] (ii) Production conditions Pyrolysis temperature Pyrolysis temperature is the temperature at which feedstock is converted to biochar. Higher temperature pyrolysis is strongly correlated to lower molar ratios, higher fixed carbon content, and greater biochar stability.[ 29 ] While Puro Earth standards allow for pyrolysis temperatures ranging from 350°C to 1000 °C, higher pyrolysis temperatures indicate better quality, more stable biochar. Pyrolysis temperatures of over 500°C to 600°C are most effective in producing stable biochar; however, this is also influenced by the type of feedstock.[ 30 ] Feedstock Feedstock (the material being used to create biochar) also affects the permanence of biochar. Different feedstocks have different permanence depending on their structural stability, ash content, and H:C( org) and O:C( org) ratios.[ 31 ] Feedstocks can be classified as woody (softwood, hardwood), crop waste (e.g. corn, wheat straw, and rice straw/husk), grassy, and manure (often poultry, pig, and cattle).[ 32 ] Woody feedstocks tend to be the most stable, and grassy and manure feedstocks the least.[ 33 ] Crop waste and grassy feedstocks are intermediates between the two but can have wide variability in their stability depending on their ash content; low ash crop wastes such as sugar cane and nut shells are more suitable for carbon storage than rice husks and straws.[ 34 ] Figure 2: SD, RH, FW, PL and PS indicate biochar of sawdust, rice husk, food waste, poultry litter and paper sludge and adjacent numeric values 1, 2, 3 and 4 indicate different pyrolysis temperatures of 350 °C, 450 °C, 550 °C, 650 °C respectively.[ 35 ] (iii) Post-production conditions The real-world applications of biochar can also strongly determine its stability in soils. The different geographic regions in which biochar is applied contain a diversity of soil types, moisture levels, mineral contents, and microorganism conditions.[ 36 ] The decomposition rates of stable carbon remain relatively unchanged by different post-production conditions, but the unstable portion is highly affected by these. Soil type influences how quickly unstable carbon in biochar degrades, with clay soils stabilizing soil carbon faster than mineral or sandy soils.[ 37 ] The mineral content of the soil also factors in, with soils high in iron and low in calcium promoting biochar stability.[ 38 ] Temperature is thought to have only minimal effects on biochar decomposition rates; even under climate warming scenarios, soil temperatures are not expected to become high enough to impact carbon stability in biochar.[ 39 ] However, abrupt soil moisture increases (from flooding or heavy rainfall) can rapidly increase the decomposition rate of unstable biochar; low moisture levels should be maintained where possible.[ 40 ] Soil microorganisms also play a significant role in biochar decomposition; conditions that enhance microbial activity can decrease the lifespan of biochar in soils.[ 41 ] High amounts of unstable carbon encourage microorganism activity, this can be remedied through high pyrolysis temperature and woodier feedstocks.[ 42 ] Biochars that have a high portion of unstable carbon from low pyrolysis temperatures and manure feedstocks can therefore temporarily enhance carbon loss. Ultimately, post-production conditions matter most for biochar with high unstable carbon content, and the net benefit on soil carbon storage is thought to be positive in the long term regardless.[ 43 ] Estimates of >1000-year half-life times for high-quality biochar remain accurate in temperate climates, but more research is needed on half-lives in a tropical context. However, any differences between laboratory and field estimates are likely to be greatest amongst lower quality biochars with high proportions of unstable biochar.[ 44 ] More research and field trials are needed to achieve greater precision around biochar’s durability in soils. Appendix II - Biochar Co-benefits Environmental Factors The impact of applying biochar to soil on increasing crop yields depends on a number of environmental factors like soil type, soil pH, fertilizer inputs, and soil fertility.[ 45 ] A meta-analysis on crop yields found that in tropical climates, where acidic, nutrient-poor, soils are more common, biochar elicited a 25% increase in yield , but had almost no effect in temperate climates.[ 46 ] Another meta-analysis found the effects of biochar on crop yields ranging from a reduction in crop yields by 28% to increases of 39% . Their results reinforce that positive effects on crop yields are most common in soils that are either acidic or neutral, or those that have a coarse to medium texture. This suggests that biochar increases crop yields where it is able to improve the water holding capacity of the soil or produce a liming effect (where calcium and magnesium are added to decrease soil acidity and add nutrients).