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Our research on the work of Opportunity Green to decarbonize aviation and shipping, and why we think Opportunity Green is a top climate charity to give to in 2024. Opportunity Green: Deep Dive // BACK Download the report: Opportunity Green - Deep Dive .pdf Download PDF • 1.11MB Summary What is Opportunity Green? Opportunity Green is a UK-based nonprofit focused on addressing gaps in global climate policy. Founded in 2021, it began with a focus on the global decarbonization of aviation and maritime shipping via policy, economic, and legal avenues. It also aims to identify and address broader legal and regulatory gaps to accelerate decarbonization in sectors such as buildings, agriculture, and steel. We base our recommendation on Opportunity Green’s aviation and maritime shipping work and have not assessed its efforts in other sectors. How could Opportunity Green address climate change? Opportunity Green invokes three main strategies in its work to decarbonize maritime shipping and aviation: (i) facilitating a private sector coalition to promote sustainable fuels, (ii) increasing representation from climate-vulnerable countries in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to promote more progressive policies, and (iii) identifying and pursuing strategic legal action. Through these strategies, Opportunity Green aims to reduce emissions by decreasing demand for aviation and shipping, shifting industries to clean, alternative fuels, and ensuring that climate-vulnerable countries are supported in the transition. What is its cost-effectiveness? In 2024, we developed a highly subjective cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to estimate the costs and impacts of Opportunity Green’s engagement with the IMO to enact regulations that decarbonize international shipping. Overall, we estimate it could plausibly be within the range of cost-effectiveness we would consider for a top recommendation. We have low confidence in the accuracy of this CEA, and an analysis focused on Opportunity Green’s IMO engagement is unlikely to generalize to its overall cost-effectiveness. However, we generally view it as a positive input to our overall assessment of Opportunity Green. Is there room for more funding? Opportunity Green could use additional funding to cover operational costs, hire more staff across projects, increase analytical capacity, and expand its communications team. In particular, Opportunity Green would use funds to open a Brussels office to assist them in influencing EU policy; having an EU entity will also allow its team to launch legal challenges against EU institutions. Opportunity Green’s leadership values a healthy work culture and would also use funds to help ensure employee security and progression. Are there major co-benefits or potential risks? We think Opportunity Green’s potential co-benefits and potential risks are linked to the technologies for which it advocates. For example, co-benefits of green hydrogen-derived alternative fuels include lower air pollution, and potential risks include toxicity and other safety concerns. See our deep dive, Decarbonizing Aviation and Maritime Shipping , for more information. Key uncertainties and open questions: Our key uncertainties include our ability to evaluate the effectiveness of a young organization, Opportunity Green’s potential difficulties attracting industry members to a coalition with ambitious climate targets, the effectiveness of legal action as a climate intervention, and the general feasibility of decarbonizing aviation. Bottom line / next steps: We classify Opportunity Green as one of our top recommendations for nonprofits addressing climate change. We think it has a strong theory of change that tackles multiple pathways of influence, including coalition and capacity building, policy advocacy, and legal action. Opportunity Green is a small organization with robust plans for growth and the ability to utilize significant amounts of additional funding.

This grant to Energy for Growth Hub will support its portfolio of work in energy abundance, including work in contract transparency, energy security, and nuclear financing. Energy for Growth Hub // BACK Overview The Giving Green Fund plans to award an unrestricted grant to the Energy for Growth Hub to support its work in various areas, including contract transparency for clean energy markets; Energy Security Compacts, an initiative that would enable the US to swiftly respond to its allied partners’ energy concerns; and nuclear financing in emerging markets. Energy for Growth primarily falls within our philanthropic strategy of supporting an energy transition in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and, to some extent, our philanthropic strategy of supporting nuclear power as a way to diversify energy portfolios . Please see Giving Green’s deep dive reports, linked above, for more information, including risks and potential co-benefits, recommended sub-strategies, theory of change, funding need, and key uncertainties. Last updated: October 2024. What is Energy for Growth Hub? Energy for Growth Hub is a think tank headquartered in Washington, DC, with a global network of researchers and advocates. Its research, policy advocacy, and thought leadership focuses on promoting energy abundance and climate resilience. Its work focuses on four main areas: (1) creating progress indicators that link economic growth with ending energy poverty; (2) exploring opportunities for new low-carbon technologies in emerging markets, especially in Asia and Africa; (3) promoting open, competitive clean energy markets and effective development finance; and (4) examining the connections between climate, energy, and development policies. Energy for Growth was founded in 2018. What are we funding at Energy for Growth, and how could it help reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Contract transparency: In many LMICs, utilities often make deals with private developers for new power capacity, without revealing the contract terms to the public. This lack of transparency slows clean energy projects, keeps prices artificially high, raises investment risks, and hinders the shift from fossil fuels to cleaner energy by preventing fair assessment of energy options. Energy for Growth and its partners are pushing for transparency, both through top-down support from leaders and bottom-up efforts from civil society and policymakers. We think increased transparency could accelerate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by (1) helping countries avoid carbon lock-in and (2) expediting a clean energy transition compared to the counterfactual. With more funding, Energy for Growth would speed up its advocacy efforts, strengthen its work with the Asian and African Development Banks, expand its global data collection, and work with partners in Asia and Africa to agree on legal ways to ensure contract transparency. Energy Security Compacts: Energy for Growth has worked alongside a partner organization to propose Energy Security Compacts, a delivery mechanism for multi-year bilateral investments that enhance energy security among US allies. Compact development would include identifying and sequencing priority investments and reforms in selected countries and committing the US to providing key services, followed by years of implementation and monitoring. We believe there could be bipartisan political momentum for the US to support allied countries that rely on US competitors for energy. According to Energy for Growth, the markets where Compacts would be implemented would most likely address their energy security challenges by building out renewables. If true, we think this targeted work could help renewables scale more quickly and lead to faster reductions in emissions. Nuclear financing in emerging markets: Energy for Growth has worked with a partner organization to map advanced nuclear markets and nuclear cooperation agreements as communication tools when engaging with policymakers. Their argument is that future demand will be in emerging markets and there is a strong need to develop financing options that will help build overseas demand for advanced nuclear reactors. Focusing on international markets could lower emissions if it supports new nuclear power projects that replace or prevent the need for new fossil fuel plants. Energy for Growth would use additional funds to update its global maps and engage with the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), an agency created to catalyze US investment in overseas infrastructure projects. It plans to watchdog DFC’s progress in financing nuclear projects and propose specific changes to DFC’s reauthorization. Why do we think Energy for Growth Hub will use this funding well? Energy for Growth Hub’s past success includes being the first to propose a consolidated development finance agency, which we think helped inform the establishment of the DFC, and working with its partners to help overturn the DFC's ban on financing nuclear technologies. Energy for Growth was also involved in supporting Ghana’s public register of power purchase agreements. We think Energy for Growth will use this funding well because it has demonstrated that it is skilled at building bold but practical policy proposals. Given its global mindset, it also seems likely to us that increased funding could help Energy for Growth replicate its efforts and success elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, we think Energy for Growth has been strategic in pushing relatively niche policies, which makes us believe funding to Energy for Growth would be additional. For more on the difference between the grantees of the Giving Green Fund and our Top Nonprofits, please see this blog post on the Giving Green Fund. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

Do refrigerant destruction carbon offsets avoid CO2 emissions? Our independent analysis finds the best carbon offsets and carbon removals to reduce climate change. Refrigerants // BACK This report was last updated in November 2022. The previous version of this report was last updated in February 2022 and focused solely on ozone-depleting substances. Summary Overview Mechanism Causality Conversion of refrigerants into less harmful substances Establishing the counterfactual of refrigerant release into the atmosphere Demonstrating minimal leakage by ensuring that the destruction of refrigerants does not lead to more production of harmful gases Accounting for the carbon footprint of the removal activities Project-level and marginal additionality Permanence Co-Benefits Cost-Effectiveness Bottom Line / Next Steps Summary When certain gases used as refrigerants enter the atmosphere, they can warm the earth at a rate orders of magnitude above carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). Although the production and use of many of these gases is banned or being phased out under the Montreal Protocol, large quantities of refrigerants still exist in appliances or stockpiles. If these gases are not properly disposed of, most will eventually leak or be released into the atmosphere. Organizations can find and destroy these gases, generating emissions credits in the process. We find refrigerant destruction offsets to be among the most credible on the market. We currently recommend one refrigerant-destroying organization, Tradewater , which sells offsets directly from its website. Overview Although CO 2 is the most well-known greenhouse gas (GHG), other substances released into the atmosphere by human activity also contribute to climate change. Some of the most powerful warming gases come from refrigerants and foams that can have up to 10,000 times the warming effect of CO 2 . These include chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are sometimes found in aerosols, refrigerators, and air conditioners. The subset of these substances that deplete the ozone layer are frequently described as Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS). Production of these chemicals is either banned or being phased out under the universally ratified Montreal Protocol, including the Kigali Amendment. But large quantities still exist, and the use of pre-existing refrigerants is not banned in most countries. If not destroyed, refrigerants will continue to leak from appliances and storage containers, entering the atmosphere and adding to global warming. In theory, refrigerant destruction is a good fit for carbon offsetting. Refrigerant destruction has no commercial value, so it is unlikely to occur in the absence of further government regulation, philanthropic donations, or carbon offsets. At this time, plenty of existing refrigerants still need to be found and destroyed; according to Project Drawdown , refrigerant management has a “net lifetime cost” of ~$622 billion. [1] Because refrigerant destruction projects can be ramped up semi-linearly with funding – i.e. they do not require large upfront capital investments but instead utilize a certain amount of funds per unit of refrigerant destroyed – revenue from selling offsets from a previous project can easily be reinvested into future refrigerant destruction. Mechanism Refrigerant destruction projects are considered emissions avoidance , as they prevent emissions that would have occurred had the ODS leaked into the atmosphere. Causality In order to determine the causality of refrigerant destruction projects, we must consider the following: Are refrigerants successfully converted into less harmful substances? Would refrigerants have been released into the atmosphere in the counterfactual? Does destruction of refrigerants lead to additional production of harmful gases to replace the refrigerants? What is the carbon footprint of the destruction activities? We tackle each in more detail below" Conversion of refrigerants into less harmful substances Refrigerant destruction projects reduce GHGs by incinerating the refrigerant gases. While measuring the exact amount of gases destroyed is straightforward, converting this into the amount of CO 2 -equivalent gas removed requires understanding the “global warming potential” (GWP) of both the refrigerant and the byproducts of refrigerant incineration. Although there is considerable debate around the exact impact of specific gases, a table of GWP has been established by the IPCC . [2] Depending on the gas being destroyed, incinerating refrigerants can lead to thousands of times less warming over a hundred years than simply letting the gases escape. Establishing the counterfactual of refrigerant release into the atmosphere If not destroyed, would refrigerants have been sequestered indefinitely in canisters and appliances, or would they leak into the atmosphere and cause warming? Even under the best conditions, many refrigerant storage containers will slowly leak, and improper maintenance or end-of-life disposal of appliances can result in complete release. Offset certifiers have standard assumptions for leakage over time. For instance, the Verra protocol allows projects to claim 100% of destruction to be additional when refrigerants are recovered from appliances at their end-of-life, and 25% when they are recovered from canisters that could be sold into the market and or sit unused in a warehouse. We believe these are reasonably conservative assumptions and accept them for offset projects that we analyze. Demonstrating minimal leakage by ensuring that the destruction of refrigerants does not lead to more production of harmful gases We may worry that destroying refrigerants might cause similar chemicals to be produced to meet the demand for this type of gas. The production and consumption of many refrigerants is either banned or must be phased out in all countries under the Montreal Protocol [3] and subsequent Kigali Amendment. [4] While this implies that the production of these gases must decrease, destroyed refrigerants might be replaced with other substances that also have warming effects when released into the atmosphere. Accounting for the carbon footprint of the removal activities Finding and incinerating refrigerants can require travel and shipping which, in turn, can lead to CO 2 emissions. However, these life cycle emissions are generally taken into account by the offset certifier when calculating the total emissions reduced. Project-level and marginal additionality There is no other market for refrigerant destruction. Additionality is much more straightforward to establish for refrigerant projects than for other carbon offset sectors. Most countries do not have any regulations on the use and destruction of existing refrigerants, even if production of many refrigerants is banned or being phased out under the Montreal Protocol. Since no market exists for the destruction of these gases apart from the carbon offset market, refrigerant destruction projects have to rely on offsets to survive. Permanence When refrigerants are destroyed, their contributions to warming can be permanently avoided or reduced. The outcome depends on the specific destruction process a project uses as well as which byproducts are produced as a result. Refrigerant destruction byproducts can range from substances like sodium chloride (table salt), sodium fluoride , [5] and water, which have no further warming potential, to gases like carbon monoxide, which may have almost double the warming potential of carbon dioxide. Nonetheless, given that even in the latter case, the byproducts will still have a much lower warming potential than the original refrigerant, [6] we consider refrigerant destruction to be an effective method for durably reducing climate change. Co-Benefits Refrigerant destruction projects do not generally offer any co-benefits, but preventing certain ODS refrigerants from escaping into the atmosphere can prevent damage to the ozone layer. Cost-Effectiveness Giving Green recommends one organization selling refrigerant destruction offsets to the public, Tradewater. We investigate its cost effectiveness in our Tradewater recommendation . Bottom Line / Next Steps We find refrigerant destruction carbon offsets to be one of the more compelling types of carbon offsets available. We have found two refrigerant destruction projects that offer credits, Recoolit and Tradewater . Recoolit is a startup based in Indonesia that works with technicians to collect refrigerants from air conditioners during maintenance or replacement. Each batch of collected refrigerants are tested to verify global warming potential before being incinerated, and the entire process is tracked digitally to ensure transparency. Given that Recoolit is offering only pilot-stage credits at a relatively high price of ~$75/ton of CO 2 e, we do not include it in our recommendations at present. However, we would be interested to investigate Recoolit as it expands and becomes more price-competitive. Currently the only refrigerant destruction project we recommend is Tradewater. For more information, see our Tradewater recommendation . Endnotes [1] “Although some revenue can be generated from resale of recovered refrigerant gases, the costs to establish and operate recovery, destruction, and leak avoidance systems outweigh the financial benefit—meaning that refrigerant management, as modeled, would incur a net lifetime cost of US$622.73 billion.” https://drawdown.org/solutions/refrigerant-management [2] “Human-made PFCs, HFCs and SF6 are very effective absorbers of infrared radiation, so that even small amounts of these gases contribute significantly to the RF of the climate system.” Changes in atmospheric constituents and radiative forcing. IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg1-chapter2-1.pdf [3] Montreal Protocol. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201522/volume-1522-i-26369-english.pdf [4] Kigali Amendment. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.872.2016-Eng.pdf [5] “ The refrigerant is fed into the arc at a controlled rate. At these temperatures, the refrigerant molecule is broken down into its individual atoms - hydrogen, fluorine, carbon and (in some cases) chlorine.” https://www.refrigerantrecovery.co.nz/destroying-refrigerants/ [6] GHG Global warming potentials, California Air Resources Board. https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ghg-gwps

Does funding climate activism generate high impact per dollar? Read Giving Green's analysis. Activism: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis // BACK This report was last updated in November 2021. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. Overview: By applying pressure onto elected officials and shifting what policies are seen as politically possible, climate change activism can trigger a chain of events that reduces greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In our cost-effectiveness analysis model, we estimated how much it would cost (in expectation) to remove a ton of CO2 from the atmosphere by donating to climate change activism. Download the full report: 2021-11 Activism CEA .pdf Download PDF Image Credit: Mark Dixon Executive Summary Climate change activism focused on US federal policy can potentially reduce levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere by impacting the likelihood of climate bills passing in the House and Senate, or by affecting executive or regulatory policy. We developed a simple cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) model that assesses activism’s contribution to GHG emissions. In this model, we focused on activism’s potential impact on two types of bills: a bipartisan bill and a progressive-influenced bill passed along party lines. After testing various scenarios in our CEA (e.g., Very Pessimistic to Optimistic), we found that donating to climate change activist groups could be highly cost-effective in reducing GHGs, which we measured in terms of CO2-equivalent (CO2e). Donating to activism runs the very small risk of either having a negative effect or no effect at all on CO2e levels. For this risk to occur, (1) bipartisan climate bills would need to be highly impactful and (2) activism would also need to reduce the likelihood of bipartisan bills being passed. We believe that the former is somewhat unlikely and that the latter is unlikely, making the overall risk low. We conducted our CEA by (1) estimating how much CO2e could be averted through bipartisan and progressive climate bills between 2022 and 2030, (2) assuming the change in probability of these climate bills being passed due to activism, (3) calculating an expected value for activism in terms of CO2e averted, and (4) using our estimates and assumptions to calculate cost-effectiveness. Given the large uncertainty on the different values we used in our analysis, our estimates should be viewed as rough, indicative estimates. Note: This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