[ 47 ] Positive effects may be further reinforced when biochar is applied alongside an inorganic fertilizer, which can increase yields by a further 10%.[ 48 ] Biochar characteristics There are two main characteristics of biochar that influence its suitability for agricultural use: feedstock and pyrolysis temperature, which determines organic carbon and mineral content, pH, and surface area.[ 49 ] Feedstocks that are less suited to carbon sequestration appear more beneficial for increasing agricultural outputs, due to their high mineral and unstable carbon content. In a 2022 meta-analysis, high-nutrient, manure-based biochars resulted in the greatest crop increases; lower-nutrient woody and crop-waste biochars still provided positive effects but performed significantly lower. Lower pyrolysis temperatures (between 401°C and 500°C) also had the greatest positive effects on crop yield, with no significant effect on yield observed when pyrolysis temperatures were greater than 600 °C.[ 50 ] This is because the mineral compounds that form at higher temperatures can be inaccessible for plant uptake.[ 51 ] While these are helpful guidelines, additional long-term field studies on the effects of biochar in soils under different contexts are needed to address our uncertainty regarding the co-benefits of biochar purposed for carbon sequestration. The recent Biochar Research Network Act of 2022 will establish a national biochar research network to quantify the characteristics that influence biochar co-benefits and carbon sequestration and understand the trade-offs between these uses. Endnotes 1. See “What is Biochar?” American University, n.d. 2. “Here we use a global-scale meta-analysis to show that biochar has, on average, no effect on crop yield in temperate latitudes, yet elicits a 25% average increase in yield in the tropics.” Jeffery et al., 2017 . 3. See Appendix 4. IPCC, 2019. 4. Puro Standard Biochar Methodology. Puro.earth, 2022. ; M0044 Methodology for Biochar Utilization in Soil and Non-Soil Applications, v1.0. Verra, 2022. 5. Puro Standard. Puro.Earth, n.d. , European Biochar Certificate. European Biochar Certificate 2022 6. See section 7.1, European Biochar Certificate 2022 7. “The decomposition of crop residues releases nutrients for plant use”. Rakkar et al., 2018. 8. “In fact, the researchers estimate that leaving crops residues to rot on the ground enables carbon to be locked into the soil for four times longer than if these residues were cleared away.” Bryce, 2021 ; “Assessments of the GHG balance of cropping systems have shown that the N2O emissions associated with crop residue decomposition can, in some situations, offset the positive effects that the recycling of crop residues has on maintaining or increasing soil C stocks”. Lashermes, 2022. 9. See abstract. Gaunt & Rondon, 2006. 10. “90% of the biochar produced in Europe is used in livestock farming.” Gerlach & Schmidt, 2012 . 11. See ‘Producers Survey Results’. Groot, 2018 ; “In terms of volume, the market was sized at 394.09 kilotons in 2021 and is expected to reach 781.09 kilotons by 2028.” Triton Market Research, 2022. 12. See Table 4. Biochar Prices Reported in Literature. Nematian, Keske & Ng'ombe, 2021 ; “Reported prices paid for biochar ranged widely depending on the packaging and volume 13. See section 1.1.1., Puro Earth 2021 14. See ‘Carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen’ section, Ippolito et al, 2020 15. See abstract and conclusions, Hassan et al. 2020 16. See section 3.1.2., Conz et al. 2017 ; section 3.1., Leng & Huang, 2018 ; ‘The amounts and rates of biochar decomposition’, Wang et al., 2015 17. See ‘Future perspective’, Spokas, 2010 ; ‘Abiotic factors and processes’, Wang et al. 2015. 18. “After injection, the bio-oil sinks within the formation. Even better, the bio-oil has tendency to polymerize into a solid, and at the temperatures and pressures in these formations, our surface-level 3rd party lab experiments have shown that bio-oil becomes a solid, locked in place, in just 48 hours”. Charm, n.d. 19. “Inexpensive and precise aerial rapid screening of methane leaks could be a proverbial game-changer for environmental monitoring.” Myers, 2022. 20. See section 2.6.1. CDR Primer, n.d. 21. See section 3.2.2. Adhikari et al., 2018. 22. See sections 4.1 and 4.3. Bai et al., 2022. 