Giving Green recommends Frontier as one of the top donation opportunities for businesses. Frontier // BACK Frontier Recommendation This report was last updated in October 2022. Giving Green believes that donating to our top recommended nonprofits is likely to be the most impactful giving strategy for supporting climate action. However, we recognize that contributing to policy advocacy (as most of these nonprofits do) may not be tenable for all donors, especially businesses. Taking this into consideration, we recommend Frontier specifically for businesses given its focus on carbon removal and more direct alignment with corporate net-zero ambitions. We believe Frontier to be a high-impact option, but we are unsure of the extent to which its cost-effectiveness approaches that of our top nonprofits. Table of Contents 1 Summary 2 Overview of Frontier 3 Theory of Change 4 Additionality 5 Co-Benefits 6 Cost-Effectiveness 7 Room for more funding 8 Conclusion 9 How to contribute to Frontier 1 Summary Giving Green recommends Frontier as one of the top donation opportunities for businesses. F rontier is a private sector-led advance market commitment (AMC) intended to support and accelerate the development and deployment of carbon removal technologies. Climate models indicate that in order to limit warming to 2°C, emissions reductions alone may not suffice; reaching net-zero in the necessary timeframe will likely require gigaton (billion ton)-scale deployment of carbon removal by midcentury. The carbon removal sector is in its early stages, both in terms of technological readiness as well as supply; available carbon removal supply is too expensive to create broad demand. Frontier’s AMC model allows companies to maximize impact by pulling forward their carbon removal demand in order to catalyze the market. 2 Overview of Frontier F rontier [1] is an advance market commitment (AMC), intended to support and accelerate the development and deployment of carbon removal technologies. Stripe led the creation of Frontier in collaboration with the founding members: Alphabet, Shopify, Meta, and McKinsey & Company. Frontier’s initial commitment to invest $925 million toward carbon removal by 2030 is funded by its founding members and businesses using Stripe Climate. The fund is currently open to more buyers in an effort to build demand and encourage supply. Given that the carbon removal sector is both nascent and varied, initial allocations of the fund take two forms: (i) Prepurchases target early-stage sellers, like startups, and provide an on-ramp into the market through either one-time, $500,000 purchases of carbon removal tons to be delivered in the future or research and development (R&D) grants. This track is widely accessible and flexible; contributions of any size can be made on a rolling basis and do not necessitate long-term contracts. (ii) Offtakes target commercial-stage suppliers, suppliers that use more developed technologies and are ready to remove tons on a commercial scale, via longer-term, pay-on-delivery agreements.This track is a great fit for organizations that are looking to commit to carbon removal on a multi-year basis and can contribute ~$1M/year through 2030. Figure 1 shows how Frontier connects buyers and suppliers of carbon removal. Figure 1: How Frontier works . Frontier plans to phase out prepurchases over time, eventually concentrating only on offtakes (see Figure 2 ). Figure 2: Illustration of projected future of Frontier's allocation between pre-purchases vs offtakes . Frontier’s first round of funding was recently announced, funneling $2.4 million to six early-stage companies in the form of prepurchases. [2] Carbon removal pathways supported in this first round of funding include direct air capture (DAC), mineralization, enhanced weathering, and synthetic biology. Frontier is the first customer for all six companies. The selection process for carbon removal sellers consists of both science and governance reviews, and the panel of technical reviewers represents a broad range of expertise. During the science review, projects must satisfy stringent criteria, including carbon storage durability of more than 1000 years, minimization of arable land use, a cost trajectory leading to less than $100 per ton, [3] scalability to more than half a gigaton of removal per year, net-negativity, additionality, and verifiability. [4] This criterion narrows eligibility to exclude less durable pathways like biochar or forestry . The governance review assesses criteria such as public engagement, environmental justice, and legal compliance, as well as issues including moral hazard, involvement of the oil and gas industry, environmental health impacts, and workforce development. [5] Frontier shares resources such as science and governance review forms, project applications, and purchase agreements through its GitHub . It does not share the completed reviews. 3 Theory of Change Carbon Removal Climate models indicate that in order to limit warming to 2°C, emissions reductions alone may not suffice; reaching net-zero in the necessary timeframe will likely require gigaton-scale deployment of carbon removal by midcentury. [6] Carbon removal will be especially useful in balancing emissions from hard-to-abate sectors like aviation, shipping, and industry. [7] In addition, it is our impression that removing more carbon than we emit via net-negative goals may be an important strategy to curb future climate damage. This is a view shared by some members of the private sector, [8] government, [9] and scientific community, [10] and would only be made possible through the development and deployment of carbon removal. Carbon removal as a sector is quite varied both in terms of the types of pathways as well as the technological readiness of each pathway. In addition, not much carbon removal is available, [11] and that which is available is too expensive to create broad demand. In fact, we have only reached about 0.0062% of a projected 10 gigaton by 2050 deployment goal, and only ~4.3% of the carbon removal purchases ever made have been delivered. [12] Much of the carbon removal sector remains in the R&D phase, and projects that have higher technological maturity are still navigating economic viability and the logistics for deployment at scale. In short, the current market is young, small, [13] and relatively uncertain; it does not yet reflect the size or certain longevity required to ensure gigaton-scale removal – a benchmark for what is needed for substantial climate change mitigation. Commercialization trajectory The first AMC, launched in 2009, was used in the development and distribution of the pneumococcal vaccine (PCV). It has been credited with substantially accelerating availability and, consequently, saving lives. [14] Subsequently, different models of AMCs have been proposed and implemented in various contexts. One salient feature of AMCs is that they appear preferable when “there is a diversity of products with different characteristics that might be appropriate to support and it is unclear which might be superior.” [15] This is especially relevant given the complexity of the carbon removal portfolio. Based on factors such as urgency, efficacy, and relevance, we see Frontier’s AMC model as potentially playing a valuable role in the growth of a robust and durable carbon removal market. The innovation trajectory of renewable energy can serve as a helpful analog to carbon removal development and deployment. The success of solar PV, in particular, was due to a combination of important interventions. These interventions included continued R&D, procurement, and the creation of certainty for future markets [16] – all three of which are present in the Frontier theory of change. Monitoring, reporting, and verification In addition, a significant challenge for carbon removal is the lack of standards for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV). [17] To this end, Frontier has collaborated with CarbonPlan to create a framework for quantifying and mapping uncertainties in the context of carbon removal pathways represented in Frontier’s portfolio. Not only will this allow for better facilitation between buyers and sellers within the context of Frontier, but it will also serve as a model for the larger carbon removal market. Our take on Frontier’s theory of change Figure 3 represents our take on Frontier's theory of change: Figure 3: Frontier Theory of Change We have high certainty that Frontier will have a significant impact in supporting carbon removal R&D, increasing the amount of deployed carbon removal, enabling more technologies and sellers to enter the market, and providing longer-term certainty about the carbon removal market. This is because it gives directly to R&D projects, procures tons of removed carbon directly, enters into long-term purchase agreements with carbon removal sellers, and proactively supports the development of MRV frameworks. We have medium certainty that the projects supported by Frontier will continue to durably remove carbon in the future. Since Frontier supports early-stage companies through either R&D funding or low-volume purchase agreements, there is inherent risk in its strategy. [18] Not only is there uncertainty as to whether the companies will succeed as business entities, but there is also uncertainty as to whether certain technologies will work and effectively scale. Given the complexity of parameters that will determine the trajectory of carbon removal at large, we are uncertain as to when and if the carbon removal market will develop to the size and scale required to meet global climate goals. Consequently, we have low certainty regarding the magnitude of Frontier’s influence on the market’s evolution. 4 Additionality There are multiple layers of additionality: In terms of specific carbon removal projects, we have high confidence that projects chosen by Frontier remove carbon that would not otherwise have been removed, as this is one of the main criteria assessed in the selection process. [19] To ensure additionality in the context of a given carbon removal pathway, Frontier includes the question, “If this project is within a removal pathway that we have purchased from previously, what compelling, differentiated innovation does this project bring?” in its project evaluation process. [20] Regarding the carbon removal sector in general, Frontier constitutes one of the largest private investment commitments in carbon removal. According to a platform continuously monitoring the carbon removal sector , as of August 30, 2022, around $172 million has been spent on carbon removal; [21] Frontier’s first funding wave is around sixfold this amount. Given how substantial this investment is, we believe that the timely development and deployment of carbon removal technology would be less tractable in the absence of Frontier. Although Frontier plays an important role in the carbon removal ecosystem, there are other efforts to aggregate private sector investment for carbon removal. One example is First Movers Coalition , a global effort to unite companies to advance decarbonization of the industrial sector. Companies may choose to participate in various sectors, including aluminum, aviation, carbon removal (launched in May 2022), shipping, steel, and trucking. Companies participating in carbon removal must pledge to either contract for at least 50,000 tons of durable, scalable carbon removal or commit at least $25 million to carbon removal by 2030. [22] A second example is South Pole , an initiative to help companies plan and implement emissions reduction projects and strategies. One of the options for financing climate action is carbon removal through its Next Generation Carbon Removal Purchase Facility. This facility, developed in collaboration with Mitsubishi, aims to direct $300-800 million toward carbon removal by 2030. [23] Companies can currently make “forward commitments” to purchase carbon removal through this facility. While we think that both of the above examples may have the potential to generate significant impact, from the information we have gathered, the eligibility criteria seem too narrow to include most businesses. We find Frontier to be more widely accessible, especially given that any size contribution can be made toward the prepurchase track. In addition, we do not see these efforts as duplicative or as negatively impacting additionality; the combination of these still constitutes only a small portion of what is needed to sustain a gigaton-scale carbon removal market. [24] 5 Co-Benefits We acknowledge that co-benefits will vary across the different carbon removal projects selected by Frontier. However, we note that Frontier’s review process includes a governance review. The governance review includes considerations such as environmental justice, public engagement, and safety, legal, and regulatory compliance. [25] 6 Cost-Effectiveness We did not find it useful to develop a quantitative model for cost-effectiveness because we are highly uncertain regarding assumptions and estimates for parameters that we deem central to Frontier’s AMC model. In particular, given that we are providing this recommendation in the specific context of a business looking to make a catalytic investment toward carbon removal, we believe that Frontier is highly likely to be cost-effective as it provides the prospect of amplifying a contribution to carbon removal through both its acceleration and deployment potential; we find this to be a notable value-add considering that both timing and scale are critical for the deployment of carbon removal technologies. We devote the remainder of this section to expanding on this. Historically, the cost-effectiveness of AMCs has been difficult to determine. In the aforementioned case of the pneumococcal vaccine (PCV), while the vaccine itself was deemed cost-effective, the cost-effectiveness of the AMC is unclear given a lack of counterfactual. [26] However, retroactive comparison to other vaccines, such as those for the rotavirus, suggests that significant acceleration of distribution might be attributable to the AMC; see Figure 4: Figure 4: Comparison of country coverage of PCV and rotavirus vaccine, from Kremer et al. 2020 . One of the major barriers to scaling durable carbon removal is cost; accelerated deployment is expected to result in a more rapid price decrease and, thus, a bigger and stronger market sooner. [27] Figure 5: Solar PV vs DAC learning ranges, from Lackner et al. 2021 . In a paper using the learning rates of solar photovoltaic (PV) to project a potential learning rate for modular direct air capture (DAC), a specific carbon removal technology, it was determined that “if DAC follows a path similar to that of comparable, successful technologies, a capital investment of several hundred million dollars could buy down the cost of DAC.” [28] In the context of this paper, this amount corresponds to about 1.5 megatons (million tons) of DAC deployment. As demonstrated by the above figure, even if the cost of DAC seems high, it is still closer to the relative price target than solar PV was early in its innovation cycle. More conservative analyses that use slower learning rates – rates closer to what have been observed empirically for DAC – estimate that deployment of 9 megatons of DAC by 2030 is needed to enable substantial learning by doing and cost reduction. [29] Given that Frontier intends to invest toward longer-term impact over choosing the lowest cost solutions available, it is unclear exactly how many tons the fund will directly purchase. However, even under the worst-case scenario of prices stagnating at the current average across the current Frontier portfolio, ~$1200, the first round of funding could result in about 770,000 tons of carbon removal. We have high confidence that through the addition of subsequent funding rounds and the highly probable decrease in price across carbon removal pathways, Frontier will catalyze enough investment to facilitate deployment capacity on the order of millions of tons. Although this investment will be spread across carbon removal pathways, we project the dynamics across the portfolio to be similar to that of DAC. (For reference, here is an example of our cost-effectiveness analysis model in the context of DAC.) We think that this magnitude of deployment is likely to contribute substantially to the growth of the carbon removal market in the next decade. 7 Room for more funding To the best of our knowledge, Frontier, through its first funding wave, has committed to one of the largest purchases into the carbon removal market to date. However, it remains orders of magnitude away from the trillions of dollars [30] needed to achieve and sustain gigaton-scale deployment by midcentury. Frontier is currently accepting contributions for its second wave of funding, demonstrating an intention and ability to absorb more money effectively. The impact of additional funds will manifest more immediately (~3 years) through prepurchases, as well as through the signaling effect of additional buyers entering the space. [31] In the longer term (~4-8 years), the impact will largely be made through offtake agreements. Hence, we expect Frontier to continue to be an effective pathway toward building a carbon removal market. 8 Key uncertainties/open questions AMCs are temporary strategies; Frontier’s plans for phasing out have not yet been shared. Given that some of the barriers to scaling carbon removal may require more than private sector intervention, [32] it is unclear whether Frontier, under current market and policy conditions, will be able to elicit a substantial supply-side response. It is unclear whether or not the carbon removal companies supported by Frontier, especially those receiving contributions through prepurchases, will successfully scale or survive in the longer term. We are uncertain that the investment from Frontier will result in a sufficient reduction in cost and scaling of deployment to substantially contribute to climate change mitigation. 9 Conclusion Setting net-zero and, eventually, net-negative goals are important, but we do not believe that they are achievable in the necessary timeline given the current state of technology, infrastructure, systems, and policies in place today. Therefore, we think that supporting the change and advancement to make these goals possible is among the most effective ways to contribute directly to robust climate action and, when possible, should be favored over ton-ton accounting; catalytic investment in emerging yet valuable technologies like carbon removal is one such way to contribute. Frontier’s AMC model provides an accessible, anticipatory investment toward enabling future net-zero pledges by supporting the growth and development of a carbon removal market. How to contribute to Frontier If your business can commit at least $500,000 per year from 2023-2030, consider becoming a Frontier member. This includes offtake agreements and a variety of other benefits depending on your contribution amount. The $500,000/year cutoff is not a sharp cutoff, but indicative of the amount that Frontier expects from its members. Companies that want to purchase offtakes at lower amounts should contact Frontier to understand the possibilities. For more details, see Frontier’s information for potential buyers . If your business has less than $500,000 per year to commit to carbon removal, consider contributing to Frontier through the prepurchase track. Contributions to this track can be made directly through the Frontier website . Note: Contributions to Frontier can be made through the 501(c)(3) arm by contacting Hannah Bebbington, hannah [at] frontierclimate [dot] com. We thank Hannah Bebbington, Strategy Lead at Stripe Climate + Frontier, for a series of conversations that informed this document. Endnotes [1] Frontier began as a public benefit LLC owned by Stripe but has recently added a 501(c)(3) arm. [2] For more information, see “Frontier facilitates first carbon removal purchases.” https://frontierclimate.com/writing/spring-2022-purchases . June 29, 2022 [3] “It’s the point at which carbon removal services become affordable at the scale needed to make it a meaningful tool to reach net zero emissions.” https://www.protocol.com/bulletins/carbon-removal-cost-per-ton [4] CDR Application: Science Review Criteria 1-6, 8.. https://github.com/frontierclimate/carbon-removal-source-materials/blob/main/TEMPLATE%20Expert%20Review%20Forms/2022/Science%20Review%20Form.pdf [5] CDR Application: Governance Review Criteria 7, Questions 1-4 and Quantitative Assessment Question 5. https://github.com/frontierclimate/carbon-removal-source-materials/blob/main/TEMPLATE%20Expert%20Review%20Forms/2022/Governance%20Review%20Form.pdf [6] “All available studies require at least some kind of carbon dioxide removal to reach net zero; that is, there are no studies where absolute zero GHG or even CO2 emissions are reached by deep emissions reductions alone.” IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, Chapter 3 [7] “These difficult-to-decarbonize energy services include aviation…production of carbon-intensive structural materials such as steel and cement…To the extent that carbon remains involved in these services in the future, net-zero emissions will also entail active management of carbon.” Davis et al. 2018. [8] “While the world will need to reach net zero, those of us who can afford to move faster and go further should do so.“ https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoft-will-be-carbon-negative-by-2030/ [9] “I believe that it’s important for all the developed countries to talk about, not net zero, but about removing more carbon from the atmosphere than they are adding — net negative is what they need to talk about.” Minister Singh, IEA-COP26 Net Zero Summit [10] “The world will be net negative once removal exceeds emissions. If it takes us more than a decade or two to lower the level of CO2, we definitely will have overshot our targets and will need to maintain net negative emissions for decades into the future. Therefore, time is of the essence.” https://www.forbes.com/sites/feliciajackson/2021/08/30/net-zero-is-no-longer-enough--its-time-for-net-negative-policy-coherence-and-robust-esg/?sh=73c495c06a34 [11] “There is an extremely limited supply of reliable, permanent carbon removal available, and what exists is extremely expensive.” Stanford Social Innovation Review. Racing to Net-Zero: A Captivating but Distant Ambition (2022) [12] As of August 30, 2022, see cdr.fyi for live updates. [13] “The market for durable carbon removal does not exist. Yet. What we have is a heterogenous space consisting of hundreds of companies with ideas on how to remove carbon.“ https://roberthoglund.medium.com/the-carbon-removal-market-doesnt-exist-3e28b9ed14cc [14] “Three vaccines have been developed and more than 150 million children immunized, saving an estimated 700,000 lives.” Kremer et al 2020 [15] “there is a diversity of products with different characteristics that might be appropriate to support and it is unclear which might be superior.” Vivid Economics. Advance Market Commitments for low-carbon development: an economic assessment (2010) [16] “There is nothing inevitable about the rapid development and wide- spread adoption of low-carbon technologies. Rather, intentional policy and pur- posive investment will be needed and sustained over many years.” Nemet, G. F. (2019). How solar energy became cheap: A model for low-carbon innovation. Routledge [17] “... a more systematic approach to CDR MRV will be needed in the years ahead to track the performance of different CDR approaches and maintain high-quality standards as the market grows.” https://carbonplan.org/research/cdr-verification-explainer [18] See Table 7. Survival of private sector establishments by opening year. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/bdm/us_age_naics_00_table7.txt [19] Criteria 6, Questions 14, 15. https://github.com/frontierclimate/carbon-removal-source-materials/blob/main/TEMPLATE%20Expert%20Review%20Forms/2022/Science%20Review%20Form.pdf [20] Holistic Question 18. https://github.com/frontierclimate/carbon-removal-source-materials/blob/main/TEMPLATE%20Expert%20Review%20Forms/2022/Science%20Review%20Form.pdf [21] Note that this includes carbon removal pathways outside of Frontier’s portfolio. [22] “Members may choose to contract for at least 50,000 tons of durable and scalable net carbon dioxide removal removals to be achieved by the end of 2030, or as an alternative may choose to contract for at least $25 million of durable and scalable net carbon dioxide removal removals to be achieved by the end of 2030.” https://www.weforum.org/first-movers-coalition/sectors [23] “South Pole today announced the development of the Next Generation Carbon Removal Purchase Facility together with Mitsubishi Corporation. The facility aims to procure at least US$300-800 million worth of certified carbon removal credits by 2030.” https://www.southpole.com/news/south-pole-announces-development-of-new-facility-to-scale-up-the-next-generation-of-carbon-removals-together-with-mitsubishi-corporation [24] “Cumulative global DAC demand is estimated to be ~3 Gt, reflecting a cumulative global market value of $3 – 4T…The U.S. market for DAC projects is expected to be substantial, with ~1.9 Gt/yr capacity reached by 2050 and a domestic market through 2050 of ~$1T, calculated as value of sales of carbon credits and CO2 for utilization.” https://thirdway.imgix.net/pdfs/override/Potential-for-US-Competitiveness-in-Emerging-Clean-Technologies.pdf [25] Criteria 7, Question 1-4. https://github.com/frontierclimate/carbon-removal-source-materials/blob/main/TEMPLATE%20Expert%20Review%20Forms/2022/Governance%20Review%20Form.pdf [26] “Evidence on the cost effectiveness of PCV does not prove the cost effectiveness of the overall AMC because we lack a valid counterfactual.” Kremer et al 2020 [27] “Currently, the primary limiting factor to DAC is its high cost, which will decrease as it is deployed.” https://www.breakthroughenergy.org/us-policy-overview/carbon-removal/technological-solutions [28] Lackner, Klaus S., and Habib Azarabadi. "Buying down the cost of direct air capture." Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research 60.22 (2021): 8196-8208 [29] “We estimate that at least nine million tons of DAC capacity need to be operational in 2030 to get the US on track for meeting mid-century carbon removal requirements.“ Rhodium Group. Capturing Leadership: Policies for the US To Advance Direct Air Capture Technology. (2019) [30] “The carbon-removal market will probably need to reach $1 trillion a year, Ransohoff told me, a figure that places it well outside any company’s reach.” https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2022/04/big-tech-investment-carbon-removal/629545/ [31] “The more we can do to stack demand through Frontier, the better it’s going to be for the ecosystem...We need to bring in those other buyers so that we can accelerate.” https://fortune.com/2022/09/19/these-tech-companies-are-accelerating-permanent-carbon-removal-to-save-the-planet/ [32] “Second, stakeholder perspectives also converged around the view that public sector support is the most important factor for scaling up long-duration CDR.” https://carbonplan.org/research/cdr-scale-barriers