23. H:Corg and O:Corg molar ratios that use organic carbon content should be used instead of H:C and O:C molar ratios that measure total carbon content where possible, as they are a more reliable indicator of permanence. This is because inorganic carbon does not form part of the stable aromatic compound structure that constitutes biochar, and thus, will not be as permanent. This is of particular importance for high-ash biochars (such as poultry manure or paper mill waste) that contain a higher proportion of inorganic carbon. See section 3.1.1, 3.1.2., Leng et al. 2019 ; 24. H:C org is considered a better measure than O:C org as it can be measured directly, whereas O:C org has to be derived from other measurements (O = 100 − C − H − N − S − ash) and so is often overestimated, see introduction in Klasson 2017 and section 3.1.2., Leng et al. 2019 : 25. See 1.1.6., Puro.earth 2022 ; section 7.2 &7.3, European Biochar Certificate 2022 ; Appendix 7, International Biochar Initiative 2015 ; introduction, Klasson 2017 26. See conclusion, Spokas 2010. 27. See section 4.1.1., Leng et al. 2019 . 28. See section 1.1.1., Puro Earth 2021 29. See section 3.2., McBeath et al. 2015 ; section 3.3., Enders et al. 2012 . 30. See ‘Carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen’ section, Ippolito et al, 2020 31. See abstract, introduction, materials and methods Chaturvedi et al. 2020 ; ‘Biomass chemical characterization’, Veiga et al. 2017 ; section 3.1., Enders et al. 2012 ; 32. See ‘Feedstock choice’ section, Ippolito et al, 2020 33. See abstract and conclusions, Hassan et al. 2020 34. See section 3.1.2., Conz et al. 2017 ; section 3.1., Leng & Huang, 2018 ; ‘The amounts and rates of biochar decomposition’, Wang et al., 2015 35. Pariyar et al, 2020 36. See ‘Future perspective’, Spokas, 2010 ; ‘Abiotic factors and processes’, Wang et al. 2015. 37. See highlights, Fang et al. 2015 ; conclusions and implications, Fang et al. 2013 . 38. See conclusion, Yang et al. 2021 . 3 9. See “Temperature sensitivity of biochar decomposition” section. Lehmann et al. 2012 . 40. See conclusion, Yang et al. 2021 . 41. See ‘Biological decomposition’ Lehmann et al. 2012 ; ‘Microorganisms and biochar stability’, Ameloot et al. 2013 42. The portion of labile (unstable) carbon in biochar is determined largely by pyrolysis temperature and feedstock type. Higher pyrolysis temperatures and feedstocks with higher lignin content (hard woods) will lead to a lower portion of labile carbon. See ‘Influence of native SOM: priming and co-metabolism’, Ameloot et al. 2013 ; section 4.1, Zimmerman et al. 2010 . 43. Biochars that have a high portion of labile carbon can enhance carbon mineralisation in soil (the process of turning the carbon in organic matter into carbon dioxide) in early stages, facilitating carbon loss. See ‘Influence of biochar production and application conditions” Ameloot et al. 2013 ; introduction & conclusion Zimmerman et al. 2010 . 44. Kuzyakov et al., 2014. 45. See section 3.2.2. Adhikari et al., 2018. 46. “ Here we use a global-scale meta-analysis to show that biochar has, on average, no effect on crop yield in temperate latitudes, yet elicits a 25% average increase in yield in the tropics.” Jeffery et al., 2017 . 47. “The greatest (positive) effects with regard to soil analyses were seen in acidic (14%) and neutral pH soils (13%), and in soils with a coarse (10%) or medium texture (13%). This suggests that two of the main mechanisms for yield increase may be a liming effect and an improved water holding capacity of the soil, along with improved crop nutrient availability.” Jeffery el al., 2011. 48. “Biochar + inorganic fertilizer increased yield by an additional 10%.” Bai et al., 2022. 49. See ‘Biochar: Production and Characteristics’. Al-Wabel et al., 2017. 50. See sections 4.1 and 4.3. Bai et al., 2022. 51. “Specifically, with increasing pyrolysis temperature one typically observes increasing biochar C, P, K, Ca, ash content, pH, specific surface area (SSA), and decreasing N, H, and O content.” Ippolito et al., 2020.

This dashboard explains Giving Green's exploration of various impact strategies to reduce climate change. Our Research Dashboard // BACK This dashboard explains Giving Green's exploration of various impact strategies to reduce climate change. It is not a comprehensive list and not a final say on what the "best" impact strategies are. Instead, it is an evolving list that includes early-stage assessments that are tentative and subject to change. Also, we have varying levels of certainty associated with our labels of High, Medium, and Low. Process: Our product offerings include top recommendations for unrestricted donors, business recommendations (including carbon removal and offset purchases), and investment opportunities. Our impact strategies are outputs from our research process , where we look for rough indications that there may be a fit for Giving Green. Across all product offerings, Giving Green loosely prioritizes impact strategies based on scale, feasibility, and funding need. Feedback and questions: If you have feedback or questions, please fill out this form or email us . View the dashboard: View the full dashboard as a Google Sheet here , or embedded below. Note that the dashboard may not display properly on mobile devices.