Our research on Industrious Labs' work to decarbonize heavy industry, and why we think it is a top nonprofit fighting climate change in 2024. Industrious Labs: Deep Dive // BACK Download the report: Industrious Labs 2024 .pdf Download PDF • 1.48MB This report was updated in November 2024. The original version of this report was published in November 2022. Unless otherwise cited, information in this deep dive comes from direct correspondence with Industrious Labs. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) provided for educational purposes. Support for Industrious Labs’ charitable climate advocacy runs through a Single Entity Fund of Tides Foundation, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. Summary What is Industrious Labs? Industrious Labs is an environmental organization launched in 2022 that aims to build advocacy networks to decarbonize heavy and light industry. What does Industrious Labs do? Industrious Labs is the only US-based organization singularly focused on industrial decarbonization advocacy. It works with partners from across the field (community, advocacy, politics, industry, etc.) to identify the unique narratives and levers that will move individual industrial sectors towards full decarbonization. Industrious Labs’ strategy has four pillars: (1) campaigns, (2) data and analytics, (3) field building, and (4) strategic communications, all of which work in collaboration to build evidence-based, sustainable advocacy efforts to decarbonize heavy and light industry. How could Industrious Labs help address climate change? Industrious Labs expects its activities to cause more heavy industry producers to switch to low-carbon production more quickly than they otherwise would have, resulting in earlier reductions in industrial emissions. It also focuses on activating the field of individuals and communities living on the frontlines of heavy industry to participate in creating a greener, sustainable future. What’s new at Industrious Labs in 2024? Industrious Labs has continued to grow its North-America-focused campaigns targeting landfill emissions, steel, and aluminum. It has also recently launched a global cement campaign and a state-based industrial heat campaign. What is Industrious Labs’ cost-effectiveness? In 2022, we developed a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to estimate the costs and impacts of Industrious Labs’ aluminum campaign to secure corporate commitments to switch to low-carbon procurement and production. This CEA included highly subjective guess parameters and was intended as a rough plausibility check. Overall, we estimate that Industrious Labs is highly cost-effective. We have low confidence in this CEA but generally view it as a positive input to our overall assessment of Industrious Labs. We did not update this CEA in 2024. Is there room for more funding? We think Industrious Labs can productively absorb additional funding, which could increase its growth trajectory over the next few years. In the longer term, we think Industrious Labs is likely to have strong fundraising success, which may limit its future room for more funding. Are there major co-benefits or potential risks? We think the co-benefits and potential risks of Industrious Labs’ efforts are similar to those for the broader effort to decarbonize heavy industry : it may reduce local pollution and have unclear employment effects as global industries respond to decarbonization. Key uncertainties and open questions: In addition to our broader uncertainties around decarbonizing heavy industry (e.g., geographic focus), we are uncertain about Industrious Labs’ industry-specific effectiveness, US focus, techno-feasibility assessments, and future room for more funding. Bottom line / next steps: We classify Industrious Labs as one of our top recommendations to address climate change, and we believe donations to Industrious Labs could increase its organizational growth trajectory. We plan to continue to assess our key uncertainties and believe that we will be able to substantially improve our understanding of these uncertainties as Industrious Labs continues executing its strategies in 2025.

Carbon Dioxide Removal // BACK Last updated in October 2024. Download the report: Carbon Dioxide Removal .pdf Download PDF • 7.11MB Executive summary What is carbon dioxide removal ? Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is an umbrella term used to describe a suite of interventions that have the potential to pull carbon dioxide (CO2) directly from the atmosphere and store it for varying lengths of time within other carbon pools, such as rocks, soils, trees, oceans, and manmade materials. How is CDR contextualized within climate strategies? CDR targets CO2 already in the atmosphere without addressing the sources of emissions. While it is not a substitute for emissions reductions, it is widely viewed as a critical part of the larger carbon management portfolio needed to reach midcentury net-zero targets, potentially address temperature overshoot, and rebalance atmospheric concentrations of CO2. What are the potential co-benefits and risks of scaling CDR? CDR deployment could potentially have ecological, social, and economic co-benefits. Associated risks include moral hazard; co-option by extractive industries; fraud and failure; energy, land, and resource demands; and negative ecological impacts. What are the major challenges to scaling CDR? Major challenges to scaling CDR include knowledge and technology gaps; land, energy, and resource constraints; lack of a social license to operate; high cost; and limited demand. What strategies are nonprofits developing to address these challenges? Nonprofits are employing a broad range of strategies to address the challenges facing scaling CDR. We think that strategies to increase demand through innovative policies could be effective: It may be highly feasible to scale CDR demand through a broad portfolio of different policy vehicles, globally and at every level of government, into which CDR demand can be embedded. A portfolio approach may also unlock contexts in which economic and ecological co-benefits are more directly valued. Is there room for more philanthropic funding? Given the broad consensus that policy will generate longer-term demand for CDR, the nascency of policy efforts critical to achieving the requisite scale to meet climate goals, and the important role that nonprofits play in influencing these policies, we think it is important to grow philanthropic support for CDR. Key uncertainties : Key uncertainties include the size of CDR demand from companies choosing to purchase CDR, the feasibility of large-scale government procurement, and the magnitude of potential CDR demand creation from innovative policy approaches. Bottom line / next steps : In 2024, the Giving Green Fund is planning to award a series of ecosystem grants aligned with a strategy of supporting foundational work to unlock innovative policy for CDR demand. Sub-strategies of focus include (i) supporting policy innovation to embed CDR into alternative policy frameworks across sectors; (ii) developing standards to match the needs and opportunities of a broad and diverse array of policy vehicles; and (iii) enabling community-driven projects and subnational policies as testbeds for novel contexts, applications, policies, and markets.

How did we identify our top nonprofits for climate giving in 2022? Read the research on climate mitigation behind our giving guide. Climate giving strategies About our approach We start our research for top climate nonprofits by performing a broad sweep of potential climate solutions across geographies, technologies, and sectors. This process allows us to identify solution areas that might be particularly promising, overlooked and/or underfunded. We then longlist and shortlist organizations that operate in prioritized solution areas. For shortlisted organizations, we conduct deep dives to thoroughly examine each organization by mapping out its theory of change to test whether it’s likely to hold, build cost-effectiveness models, assess room for more funding, consider any co-benefits and adverse effects, and make a final recommendation decision. Our Top Nonprofits can be found here . The following research reports capture our findings during every stage of this process. We share all research reports publicly to encourage dialogue, and we value your feedback. Our research on climate giving strategies Our approach Up Giving Green's Research Process READ Our Research Dashboard READ How and why we think about systems change READ Agriculture & land use Up Food System Emissions READ Food System Emissions: Other Grantees READ Restoring and Protecting Wetlands READ The Good Food Institute: Deep Dive READ Cutting Short-Lived Climate Pollutants READ The Good Food Institute: Recommendation READ Forestry READ Policy: US Up How We Determined Our 2021 Research Priorities READ Activism: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis READ Clean Air Task Force: Deep Dive READ Giving Green's Approach to Policy Change READ Insider Policy Advocacy: Overview READ Evergreen Collaborative: Deep Dive READ Activism: Overview READ State Legislative Advocacy READ Clean Air Task Force: Recommendation READ Policy: International Up Coming soon! READ Energy Transition Up Geothermal Energy READ Nuclear Power READ Nuclear Power: Other Grantees READ Project InnerSpace: Deep Dive READ Clean Air Task Force: Deep Dive READ Energy Transition in LMICs READ Project InnerSpace: Recommendation READ Clean Air Task Force: Recommendation READ Energy Transition in LMICs: Grantees READ Heavy Industry Up Decarbonizing Heavy Industry READ Future Cleantech Architects: Recommendation READ Industrious Labs: Deep Dive READ Future Cleantech Architects: Deep Dive READ Industrious Labs: Recommendation READ Heavy Industry: Other Grantees READ Shipping & Aviation Up Decarbonizing Transportation READ Clean Air Task Force: Deep Dive READ Opportunity Green: Deep Dive READ Clean Air Task Force: Recommendation READ Opportunity Green: Recommendation READ Climate Interventions Up Carbon Dioxide Removal READ SRM: Grantees READ CDR: Grantees READ Solar Radiation Management READ The above research represents our current areas of focus. Our older research can be accessed here .

We perform rigorous research and recommend highly effective climate initiatives, so you can give with confidence. About Giving Green We make high-impact climate giving easier, for everyone. OUR VALUES OUR TEAM ADVISORS FUNDERS What can I do about climate change? We had the same question. So we created Giving Green. Giving Green is a guide for individuals and businesses to make more effective climate giving decisions. We perform rigorous research and recommend highly effective climate initiatives, so you can give with confidence. Giving Green is incubated at IDinsight , a global advisory, data analytics, and research organization that uses data and evidence to improve lives worldwide. We are also inspired by the principles of effective altruism , which seek to find ways of doing good that actually work. We bring IDinsight’s deep expertise and effective altruism’s research rigor to everything we do. Our work is funded by generous climate donors like you who believe in high-impact climate action and evidence-based climate giving advice. We receive no funding from and have no formal relationship with any of the organizations we study or recommend. If you share our mission, please consider donating to Giving Green directly . We also provide consulting services to individuals and organizations that want to give more effectively to fight climate change. Learn more about how we create bespoke climate giving recommendations here . OUR VALUES Vaues To guide our search for effective climate projects, we strive to uphold four values. These are our commitments to teammates, supporters, and the planet. 1. Truth-seeking We ask challenging questions and perform rigorous research, guided by evidence and reason. 2. Humility We value different perspectives and acknowledge our own limitations. 3. Transparency We share research and deliberations publicly to encourage dialogue. 4. Collaboration We foster catalytic partnerships to amplify climate actions and maximize impact. Our Team OUR TEAM Dr. Dan Stein Dan Stein is Giving Green's founder and executive director, and the Chief Economist at IDinsight. Dan is passionate about using evidence-based approaches to fight the cli mate crisis. Prior to IDinsight, Dan worked as an Economist at the World Bank, where he launched a program of impact evaluations in energy and environment. Dan holds a PhD in Economics from the London School of Economics, and a BA in Physics and Political Economy from UC Berkeley. Emily Thai Emily Thai is Giving Green's Chief of Staff. Prior to joining Giving Green, Emily worked at the University of Chicago’s Center for RISC, managing behavioral science consultancies for social impact, and at Rhapsody Venture Partners, investing in sustainable technology. Emily holds bachelor’s degrees in Materials Science and Engineering and Women’s and Gender Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Enzia Schnyder Enzia Schnyder is a Research Associate at Giving Green. Prior to joining Giving Green, Enzia worked in research at the International Renewable Energy Agency, the UK Department for Environmental and Rural Affairs and an alternative protein start-up. She holds an MEng in Engineering Science from the University of Oxford and a Postgraduate Diploma from the University of Nottingham, where she studied the use of microbes to produce alternative proteins made from carbon dioxide. Jack Rafferty Jack Rafferty is the Manager of Climate Giving for Giving Green Australia. Prior to joining Giving Green, Jack was the Co-founder and Director of Lead Exposure Elimination Project, a policy focused international NGO that is working to end childhood lead poisoning worldwide. Jack holds bachelor’s degrees in Environmental Science and Philosophy from the University of Sydney. Jackie Ciraldo Jackie Ciraldo is Giving Green’s Growth Officer. Prior to Giving Green, Jackie worked at Elle Communications and DEY. Ideas + Influence where she drove a wide range of impact-driven communications strategies for influential individuals, nonprofits, philanthropies, advocacy campaigns, businesses, and brands spanning environmental justice, climate solutions, impact investing, global health, worker rights and protections, democracy, and more. Before shifting gears to more mission-driven communications, Jackie got her start in travel and hospitality public relations at Hawkins International, and spent time as an educator, teaching English in Thailand and then elementary Zoom school during the height of the pandemic. Jackie holds a bachelor’s degree in Public Relations with International Studies and Sociology minors from The Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Kimberly Huynh Kimberly Huynh is Giving Green's Associate Director of Research. Prior to joining Giving Green, Kimberly worked as a Content Editor and Summer Research Analyst at GiveWell and conducted environmental fieldwork in Canada, New Zealand, Chile, and the United States. Her PhD in Civil & Environmental Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley focused on estimating methane emissions from wetlands. She earned both a M.S. in Mechanical Engineering & a B.S. in Environmental Engineering from Northwestern University. Dr. Lucia Simonelli Lucia is a Senior Researcher for Giving Green. Prior to joining Giving Green, Lucia was a Senior Policy Fellow at Carbon180 where she specialized in federal policy for direct air capture (DAC) and other carbon removal pathways. She also served as a AAAS Science & Technology Policy Fellow in the Office of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, working on climate initiatives and learning about the legislative process. Before pivoting to policy, Lucia was a postdoc in mathematics at the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Trieste, Italy. Lucia holds a BSc in mathematics from the University of Texas and PhD in mathematics from the University of Maryland. Sunnie Huang Sunnie Huang is Giving Green's Growth Officer. She began her career as a journalist, first at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Toronto, then at The Economist in London. After moving to the nonprofit sector, she worked with Generation Pledge to grow the community of ultra-high-net-wealth inheritors who want to do good with their resources. Sunnie holds degrees in journalism and environmental economics. She is passionate about helping impact-oriented organizations grow. ADVISORS Dan Plechaty Dan Plechaty is a Strategist at ClimateWorks. As part of the Global Intelligence team, he provides actionable insights to climate grantmakers through emissions modeling and scenario analyses, coordinates projects on action, accountability and progress tracking, and explores new topics that intersect with existing programmatic grantmaking areas. Dr. Jae Pasari Jae Pasari is the Program Manager for Climate Action at Preston-Werner Ventures. He leads research to identify high leverage climate investment opportunities in non-profit, political, and business spheres. Michelle Levinson Michelle Levinson is a Manager in eMobility at the World Resources Institute. She has over a decade of experience working on US climate policy and electricity markets. Dr. Neil Buddy Shah Neil Buddy Shah is the CEO of the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) and previously the Managing Director of GiveWell. Buddy has a decade-plus track record of taking cutting-edge ideas from academia and industry and applying them to the needs of the social sector. Shu Dar Yao Shu Dar Yao is the Founder of Lucid Capitalism, an advisory firm that educates and guides VC and PE funds and their portfolio companies on ESG issues, including climate change and social inequality. Her career has spanned finance and nonprofit ecosystems; she led the Investment Committee at RSF Social Finance and previously has worked at Social Finance, Citigroup's Inclusive Finance, the World Bank Group's IFC, and JPMorgan. Funders FUNDERS

Read Giving Green's research on activism's role in addressing climate change. Activism: Overview // BACK This report was last updated in December 2021. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. What are the key techniques used by activists? When is activism effective in influencing policy? What does the academic literature on activism suggest is important to effective work? In this document, we address these questions and present our overall evaluation of the use of activism to influence US national climate policy. This review of the literature forms the basis of our work reviewing and recommending activist organizations. Read the full report below, or download here: 2021-12 Activism Overview .pdf Download PDF Activism: Giving Green's approach What is activism? Activism seeks to influence political outcomes by mobilizing citizens who are not political insiders to take actions that generate widespread or well-targeted public attention around specific issues or demands, usually through generating media coverage of events like protests, confrontations, or strikes. [1] Activism often seeks to generate a feedback loop where initial actions and attention draw greater participation, which leads to further activity and attention. Some activism is led by organized groups with complex strategies, while other activism emerges when ordinary people collectively protest a grievance and spark waves of action. Activism can play an important role in accomplishing the following objectives: Shifting public attention towards specific issues and disseminating a specific strategic framing to shape how the public understands and makes sense of an issue, leading to public opinion shifts that may change individual behavior. Targeting politicians, judges, or bureaucrats currently in power to change their opinion or behavior. As some of these individuals are accountable to public opinion to some degree, this is often strongly related to point (1) above. Changing the political fortunes of those in power, to generate support for alternative candidates or fend off challengers during the electoral process. These three aims are distinct but share a common goal, which is to change political outcomes (often legislation passed). This is usually achieved by shifting public opinion such that politicians responsive to public opinion must act differently in order to maintain electoral support. In addition, public opinion shifts can have broader impacts on society by changing how individuals and organizations behave, though our focus in this document is on activism for policy change. In addition, activism can shift the way companies and other organizations behave. While this is an important outcome of activism, we focus in this document on the outcomes of activism on US policy change. Giving Green's approach to activism To better understand how activism works, we analyzed the activity of activist organizations working on climate policy through a series of shallow dive reports. This allowed us to begin to inductively build a theory of change that describes how activism works (in theory and in practice) to affect policy outcomes in the climate space. Then, we completed a systematic literature review analyzing climate activism and the evidence on the effectiveness of the specific activities we catalogued in the first stage of our research. This allowed us to further refine our general theory of change for activism and to critically examine key assumptions linking each part of the theory together. While any one activism organization has a unique theory of change resulting in a unique approach to work, the theory of change in Figure 1 captures a broad overview of common threads running through most activist work, which we identified through reviewing both academic literature and the behavior of actual activist organizations. Note that we focus on research dealing with activist organizations in the United States, though we draw on some related work in other countries. Activism's theory of change The theory of change we developed is organized into 5 distinct stages, each of which corresponds either to inputs, outputs, or outcomes. We follow the broad formula of inputs + outputs = actions, which expresses the overall structure of the theory of change. The three final stages of the five are all outcomes, which occur one after another according to the arrows depicted in Figure 1 . The first stage of the theory of change is campaign building . This stage includes the starting points for all of the movement’s activities, including the creation of an organizational structure that allows room for the movement to grow while remaining coordinated, its strategic framing (and related content and branding) to shape public understanding of an issue, its internal policy consensus, and its alliance with powerful champions across the climate advocacy, political, and activist communities through coalition building. The second stage of the theory of change is directed action . This stage includes each of the key tactics employed on the ground like protests, participation in climate strikes, endorsement of political candidates, and participation in