Do fuel-efficient cookstoves avoid CO2 emissions? Read our independent analysis of whether these carbon offsets can reduce climate change. Fuel Efficient Cookstoves // BACK This report was last updated in November 2020. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. Summary Adoption of fuel-efficient cookstoves can decrease household fuel use and therefore carbon emissions. There are a wide variety of cookstove offsets on the market, using different technologies in different contexts. Although the methodology used to certify these projects ensures that they make a reasonable case for offsetting emissions, it also requires strong assumptions around stove use and changes in cooking behavior. The impact evaluation literature shows highly mixed results. Some randomized control trials (RCTs) show cookstoves having strong effects on fuel usage while others show null effects. We do not feel comfortable recommending cookstove offsets in general, as the RCT literature shows that the required assumptions are frequently not satisfied. We would recommend offset projects similar to those that have shown strong results in a rigorous evaluation, such as the recent work by Berkouwer and Dean. Given this RCT, we recommend offsets generated by the the manufacturer of the cookstoves studied in that paper, BURN. Cookstoves as a carbon offset In theory, clean cookstoves appear to be a good way for donors to achieve emissions reductions while also improving the lives of poor households. Many poor households in the developing world cook over an open fire, which is not energy efficient and results in household smoke. Myriad cookstove technologies promise improved fuel efficiency. This leads to fewer CO2 emissions, as well as improved indoor air quality and savings on fuel costs. Revenue from offsets can be used to subsidize cookstove distribution or even to give them away for free. However, clean cookstove projects have a mixed record of success. Many have used technologies that were not well-suited to local conditions, leading to stove malfunctions and limited usage. Whether a cookstove project is truly offsetting emissions depends on the details of the specific project. Mechanism Use of fuel-efficient cookstoves is considered emissions avoidance . The greater emissions from the use of a less efficient method, such as an open fire, are avoided, and the offset can be credited with the difference in emissions between the two methods. Causality Efficient cookstoves result in decreased emissions by decreasing the amount of fuel (generally wood) a household uses for cooking. This causal mechanism is theoretically valid, but in practice, even the introduction of stoves that are mechanically superior will not result in reductions in fuel usage, due to variations in human behavior. Certifiers such as the Gold Standard use a specific methodology to calculate emissions reductions from cookstove projects. We base our assessment off of the Gold Standard methodology, but to the best of our understanding, the methodology of the other certifiers is roughly similar. Their calculation relies on a standard model which takes into account the baseline value of fuel usage, the efficiency of the stove, and pre-determined conversion factors of wood to emissions to calculate emissions reductions. It also includes corrections for some human behavior elements, such as the fraction of households who continue to use the less efficient stoves and the fraction of cooking that continues to be conducted on the old stoves. Key model parameters, such as whether households are still using the more efficient stoves, need to be continually verified by a third party in order for carbon credits to be issued. Overall, we have three main concerns with cookstove certification methods: There is no actual measurement of fuel usage. While this is understandably difficult to measure, it would provide an indication of the magnitude of avoided CO2. Without this data, we have to rely on strong assumptions about usage of the stove and its efficiency in real-world conditions. Additionally, the offset certifiers assume that energy demand stays constant, even though the stove drastically decreases the price of cooking by reducing fuel needed. There is no comparison group. Offset certifiers estimate a reduction of fuel usage compared to the households’ fuel use prior to cookstove distribution. Thus, we must make the strong assumption that the level of wood consumption would have stayed constant in absence of the cookstoves. This may not be true if cooking practices are changing over time for other reasons, such as decreasing availability of foraged wood. Verification data is collected by recipients of offset funds. Verification surveys in the field are contracted by the project developers. They have a strong incentive to show that stoves are being used. Given that certification methodologies rely on a number of questionable assumptions, we next ask whether these are validated in the academic literature. Fortunately, a number of high-quality RCTs on improved cooking technology have been conducted in a number of contexts. RCTs are the gold standard in determining causality. If these studies generally find that stove usage remains high and wood usage decreases, they make a strong case for cookstoves meaningfully reducing