endorsed candidates’ campaigns. Many of these activities provide an opportunity for media content creation, by external media sources or, especially in recent times, media-savvy members of activist groups who record, package, and frame key events organized by the movement for social media dissemination. Each of these activities lays the groundwork for preliminary outcomes that eventually lead to policy change. The third stage of the theory of change is initial changes . Each of these changes in public opinion, the electoral prospects of politicians, and issue prioritization are preconditions for further policy change. In order to generate commitment by candidates and issue prioritization by politicians generally, media coverage of activist’s activities must draw public attention to candidates and activists’ stance on climate issues, mobilize larger numbers of the public to join the organization or otherwise pressure politicians to take action on climate change, and shift public opinion such that politicians perceive that their continued electoral success (including in primaries) is in part dependent upon their stances and actions around climate change legislation. The fourth stage of the theory of change is legislative change , the enactment of legislation to take action on climate change and reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Due to increasing pressure and the presence of politicians sympathetic to the activists’ aims of more aggressive and concerted legislative action around climate change, climate change has become a policy priority for the government. As a result, climate change legislation is enacted that would not have been enacted otherwise. The fifth and final stage of the theory of change is reduced greenhouse gases in the atmosphere . This is the final and most important outcome which an activist movement must cause in order for it to make a difference to the trajectory of climate change. Figure 1: Climate Activism – Theory of Change Below, we detail the assumptions and evidence available for each of the elements of the theory of change above. Assessing the Activism Theory of Change 1. Organization Building The social movement literature is composed of differing schools of thought on best practices for aspiring social movements and activist organizations. Roughly, we found that modern social movement theory can be divided into two camps: those that favor structure, and those that favor more informal organizations. We find it likely that both types of activist organizations have a role to play in the ecosystem of climate action, and we discuss both in this section. Importantly, their efficacy likely varies based on the political realities at any given time. A movement must not only organize itself well, but also take advantage of a favorable “political opportunity structure” that creates an opening for social change to occur, e.g. the fragmenting of elites or destabilization of the status quo (Piven and Cloward 1995; McAdam 2017; Caniglia et al 2015). Structured activist organizations Those that favor more structured organizations tend to fall into the camp of “resource mobilization theory,” which stipulates that an organization’s ability to create change is dependent on the resources it is able to access. Resources may be moral (legitimacy, solidarity); cultural (knowledge, know-how, magazines); human (labor, expertise, leadership); material (money, property, equipment); social-organizational (networks, organizations) (Edwards and Gillham, 2013). This creates several implications for effective social movements, e.g. that movements are more likely to develop and grow among existing socially integrated networks, and that hierarchically organized groups are more likely to succeed in challenging elite antagonists (Piven and Cloward, 1995). Resource-oriented organizations roughly correspond to the Alinskyite community organizing tradition, based on the work of Saul Alinsky; these tactics focus on building long-lasting structure through accumulating small yet radical wins. Notable Alinskyites include Cesar Chavez and Barack Obama (Engler and Engler, 2016). What makes such an organization successful? A common theme that emerges in the literature on policy-focused activism is a need to achieve internal policy consensus and have clear organizational and leadership structures. These signal to politicians the existence of a well-organized public interest group that they cannot easily counteract. Some recent literature on social movements and protest movements in the age of social media critiques an overall low level of organizational structure and coherence in such movements (Tufekci, 2017). This literature identifies the signaling importance of social and protest movements: in the past, organizing a large-scale protest or other collective action event required a significant amount of organizational centralization and commitment. Because of this, collective action may have derived much of its power through signaling effects: a protest served as a signal of a broader non-state organizational structure that could pose a meaningful electoral threat and not easily dissolve into disagreement and infighting. Because of the relative ease of organizing mass events today through social media mobilization, contemporary social movements have been hypothesized to lack effectiveness relative to historical movements due to their tendency to involve large numbers of people without a parallel organizational structure to ensure consensus and organized tactics (Tufekci, 2017). This suggests contemporary social movements that achieve success need to have a high degree of consensus and organization and clear leadership to achieve the same effect as historical movements. Informal mass movements Critics of resource mobilization theory argue that these highly structured and bureaucratic organizations with roots in longstanding social networks have their limits. At an individual level, people with many ties to the existing social order may be more constrained in their participation in movements, which may explain why students and young people are disproportionately represented in movements such as the 1960s civil rights movement (Piven and Cloward, 1995). At an organizational level, groups that depend on established social structures, e.g. for funding or legitimacy, are unlikely to meaningfully challenge those structures (McAdam, 2017). Indeed, some critics point to the failure of the institutionalized climate movement to enact meaningful federal policy despite an “impressive array of social movement organizations” (Caniglia et al, 2015), complex coalitions, and numerous Congressional testimonies (Brulle, 2014). This suggests that, while structured movements can be effective at winning short-term marginal victories, “informal” movements outside of dominant institutions may be more effective at creating larger shifts in political discourse and broader systemic changes. Such informal movements need “free spaces” to develop “truly oppositional” campaigns against the status quo (McAdam, 2017). Piven and Cloward (1995) argue that “lower-stratum” protestors—people without traditional political influence or access to the resources that enable the formation of a structured movement—can exert influence and mobilize outside support by disrupting “the workings of an institution on which important groups depend”. Such disruptions often arise from moments of mass grievance that must be effectively harnessed by existing mobilizing infrastructures. Examples of movements seen as more closely aligned to this tradition include Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, and some flanks of the feminist and civil rights movements of the 1960s. 2: Framing Framing processes are the ways in which activists (and other organizations) create collective understanding of a given issue based on their messaging and activities (Wasow, 2020; Goffman, 1974; Gitlin, 1980; Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993). The links between social movements and climate change knowledge have not been closely examined, though Jamison (2010) contends that the main positions in public discourse around climate change and climate science are shaped by social movements. We have thus far not found specific literature on effective framing processes for climate change activists, so we turn here to more general research on public opinion and the factors that influence individuals’ climate beliefs. Public opinion on climate change Addressing climate and environmental issues consistently polls favorably among Americans. However, as discussed in the previous section, several authors contended as recently as 2017 that an effective climate movement did not exist in the US. As recently as 2012, survey data in Western countries including the US indicated that the long-term increase in scientific confidence in climate change was not linked to any long-term increase in public concern (Ratter et al, 2012). Because of the scientific nature of climate phenomena, a lack of easy attribution of events in lived experience to climate change, a perception that climate change effects other countries more than the United States, and a concerted effort by fossil-fuel interests to tie climate change opinion to polarized American politico-cultural identities, climate change is an issue area that commands relatively little public attention and is also subject to high degrees of motivated and self-confirmatory reasoning (Egan & Mullin, 2017; Weber & Stern, 2011). This may be exacerbated by incentive structures in politics and the media that reward overemphasis on “extreme” scientific results from either end of the political spectrum (Schenuit et al, 2019). Further, climate change public opinion in the United States is typically believed to be elite-directed and determined by the dynamics of institutional polarization, rather than influenced by mass movements (Brulle et al. 2012; Stokes & Warshaw, 2017). Indeed, climate change has been found to be salient to extreme conservatives, who oppose governmental climate action as part of their core belief system, but not any other segment of the American public (McCright & Dunlap 2011 and Kahan 2015, in McAdam 2017). Thus, while many support climate action, few will take to the streets in favor of it. Factors that influence public opinion and individual beliefs We found that the literature on effectively framing climate change was inconclusive, with many studies of individual messages but few overarching patterns. Further, studies that examine specific messages on specific audiences in controlled settings may not generalize to real-world activism. Studies have found positive effects of framings that: Emphasize the potential for climate change to impact one’s own community and home (Spence et al., 2012), which is especially effective for independents and Republicans (Wiest et al., 2015); Emphasize gains from climate change action and de-emphasize climate change losses (Spence & Pidgeon, 2010); Emphasize air pollution and energy independence implications of climate policy, particularly towards Republicans (Feldman & Sol Hart, 2018); Emphasize job creation (Stokes & Warshaw, 2017); Focus on the negatives to be addressed (e.g. stop dirty energy) rather than the positives (e.g. promote clean energy) (Michelson and DeMora, 2021). Conversely, An emphasis on increased energy cost has negative effects on framing (Stokes & Warshaw, 2017); Multiple studies find “a strong relationship between economic fluctuation and concern for climate change,” with e.g. the Great Recession causing decreases in support for climate action (McAdam, 2017). Research has suggested that linking extreme weather events to climate change may be an effective framing (Egan & Mullin, 2017). Empirical evidence of the effects of extreme weather on climate beliefs is mixed (Demski et al, 2017). The effects of extreme weather on climate beliefs may depend on a variety of factors. For instance, different studies have found that long-term temperature changes affect climate beliefs, but recent temperature extremes do not (Hughes et al, 2020); and that cold temperatures and snowfall can decrease belief in climate change, whereas high temperatures and drought increase it (Borick and Rabe, 2017). Notably, motivated reasoning may result in people interpreting the weather in a way that confirms preexisting views. A person’s perception of the extreme weather event may influence or be correlated with climate beliefs (Howe, 2021; Dai et al, 2015), but it is unclear whether preexisting beliefs are merely causing them to perceive weather events in a way that confirms those beliefs (Borick and Rabe, 2017). How should climate-focused activist organizations frame climate issues? Overall, the evidence discussed above suggests emphasizing gains from climate action and links to one’s immediate experience. For instance, McAdam (2017) suggests mobilizing an identity-based group (e.g. young people, or coastal dwellers); organizing directly in communities affected by extreme weather in order to promote knowledge of its links to climate change; utilizing anger and hope against a common enemy; and choosing a campaign that allows for small victories. However, the literature is inconclusive on this front, and effective messaging is likely to depend on the target audience and broader political climate. 3: Coalition-building Coalition-building is a feature of most activist organizations, who frequently partner and collaborate with other peer organizations as well as insider policy advocates and value-aligned politicians themselves. We found little evidence to suggest specifically how a climate organization should go about building a coalition, which is likely highly context-dependent. Importantly, public opinion and attention to climate change is highly responsive to elite partisan cues (Brulle et al., 2012; Stokes & Warshaw, 2017). For this reason, coalitions with sympathetic politicians may play an important role in amplifying and framing an issue. Politicians are highly accessible to the media and receive large amounts of coverage and attention, which filters to the public and plays a role in determining public opinion and discourse on the topic. On the other hand, of course, allying with a politician from one side of the political spectrum risks alienating members of the public on the other side. 4: Political endorsement and campaign involvement Climate activist organizations often become involved in the political process through issuing endorsements, supporting campaigns through direct voter contact campaigns to persuade and mobilize supporters, and pressuring candidates on climate issues. Political endorsements Overall, political endorsements are likely effective, particularly in settings such as primary races where voters and politicians share similar ideologies. A 2014 poll found that 60 percent of Democratic Party voters reported attaching importance to endorsements in determining which candidates to support. Voter contact The evidence of campaigns’ efforts on candidate choices is mixed, with one meta-analysis yielding an average effect of zero (Kalla & Broockman, 2018). However, efforts to mobilize existing supporters, rather than persuade undecided ones, may be more effective; recent studies suggest a positive effect on voter turnout of non-partisan get-out-the-vote efforts (Ohme et al, 2020; Peixoto et al, 2020; Green and Gerber, 2019), though this finding is by no means universal (Scott et al, 2021). We believe that such activities, when properly tailored to the race and political climate, may have a modest effect. Pressuring candidates on climate issues A number of activist organizations pressure candidates and politicians to refuse donations from fossil-fuel linked interests. The evidence on whether such donations influence political behavior is mixed. Until recently, much of the literature on campaign contributions and political donations found little evidence of systematic benefits accruing to corporations who make political donations when looking at roll call voting patterns, but more recent studies have called this into question (Powell, 2013). Kalla and Broockman (2016) find that politicians make themselves available for meetings with individuals said to be donors between 3-4 times more often than others. Overall, it is difficult to determine the effect of donations on political behavior, especially since many studies focus on single politicians and issue areas. Thus, we conclude there is modest evidence that pushing candidates to refuse campaign donations from fossil fuel interests could affect the candidate’s political behavior once in office. Refusing contributions is also unlikely to disadvantage the candidate in an election: corporate donors overwhelmingly donate to incumbents in non-competitive races (Bonica, 2016), and there is little evidence that campaign spending has electoral implications for incumbents (Gerber, 2004). Fundraising may be more impactful in competitive races and for challenger candidates (Gerber, 2004). 5, 6, 7, 8, 9: Protest action, targeted action, media content creation, attention, shifts in public opinion and candidate perception Overall, research demonstrates that activism has in the past played a key role in shifting public opinion around contentious social issues, with important implications for politics and policy. Broadly, some evidence suggests protest and movement activities generally tend to lead to greater political prospects for politicians aligned with protester demands (Gillion & Soule, 2018. Existing literature suggests that the success of mobilization is highly dependent on the number of individuals mobilized (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Importantly, negative media coverage has been shown to have had a negative effect on popular support for social movement aims (Gillon & Soule, 2018); climate policy is often the target of such coverage. Case studies in the US The civil rights protests of the 1960s were highly successful at gaining media and thus public attention, shifting public opinion, electoral support, and policy (Mazumder, 2018; Wasow, 2020). Social movements played an important role in shifting discourse and awareness around marriage equality issues in the United States (Woodly, 2015). Even movements initially seen as a failure, such as Occupy Wall Street, may turn out to bear fruit by shifting discourse five or ten years later (Engler, 2016). On the other hand, protest movements have certainly been evaluated as failing in achieving their mission, such as the anti-Vietnam war movement (McAdam & Su, 2002). Overall, these prominent case studies and others demonstrate that large-scale policy shifts driven by social movement activities are possible, but highly context-dependent, making it difficult to predict whether a particular protest act or social movement will achieve success with any reasonable certainty. The chain from base-building to action to shifting public opinion is long. Implications for climate activism Turning to climate change specifically, some evidence suggests that large-scale protests like marches may change public intentions to participate in climate social movement activities further (Swim et al. 2019). Continued participation is key to reaching the critical mass of active protestors observed by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). Overall, such evidence is not conclusive. In summary, we find ample evidence that activist mobilization can succeed in generating media attention and shifting public opinion, but little evidence that there is one “best-practice” approach to achieving public opinion and policy shifts. This suggests that a key criterion for evaluating the likely effectiveness of a climate activist organization must be the organization's ability to adapt its tactics to shifting political conditions and public opinion. 10, 11, 12: Commitments by candidates and politicians, election of political allies, climate change becomes a policy priority We observe that many climate activist organizations seek to gain commitments by elected politicians or candidates to act in a particular way. This serves partially as a way to attract media attention, but it may also be useful in changing politicians’ policy priorities. Overall, we find evidence that politicians most often do follow through on promises and commitments made during campaigns. The academic literature on the subject suggests that most politicians keep promises and follow through on their campaign commitments most of the time. A review of the literature on the subject by Pétry & Collette (2009) finds that on average across studies in North America and Europe, politicians keep their promises about 67 percent of the time. However, the variance of the studies is significant (around 10 percent) and the overall quality of research reviewed is deemed fairly low. In an analysis of follow-through on environmental campaign promises in the 105th US Congress (1997-99), Ringquist & Dasse (2004) found a rate of 73 percent agreement between campaign promises and votes on legislative proposals. Sulkin (2009) finds additional evidence of this, particularly in the context of campaign promises in the US and political activity in the 106th to 108th US congress (1999-2005). Thompson et al. (2017) provide a further up-to-date verification of these overall findings. Ultimately, we conclude that politicians are more likely to follow through on their promises than not. 13, 14: Enactment of legislative commitments, reduced atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration Activists often advocate for politicians to adopt commitments, such as commitments to decarbonize the American economy by a particular date (most often 2030 or 2050). Overall, we find little evidence that such commitments, in the context of climate policy, represent likely follow-through. Some intermediate evidence suggests that climate commitments across countries have tended to lead to expected intermediate changes (Tolliver et al., 2020). Conclusion Our analysis of available research demonstrates that activism has in the past played a key causal role in shifting public opinion around contentious social issues, with implications for politics and policy, but that such shifts are far from assured. For every instance of successful activism, instances of unsuccessful activism abound. The success of activism is highly context-dependent, relying on the ability of activists to formulate winning strategies in the face of existing and constantly shifting political, media, and public opinion conditions. Because of the demonstrated successes of activism in causing massive political and policy change around contentious social issues in the past, we believe that activism is a highly promising activity for influencing policy, but that activist organizations must be assessed for quality and the coherence of their theory of change within the political context in which they work . In our shallow-dive and deep-dive documents, we apply the lessons gained from our theory of change exercise and literature review presented here to identify high-potential opportunities for funding climate activism efforts. Note: This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes. Works Cited Bergquist, P., Mildenberger, M., & Stokes, L. (2019). 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We provide overviews of common “sustainable investment” strategies, namely climate impact investing and ESG investing. ESG funds and climate impact investment research Why invest for the climate? Giving Green’s research is primarily focused on helping climate donors find effective nonprofits that fight climate change. Yet, philanthropic capital isn’t the only form of money individuals can use to reduce climate change. Investment capital–from retirement funds to venture capital–has an enormous role to play as well. Giving Green's research on climate-friendly investments provides overviews of common “sustainable investment” strategies, namely climate impact investing and ESG investing. Our research focuses on options available to retail investors (i.e. individual households and investors who are not accredited or high-net-wealth). At the moment, we do not have specific climate investment product recommendations, though our research documents describe climate investment strategies we find promising. With more funding, we can update this work to reflect the rapidly changing market. If you are interested in supporting this research workstream and making high-impact climate investment easier for everyone, get in touch here. For investors interested in concrete recommendations, we recommend checking out our friends at GreenPortfolio . While we have not vetted their process or their top recommendations, we share the same goal to help retail investors have the greatest possible impact with their money. Note: These articles are intended for research and information purposes only in order to review the potential positive climate impacts of available investment opportunities, not their financial performance, and therefore should not be construed as investment, financial, or other advice, or construed as a recommendation to buy, sell, or otherwise transact in any investment. We do not endorse any specific product that is referenced in these articles. These articles are not a replacement for personal financial advice and it is strongly recommended that you review your own personal financial situation and seek professional investment and/or financial advice before engaging in any investing. Reading these articles does not create a professional relationship and we are not in the business of providing investment or financial advice. The information provided in these articles is as accurate as possible, however errors may occasionally occur and we are not responsible for any errors. We expressly disclaim any liability or loss incurred by any person who acts on the information, ideas, or strategies discussed in this report. ESG funds & impact investments Our research Up Climate Impact Investing READ ESG Funds & Climate Impact READ