emissions. Unfortunately, the results of these studies are mixed. Certainly, some show positive results. For instance, Bensch and Peters (2015) conduct an RCT of improved cookstoves in Senegal and indeed find large decreases in firewood usage. But they also find that 27% of meals are still cooked on traditional stoves in the treatment group a year after distribution, which is higher than the assumptions we see in many offset projects. Berkouwer and Dean (2019) find that improved cookstoves in Kenya lead to reductions in fuel expenditure by 40%, close to the manufacturer’s claims of 50% reduction, and that these effects persist for 18 months after the cookstoves’ adoption. On the other hand, Hanna et al (2016) find no change in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from a cookstove project in India, primarily due to dis-adoption of the stoves. Aung et al (2013) find no change in fuel usage for a cookstove project that received emissions credits in India. Beltramo and Levine (2013) also find no effect of an improved cookstove on fuel usage in Senegal. Due to the strong assumptions that must be made in the certification process and the mixed results in the RCT literature, we do not feel like we can confidently recommend cookstove offset projects unless causality has been validated with a high-quality impact evaluation. Project-level additionality There are many different types of cookstove projects, and the details of the implementing organization(s) are important in determining project-level additionality. Many cookstove projects sell their stoves, so offsets are not strictly necessary to ensure stove distribution. In these cases, the organization may have a valid business model without offsets, and therefore the offsets would not satisfy project-level additionality. In some markets, it might be necessary to sell the stoves at a subsidy, which would make offsets more additional. Also, some projects distribute stoves for free. These types of projects would not survive without offsets, and would have the strongest claim to project-level additionality. Marginal additionality In theory, a cookstove project should be able to satisfy marginal additionality. For projects that distribute stoves for free, an additional offset sold can provide funding to distribute an additional stove. For projects that sell stoves, offsets can be used to decrease prices, therefore increasing the total amount of cookstoves sold. As shown in Berkouwer and Dean (2019), the demand for cookstoves increases sharply as costs are lowered. Permanence If cookstoves avoid emissions from biomass burned as fuel, these gains could be short-lived if the biomass later burns down in a fire. However, in general, emissions avoided due to stoves being more fuel-efficient are avoided permanently. Co-benefits Improved cookstoves can deliver benefits to their owners apart from lowered GHGs. Households with an efficient cookstove save time and money that would otherwise be spent gathering and purchasing fuel. Improved cookstoves result in less indoor smoke, improving the health of family members, especially of women and children. Both economic and health benefits rely on the same mechanism as reduced GHG emissions: using less fuel. Therefore, if stoves are effective in reducing households’ use of fuels, they are likely to provide co-benefits. Assessment of cookstove projects Our main concern with cookstove offsets is that cookstove projects do not always result in lowered fuel usage by households. Therefore, the key input into our recommendations would be a clear indication that a particular offset project actually decreases household fuel usage in its real-world setting. We recommend BURN due to strong evidence of this real-world decrease in Berkouwer and Dean (2019). This study showed reductions in actual fuel use of a similar magnitude to reductions predicted by the efficiency of the stove, which is a key assumption made in the offset certification process that is rarely validated in the RCT literature. We would also feel confident recommending additional offset projects supported by a strong impact evaluation, or projects that are similar enough to BURN stoves such that we believe that the results in Berkouwer and Dean (2019) apply. References Aung, Ther W., et al. "Health and climate-relevant pollutant concentrations from a carbon-finance approved cookstove intervention in rural India." Environmental science & technology 50.13 (2016): 7228-7238. Berkouwer, Susanna and Joshua Dean. “Credit and attention in the adoption of profitable energy efficient technologies in Kenya.” Mimeo, 2019 Beltramo, Theresa, and David I. Levine. "The effect of solar ovens on fuel use, emissions and health: results from a randomised controlled trial." Journal of Development Effectiveness 5.2 (2013): 178-207. Bensch, Gunther, and Jörg Peters. "The intensive margin of technology adoption–Experimental evidence on improved cooking stoves in rural Senegal." Journal of health economics 42 (2015): 44-63. Hanna, Rema, Esther Duflo, and Michael Greenstone. "Up in smoke: the influence of household behavior on the long-run impact of improved cooking stoves." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8.1 (2016): 80-114. https://givinggreen.earth/carbon-offsets-research/burn https://givinggreen.earth/carbon-offsets-research/burn